

Aune on Thought and Language

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In his recently published book, *Knowledge, Mind, and Nature*, subtitled *An Introduction to Theory of Knowledge and the Philosophy of Mind*,¹ Professor Bruce Aune has put forward a coherent set of views on a variety of epistemological and metaphysical problems, while placing these views in the context of past and present positions. For the most part his theses are carefully argued, and the discussion is almost invariably stimulating and often enlightening. The book has two main thrusts, epistemological and metaphysical, and Aune is at pains to forge links between the two. In the grand design of the book the epistemological concern is the more basic, though it receives relatively little space, far too little for the demands of the subject. The main epistemological theme is an attack on what is called the "foundations" picture of knowledge, and a proposal to replace it with a sort of "contextualism" (though Aune does not himself use this term). The opposition between these epistemological positions provides the basis for the metaphysical discussions that take up most of the book. Aune maintains that the metaphysical positions he attacks—e.g., phenomenism, direct realism, and behaviorism—result from consistently employing the foundations picture of knowledge in one or another form; while he represents the positions he espouses on mind and nature as arrived at from his preferred epistemological perspective.

I am wholly in sympathy with Aune's attack on "foundationalism", though he needs to do much more by way of setting out and defending his alternative to it, and I feel that his criticisms of phenomenism, behaviorism, direct realism, the "private language argument", and the Malcolmian position on "criteria", are acute and,

¹ New York: Random House, 1967.

for the most part, completely successful. At a number of points I have some reservations about his discussions, but rather than concentrate on jotts and tittles, I shall devote these pages to a consideration of Aune's discussion of the nature of thought in Chapter VIII, a discussion which is among the most original and stimulating, as well as the most controversial, parts of the book.

Aune's views on thinking, as well as his views on sensation, constitute a development of the "analogy" view, recently put forward by Wilfrid Sellars and P. T. Geach. According to this view "the notion of silent thinking . . . is . . . usefully regarded as an analogical development of the concept of saying . . . The utility of interpreting the concept of silent thought in this way is that it can then be understood as a thoroughly intersubjective one, even though it applies to publicly unobservable episodes." (182-3) The analogy in question is said to be a purely "formal" or "functional" one. That is,

To conceive of silent thinking in this way would be to regard it as involving a sequence of covert episodes, elements of which have the definitive property of being related to one another in the formal manner that elements of overt discourse are interrelated. By saying that elements of silent thought are *formally* analogous to the elements of a corresponding line of intelligent speech, I mean that while the pairs may differ materially or empirically even more radically than utterances of "It is raining" differ from utterances of "*Es regnet*", they nevertheless play analogous roles in, for instance, taking one from a given premise to a given conclusion. (184).

On this view our concepts of thoughts contain no specification of the intrinsic nature of the episodes involved, no commitment as to their being spiritual processes, a play of mental images, rearrangements of nuts and bolts, or whatever. Our concept of, e.g., the thought that Nixon has been elected, is the relatively unspecific concept of some unobservable episode or other that occupies a place in a network of logical relations, a place analogous to the place occupied by the overt statement that Nixon has just been elected in a network of logically related statements.

Before going further into the matter, let me say that I have a keen sense of the attractiveness of this approach to the problem and that I recognize Aune to have done a good job both of formulating the essential features of the position and of bringing out its ad-

vantages. I should like very much to see it work, though as the ensuing discussion will reveal I do not believe that Aune has made it work.

Aune clearly recognizes that, as so far stated,

. . . the Analogy Theory fails because it is basically circular, presupposing ideas it purports to analyze. In attempting to elucidate the notion of silent thinking by reference to overt assertion, it tacitly assumes that the latter could be adequately characterized without reference to silent mental activities. Yet this assumption can be seen to be false as soon as one focuses attention on the frame of mind appropriate to an assertion. As is clear from the argument of Chapter IV, such a frame of mind will always involve a readiness to make further utterances if the speaker is asked, *hears and thus understands*, certain questions that might be put to him in order to illuminate the actual claim that he has made. Also, if his assertion concerns the sensible qualities of a thing, such as its color, his frame of mind will normally involve a readiness to identify other instances of the qualities he is talking about. But to identify an object as having a certain color—to *see it as being* of this color rather than that—is not just to have a particular sense experience; it is to heed or notice something. This being so, it follows that we are to specify everything involved in using language to make assertions, we shall have to make some reference to silent mental activities—of taking certain noises to be questions of this or that sort, and of hearing, seeing, or feeling *that* such and such is so. Since the notion of an overt assertion necessarily involves a reference to such activities, it is clear that the analogy theorist's attempt to analyze the latter by reference to the former is inescapably circular. If we really had no conception of silent mental activities, we could not understand the explication the theory provides. (191-2)

He then proposes to remove the circularity by regarding the most basic concept of silent thought as derivative not from the rich concept of assertion we currently employ, but from a reduced “proto-concept” of assertion, which differs from the current concept in *not* presupposing any concept of unobservable mental activities. He then supposes that, starting from this base, one can, by a series of stages, build the richer concept of assertion we actually possess and

then on the basis of that our actual full-blown concept of silent thought.²

At this point we begin to run into heavy water, because, unfortunately, Aune has given us no unambiguous recipe for constructing proto-concepts, and, more especially, for constructing the crucial concept of proto-assertion. It is clear that the concept will have to meet the requirement specified in the previous paragraph, of being like the full-blooded concept of assertion except for not presupposing any silent mental activities; but it is not clear just what will be the positive feature of such a concept. At this point it will repay us to take a close look at the section in which Aune sets out his official explanation of "proto-concepts".

Let us suppose, then, that at a certain stage of our intellectual development our linguistic resources were such as to permit us to ascribe very complicated dispositions to our fellows but not to allow reference to any inner *mental* phenomena. With reference to such a linguistic framework, we can easily define less sophisticated counterparts to our familiar notions of seeing, trying, wanting, and the like. To proto-see X, for instance, would involve training your eye on it, having some kind of sensory experience, and then uttering, or gaining a short-term disposition to utter, the words "X is . . ." To proto-try to secure Y would involve uttering, or being disposed to utter, the words "I want Y", moving in Y's direction, groping at it, and so on. A proto-concept of asserting could then be given in a fairly natural way. To proto-assert that p would be to utter appropriate sounds in a certain frame of mind. This frame of mind would be characterized entirely by proto-terms: roughly, to follow up the one utterance with others of certain kinds, depending on what one proto-sees or proto-hears; to make movements of various sorts, depending on what one proto-senses, and so on.

(193)

It is clear that, on Aune's view, to assert that p and to proto-assert that p is to utter some appropriate sentence in a certain "frame of mind", the frame of mind consisting of certain dispositions. The difference is supposed to lie in the fact that for full-

² It is not clear to me that this programme could be carried out, even if we actually had a concept of proto-assertion with the required properties. However since, as I shall go on to argue, the concept of proto-assertion is fatally obscure, I shall not go on to discuss how one might use such a concept if he did possess it in satisfactory shape.

blooded assertions the dispositions that make up the frame of mind contain mental activities, episodes, or events in their antecedents and/or consequents; whereas with proto-assertions, the crucial dispositions will at most include proto-understandings, proto-hearings, etc. And it is supposed that these proto-mental occurrence concepts can be explicated without employing concepts of full-blooded mental occurrences or any other concepts, such as concepts of full-blooded assertions, into the explication of which full-blooded mental occurrence concepts have to enter.

The weak point in this construction is revealed as soon as we ask the question: what sort of linguistic actions is such that dispositions to perform the actions are involved in proto-concepts, including both proto-mental occurrence concepts, like proto-see and proto-understand, and proto-speech act concepts, like proto-assert. Remember that Aune has included linguistic dispositions in the relevant frame of mind in each case.

To proto-see X, for instance, would involve . . . uttering, or gaining a short-term disposition to utter, the words "X is. . ." (193)

To proto-try to secure Y would involve uttering, or being disposed to utter, the words "I want Y". . . (193)

To proto-assert that p would be to utter appropriate sounds in a certain frame of mind. This frame of mind would be characterized entirely in proto-terms: roughly, to follow up the one utterance with others of certain kinds, . . . (193)

The first two quotations explicitly assert, and in the light of that the third quotation strongly suggests, that the linguistic dispositions involved are dispositions to sentence-utterances, i.e., that the actualizations of the dispositions would be specified by specifying what I have elsewhere termed a "locutionary act",³ i.e., simply by specifying *what sentence* the person uttered. The passage certainly seems to single out linguistic dispositions of this rudimentary sort, not the richer sort, actualizations of which would involve performance of some particular "illocutionary act",⁴ such as asserting that p, requesting someone to do x, predicting that p, expressing annoyance at someone's doing x, etc. And yet this cannot be what Aune really

³ *Philosophy of Language* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964): 34-36.

⁴ See *loc. cit.*

intended. So much is plain from later discussions in which he attributes logical relations (194) and meaning and reference (195; 200) to proto-assertions, and makes it explicit that concepts of proto-assertion possess intentionality.⁵ Yet if the linguistic dispositions contained in proto-concepts were restricted to locutionary-act dispositions, a given proto-assertion would have no determinate meaning or reference. More exactly, in applying a given proto-assertion concept to a person, P, we would not be committing ourselves to any particular meaning or reference possessed by his utterance, or indeed implying that his utterance had any meaning or reference at all. If in saying of P that he proto-asserted that there is beer in the refrigerator, I am saying no more than that he uttered a certain sentence, and that he will utter certain other sentences, depending on what he proto-sees and proto-hears (e.g., that he will utter the sentence 'What a surprise!' if he opens the refrigerator and does not proto-see some beer there, and that he will utter the phrase 'in the refrigerator' if he proto-hears someone utter the sentence 'Where is the beer?'), I am not implying that his utterance meant anything in particular or had any particular content. For a person may be conditioned to produce certain sentences in response to certain other sentence-utterances, even though he has no idea of what any of them mean to refer to, and indeed even if none of them do mean or refer to anything. The fact that a person utters a sentence while disposed to utter certain other *sentences* under certain conditions is not sufficient to give his utterance any content.⁶

Thus we have no choice but to construe the above formulations as slips on Aune's part. But what is he going to put in place of "utter the words 'X is . . .' ", etc.? If he replaces these phrases with specifications of full-blooded assertions, or other illocutionary acts, then the detour via proto-concepts will have been futile. We embarked on

⁵ ". . . it should be noted that proto-assertion is intentional both in the sense of referring to something and in the sense of satisfying Chisholm's marks." (200)

Aune is well advised to insist that proto-assertions have meaning and reference, and hence intentionality. For without this they could hardly serve as models for even *proto*-thinkings, along the lines of the analogy theory. For, lacking any determinate import, they would not stand in logical relations with other utterances, and hence would lack the functional role that forms the crucial point of the analogy in this theory.

⁶ A proto-assertion construed in this stripped-down fashion is close to what Aune later calls the "extensional counterpart of proto-assertion". He is quite clear that this "extensional counterpart" must be enriched so as to give it meaning and reference before it can serve as a base for the construction of the concept of thinking. See below p. 177.

that detour just because the use of the full-blooded concept of assertion was seen to involve concepts of inner mental occurrences, and so to entangle the explication of the latter in a circle. But now if the proto-concepts themselves involve the concept of full-blooded assertion, and hence concepts of inner mental occurrences, we are no better off than before.

This being the case, the only thing Aune can insert in the crucial slots of his linguistic disposition specifications is "proto-assert that X is . . .", "proto-assert that he wants Y", and so on. If the crucial linguistic dispositions are dispositions to proto- illocutionary acts, all the above objections are evaded. But only at the price of leaving the concept of proto-assertion totally obscure. It will be remembered that we embarked on a scrutiny of the paragraph quoted on page 172 in order to get clear as to just what concept of a speech act is such that it is just like the concept of an assertion, except for not involving any concept of inner mental occurrences. In order to carry this through we had to arrive at an understanding of the frame of mind partly constitutive of such an act; and in order to understand the frame of mind we had to understand the dispositions of which it consists, among which linguistic dispositions play an important role. But now it appears that in order to grasp these dispositions we have to already understand what it is to perform a proto-assertion, and other proto- illocutionary acts. Thus we have made no progress. We still do not know what sort of speech act, if any, is just like an assertion, except that its concept involves no concepts of mental occurrences. We are in a circle that is worse than the one for the avoidance of which Aune introduced proto-concepts; worse because here the circle interferes not just with a philosophical explication of familiar terms of which we already have a working grasp, but rather interferes with the attempt to give us a basic working grasp of some new technical terms.⁷

However Aune does not end his discussion at this point, and his further moves, though not, of course, designed to remove an obscurity the author did not feel, do contain elements one might suppose to be usable for that purpose. What Aune actually does next is to consider a second objection to the Analogy Theory, this one directed equally against the revised version in terms of proto-concepts. The

⁷ Aune could, of course, get out of this dilemma if he could explicate proto-concepts in terms of non-linguistic behavioral dispositions solely. But he shows no inclination to think this possible, nor do I have any such inclination.

objection is that proto-concepts "essentially involve the idea of intentionality. And when this idea is carefully examined (the objection goes) it can be shown to presuppose the concept of thought." (194-5) More specifically, "language has intentionality (that is, reference) only because it is used to express thoughts." (195) Aune imagines the objector as further claiming that even if we explicate meaning and reference in terms of Wittgensteinian "forms of life", the objection will still remain, since the relevant forms of life cannot be characterized without employing intentional psychological concepts, such as purpose, need and interest.⁸ (195-6) Aune tries to meet this objection by envisaging an "extensional counterpart to proto-assertion", and then showing that one can add intentionality to this counterpart without any reference to inner mental occurrences. If Aune were successful in this endeavor he would not only have avoided this last charge of circularity; he would also have presented an intelligible concept of a proto-assertion, by constructing it from the bottom up, in contrast to the method we have already seen to be unsuccessful, of just indicating what is to be stripped away from the richer concept of assertion.

The project begins auspiciously enough, for the concept of the extensional counterpart, unlike the concept of proto-assertion itself, is reasonably clear. Here is the passage in which it is first introduced.

From an extensional point of view, what obviously happens in proto-assertion is that an agent emits certain noises while in a frame of mind (state of readiness) to emit certain other noises and perhaps to make certain physical movements, depending on what happens, occurs, or exists in his immediate sensory vicinity. Just what these further noises or movements would be

⁸ Aune does not seem to notice that this would land us into circularity only if the characterization of the forms of life required reference to inner mental *occurrences*, as well as to dispositional states like interests and purposes. Though he might well have argued that in explicating these psychological dispositions we inevitably use concepts of inner psychological occurrences; thus to want x is to be disposed to do y when one *notices* that doing y is likely to lead to x. Perhaps one reason for Aune's lack of care about the details of the circularity charge is that he is also worried about the intentionality of his proto-concepts because of the general requirement that the language of science be an extensional one. I cannot share Aune's sympathy for this demand (he does not give any reasons for his favorable attitude), but that disagreement does not lie along the main line of this paper.

I do, however, believe that the circularity charge has force. Indeed, as will be made explicit in the ensuing discussion, I feel that the charge cannot be met, for I see no way of explicating illocutionary-act concepts without employing concepts of mental occurrences.

in certain circumstances could be stated, of course, only by someone who knows the language the agent is speaking and is aware of the peculiar dispositions (the proto-interests) the agent has. But assuming that this knowledge is in hand, it would not, in principle, be impossible to construct a complex description that would represent, in entirely extensional terms, the full pattern of movements and noises that characterize the man's frame of mind and, consequently, the empirical features of his entire speech-act. (201-2)

It is fairly clear from this passage just what sorts of ingredients would go into a concept of an extensional counterpart to a proto-assertion (which we may term, for short, 'E-assertion', in contrast to 'P-assertion' (proto-assertion)). It is also clear that in applying an E-assertion concept to a person, P, we have not committed ourselves to *what* P said, what the meaning, reference, import, or content of his utterance is, or even that there is any; any more than we commit ourselves on these matters when we make explicit what sentence he uttered. Having said that P produced noises of a certain physical description, and that he had at the moment certain dispositions, physically described, is not to commit ourselves to any particular interpretation of his utterance. No matter what interpretation we consider, it will be possible for someone to make the noises and have those dispositions to make further physical movements under certain physical circumstances (he could be so conditioned) without his utterance being correctly interpreted in the specified way, and, indeed, without its having any correct interpretation at all.

Now how does Aune propose to transform the concept of an E-assertion into a concept that does carry implications as to the meaning and reference of the utterance, while avoiding any reference to inner mental occurrences. His fundamental idea is one that is quite familiar nowadays.

. . . mere correlations cannot possibly capture the meaning of a linguistic element.

To know what certain noises mean in a certain linguistic community, we must know how they *may* be related so as to form intelligible utterances, descriptions, and so forth. And what *may* be done—what is legitimate, permissible, or sanctionable—cannot be boiled down to what *is* done.

To know what proto-assertion is being made is to know, not just what is likely to follow upon its utterance (what noises,

what movements), but what *may* be inferred from it, what *must* be the case if it is true, reasonable, or appropriate. These "mays" and "musts" are essential to the notion of an assertion because a linguistic move of this sort is possible only in relation to a system of linguistic norms or rules. It is, after all, norms or rules that specify the defining characteristics of assertions: that they have implications, denials; that they are clear, confused, consistent, self-contradictory, tautologous, and the like. (204)

It is by virtue of its, and countless other assertions, being governed by a system of rules or norms, that a proto-assertion acquires a "function" or "linguistic role" which constitutes the crucial base for the analogy to silent thoughts on which the analogy theory depends.

Thus if Aune is correct in supposing that it is rule-governedness that is the source of meaning and reference, and if he is correct in his further claim that the appropriate sort of rule-governedness can be explained without bringing in concepts of inner mental occurrences, then he is home free. As to the first point, it is, of course, highly controversial, but since I am in whole-hearted agreement with Aune here, for reasons I have made explicit elsewhere,⁹ I shall not go into the matter in this paper. The second claim is, in my judgment, the vulnerable one.

Aune's argument is not altogether perspicuous at this point, but, as I read him, the basic claim is that what we have added to the concept of E-assertion to make it into P-assertion does not include any specification of inner mental occurrences, because it does not include any specifications of any matters of fact. It includes only normative statements. As far as their factual contents go the concepts of E-assertion and P-assertion are identical. There is nothing in the "empirical reality" of the P-assertion that is not in the corresponding E-assertion. A P-assertion *is* an E-assertion, viewed as falling under certain norms.

. . . to characterize an utterance, suitably produced, *as an assertion* is not to call attention to its empirical features—let alone describe it as springing from some arcane inner episode in connection with which such intentional objects as golden mountains "inexist". To characterize an utterance in this way is rather to subsume it under a network of essentially normative concepts. (204-5)

⁹ See, e.g., *Philosophy of Language*: 41-44.

More precisely, the explication of an attribution of a P-assertion concept to a person would contain no purely factual statements not contained in an explication of an attribution of a corresponding E-assertion concept to that person. What would be added to the latter to yield the former would be certain normative statements.

Now, of course, one could raise quibbles, and more than quibbles, about the sharp factual-normative distinction Aune is employing, without defending it or even precisely formulating it. However a more serious, and indeed a fatal, difficulty lies in the fact that the above position is based on a straight-out confusion between normative statements on the one hand, and, on the other hand, factual statements to the effect that certain norms hold in a certain social group or that a certain person recognizes them to hold, a confusion that is not the less reprehensible for being so widespread. In making explicit the rules that govern a certain word, sentence, or grammatical form in English, I am not, or at least need not be, making any normative statements at all. I am saying something about how things are in the English language community; and what I say is correct or incorrect by reference to "the state of affairs" there, just as is the case with any admitted "empirical" or "scientific" statement. No doubt the state(s) of affairs in question is a very complicated one; no doubt it is difficult to give an adequate account of its constitution; no doubt the correspondence between such a statement (when true) and the facts that make it true is itself a much more complicated matter than the sort of correspondence that obtains with simple observation statements like 'This pencil is yellow'. Nevertheless the same could be said for many admittedly factual statements in the sciences, and Aune certainly shows no inclination to deny a factual status to assertions on grounds such as these. In any event it is quite clear that in enumerating the rules that hold in a given language community I need not be making any normative statements myself, or if I do they may be contrary to those to which speakers of the language are committed. I may disapprove of the rules of the community, or be quite indifferent to them. It is to be feared that Aune has confused the act of making an assertion in a language, L_1 , which does require (at least practical) acceptance of the norms of the language community within which that assertion was made, with the meta-assertion that specifies the content of the first assertion (or the rules to which the sentence uttered is subject), which does not require acceptance of the norms of L_1 , provided it is made in some other language,

though it does, of course, in its turn require a practical acceptance of the rules of the language within which it was made.

It was perhaps a foreboding of such an objection as this that led Aune to make the otherwise puzzling claim that “from a strictly scientific point of view, nothing else need be involved in proto-assertion than what an extensional description of this sort would disclose”, even “the linguistic rules the speaker is following.” (202)

Consider the agent’s linguistic rules. From an extensional point of view, such rules can affect a man’s behavior in two logically distinct ways. Either his behavior is merely in accordance with them, as it would be if he were incapable of formulating them, or else it results from his conception of them, which means that he is able to formulate them and indeed “has them in mind” when he acts. The first alternative is obviously accommodated by the extensional description, since the entire range of the man’s rule-conforming is laid out in detail. The second alternative is also accommodated, though perhaps less obviously, because by hypothesis the man belongs to a community of proto-asserters, who do all their thinking out loud. If, then, he acts on a formulated rule, his formulation of the rule will consist in overt verbal behavior, the connection with his other behavior (his other utterances and movements) being included in the extensional description. (202)

But this is nothing to the point. What Aune has described in this passage is at most an “extensional counterpart” of rule-following, which is no more rule-following than E-assertion is assertion. Having enumerated all these noises that we *would* interpret as rule-formulations (but without saying so) and having enumerated responses to these noises that we *would* interpret as expressions of recognition that the rules do hold, we still have not *said* what rules are *as a matter of fact* taken to hold by members of the language community. Thus there are still matters of fact we must make explicit before we have explicated the notion of an utterance with content, and which are not made explicit in the purely extensional description.¹⁰

¹⁰ One should also note that in the above passage Aune has set out too restricted an array of alternatives. There can be a situation in which a man’s behavior is not merely in accordance with certain rules, in which he acts as he does, in part, *in order to* conform to, or violate, the rules, and hence in which his behavior does in a sense “result from his conception of the rules”, but where he is unable to formulate the rules. The brief account of rule-governedness

Thus we cannot spell out what it is for assertions, and other illocutionary acts, to be rule-governed by making normative statements. Then how can we do it? Aune might still be able to show that the spelling out, even if it involves factual statements, does not involve statements about inner mental occurrences. However since he does not feel called upon to address himself to this question, his discussions contain little in the way of suggestions. He does maintain, and rightly, that we can envisage a state of affairs in which the concepts of assertion and other illocutionary acts were restricted to overt actions, and hence that it must be possible to conceive of overt assertions as being rule-governed without yet being able to conceive of rule-governed inner mental acts. (209) But the question still remains as to how rule-governedness is to be analyzed, to whatever category of acts we imagine the rules to be applied.

In the absence of any competition from Aune I shall simply state my view that in order to explain what it is for rules to hold in a community we must bring in the notions of rule-sanctioning and rule-recognition. Roughly, to say, e.g., that a rule, forbidding actions of category A by persons of category P in circumstances of type C, holds in a certain society S, is to say that there is activity by members of S that is designed to maximize the probability of P's not doing A's in C's; in particular, that negative sanctions are applied to new members of S who, being P's, do A in a C; that when a member of S realizes that being a P he has done an A in C, he recognizes that he is rightly taken to task for it; and so on. (We should be most careful not to understand the rule-holding claim to imply that *every time* a member of S recognizes that a P has done A in C he applies negative sanctions, or that *every time* any thing else. The determinants of actual behavior are too complicated for formulations as simple as that).

It is to be noted that this explication involves, not indeed concepts of self-contained silent thinking, but concepts of inner unobservable mental occurrences, such as recognitions that something or other has taken place, recognitions that one is in a certain position, and so on. Thus if we explicate the notion of linguistic rule-governedness in this way, and if the latter is essential to the concept of proto-assertion, then Aune's programme of analyzing the concept of inner mental occurrences by an analogical extension from

offered below applies to situations in which the participants are unable to formulate the rules as well as to situations in which they have that ability.

the concept of proto-assertion is faced with just the kind of circularity he finds in the original form of the analogy theory.

I do not have time in this paper to argue that the above represents the only way of adequately explaining what it is for a rule to hold in a society, and even if I had the time I probably could not carry out a conclusive demonstration. Hence for the limited present purpose of examining Aune's views I shall just say the following. Until Aune has provided us with a viable alternative way of analyzing rule-governedness, one that does not invoke the notions of inner mental occurrences, he has not escaped from the circularity he himself has pointed out.

The deficiencies of Aune's account of the intentionality of language and thought infect his treatment of the mind-body problem, in Chapter IX, at one of the most crucial points of that discussion. Aune argues that intellectual activities, as ordinarily conceived cannot be identical with any purely physical activities, since our concept of the former, but not that of the latter, is partly normative.

If, to restrict ourselves initially to the strict sense of "mental", we ask for the relation between a man's mental and physical characteristics, the answer seems both obvious and unproblematic: they are simply *different* characteristics of the same unitary subject. The reason they are actually different is that one of them is a partly formal or normative characteristic, and *no* such characteristic can be identified with one that is purely naturalistic. (231)

The most that could be claimed by physicalism is that "the activity that, in a particular case, gives a conceptual move its concrete empirical character" (231) is a purely physical one, in other words that "man's purely extensional counterpart" (236) is a purely physical system. Now it is clear that the argument mounted above against Aune's treatment of intentionality strikes equally at *this* argument against the identical theory. As I have maintained above, in construing an overt or covert occurrence as an assertion or as a thought, we (the construers) are not committing ourselves to any norms or rules, but rather to the factual claim that the asserter or thinker recognizes the sway of certain norms or rules. Hence at best this objection of Aune's to the identity theory would have to be reconceived. It is not enough just to point out that a norm or rule is not itself something physical. What would have to be shown is that a person's *recognition* that certain norms or rules are in force

cannot be construed to be a purely physical matter. Following out the suggestions we made earlier as to the nature of rule-governedness, this "recognition" is to be thought of as consisting of certain complicated dispositions: to apply negative sanctions in certain circumstances to rule-violators, to see oneself as properly taken to task if one violates the rule, and so on. Whether such dispositions can be defensibly construed as physical states I do not know. In any event there are serious difficulties and obscurities in the identity theory not canvassed by Aune. But at least it is clear that, if the earlier criticisms of Aune's treatment of intentionality are sound, this argument of his against the identity theory has no force.