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DTHAT*

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Donnellan (1966) says, "Using a definite description referentially a speaker may say something true even though the description correctly applies to nothing" (p. 298). His example—taken from Linsky (1963)—has someone saying of a spinster:

Her husband is kind to her.

after having had Mr. Jones—actually the spinster's brother—misintroduced as the spinster's husband. And—to fill it out—having noticed Jones' solicitous attention to his sister. The speaker used the nondenoting description 'Her husband' to refer to Mr. Jones. And so, what he said was true.

There are a lot of entities associated with the utterance of 'Her husband is kind to her' which are commonly said to have been said: tokens, types, sentences, propositions, statements, etc. The something-true-said, Donnellan calls a *statement*.

On the other hand, "If. . . the speaker has just met the lady and, noticing her cheerfulness and radiant good health, made his remark from his conviction that these attributes are always the result of having good husbands, he would be using the definite description attributively" (p. 299).

After pointing out that "in general, whether or not a definite description is used referentially or attributively is a function of the speaker's intentions in a particular case," (p. 297) he mentions that according to Russell's theory of descriptions, the use of the \emptyset might be thought of as involving reference "in a very weak sense . . . to whatever is the one and only one \emptyset , if there is any such." (p. 303). Donnellan then concludes:

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Do not partake of this article before reading the Warning on page 242.

Now this is something we might well say about the attributive use of definite descriptions . . . But this lack of particularity is absent from the referential use of definite descriptions precisely because the description is here merely a device for getting one's audience to pick out or think of the thing to be spoken about, a device which may serve its function even if the description is incorrect. More importantly perhaps, in the referential use as opposed to the attributive, there is a right thing to be picked out by the audience, and its being the right thing is not simply a function of its fitting the description (p. 303).

Donnellan develops his theory by adducing a series of quite plausible examples to help him answer certain theoretical questions, e.g. Are there sentences in which the contained definite description can only be used referentially (or only attributively)?, Can reference fail when a definite description is used referentially?, etc.

In my own reading and rereading of Donnellan's article I always find it both fascinating and maddening. Fascinating, because the fundamental distinction so clearly reflects an accurate insight into language use, and maddening, because: First, the examples seem to me to alternate between at least two clearly discriminable concepts of *referential use*; second, the notion of *having someone in mind* is not analyzed but used; and third, the connections with the developed body of knowledge concerning intensional logics—their syntax and semantics—are not explicitly made, so we cannot immediately see what Donnellan and intensional logic have to offer each other, if anything.

As one of the body developers, I find this last snub especially inexcusable. This is not a divergent perception for those of my ilk. Hintikka remarks (plaintively?), "The only thing I miss in Donnellan's excellent paper is a clear realization that the distinction he is talking about is only operative in contexts governed by propositional attitudes or other modal terms" (1967:47).

Hintikka's remark is at first surprising, since none of Donnellan's examples seem to have this form. But the remark falls into place when we recognize that Donnellan is concerned essentially with a given speaker who is *asserting* something, *asking* something, or *commanding* something. And thus if we pull back and focus our attention on the sentence *describing* the speech act:

John asserted that Mary's husband is kind to her.

the intensional operator appears.

Probably Hintikka wanted to argue that the sentence:

Her husband is kind to her.

is not itself ambiguous in the way that, say:

Every boy kissed a girl.

is. The fact that an ambiguous sentence is produced by embedding \emptyset in some sentential context (for example, an intensional or temporal operator) should not be construed to indicate an ambiguity in \emptyset . For were it so, (almost?) all sentences would be ambiguous.

Donnellan's distinction is a contribution to the redevelopment of an old and common-sensical theory about language which—at least in the philosophical literature—has rather been in a decline during the ascendancy of semantics over epistemology of the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. The common-sense theory is one that Russell wrestled with in *Principles of Mathematics* (1903) but seemed to reject in "On Denoting" (1905). This theory asserts roughly that the correct analysis of a typical speech act, for example:

John is tall.

distinguishes *who* is being talked about, i.e. the individual under consideration—here, John—from *how* he is being characterized—here, as tall.

Russell's analysis of the proposition expressed by

John is tall.

provides it with two components: the property expressed by the predicate 'is tall', and the individual John. That's right, John himself, right there, trapped in a proposition.

During the Golden Age of Pure Semantics we were developing a nice homogeneous theory, with language, meanings, and entities of the world each properly segregated and related one to another in rather smooth and comfortable ways. This development probably came to its peak in Carnap's *Meaning and Necessity* (1947). Each *designator* has both an intension and an extension. Sentences have truth values as extensions and propositions as intensions, predicates have classes as extensions and properties as intensions, terms have individuals as extensions and *individual concepts* as intensions, and so on. The intension of a compound is a function of the intensions of the parts and similarly the extension (except when intensional operators appear). There is great beauty and power in this theory.

But there remained some nagging doubts: proper names, demonstratives, and quantification into intensional contexts.

Proper names may be a practical convenience in our mundane transactions, but they are a theoretician's nightmare. They are like bicycles. Everyone easily learns to ride, but no one can correctly explain how he does it. Completely new theories have been proposed within the last few years, in spite of the fact that the subject has received intense attention throughout this century, and in some portions of Tibet people have had proper names for even longer than that.

The main difficulty has to do, I believe, with the special intimate relationship between a proper name and its bearer. Russell said that in contrast with a common noun, like 'unicorn', a proper name *means* what it names. And if it names nothing, it means nothing. In the case of 'unicorn' we have a meaning, perhaps better a *descriptive meaning*, which we make use of in looking for such things. But in the case of the name 'Moravcsik' there is just Moravcsik. There is no basis on which to ask whether Moravcsik exists. Such a question is—for Russell—meaningless. But people persist in asking this question. Maybe not this very question, but analogous ones like:

Does Santa Claus exist?

There were other apparent difficulties in Russell's theory. The astronomical discovery that Hesperus was identical with Phosphorus became a triviality. The sentence expressing it expressed the same proposition as 'Hesperus is identical with Hesperus'. Furthermore, although the bearer of given proper name is the be-all and end-all of the name's semantic relata, almost every proper name has dozens of bearers.

And then there are the unforgivable distortions of the minimal descriptive content of proper names. We all know of butchers named 'Baker' and dogs named 'Sir Walter'. The ultimate in such perversity occurs in titles of the top administrative officers at UCLA. We have four vice-chancellors at UCLA, one of whom has the title 'The Vice-Chancellor'.

All in all, proper names are a mess and if it weren't for the problem of how to get the kids to come in for dinner, I'd be inclined to just junk them.

At any rate, the attempt during the Golden Age was to whip proper names into line. In fact into the line of common nouns. People do ask:

Does Santa Claus exist?

So that must mean something like:

Does a unicorn exist?

They do ask:

Is Hesperus identical to Phosphorus?

So that must mean something like:

Are bachelors identical with college graduates?

Thus was waged a war of attrition against proper names. Many were unmasked as disguised descriptions, e.g. 'Aristotle' means *the student of Plato and teacher of Alexander who . . .*—not an unreasonable proposal.

However, some of these exposés did seem a bit oppressive, e.g. Russell's suggestion that:

Scott is Sir Walter.

really means:

The person named 'Scott' is the person named 'Sir Walter'.

followed by his nonchalant remark: "This is a way in which names are frequently used in practice, and there will, as a rule, be nothing in the phraseology to show whether they are being used in this way or as names" (1920:174). But at least they isolated the few real troublemakers—who turned out not to be our good old proper names at all but a handful of determined outside demonstratives: 'this', 'that', etc.

In summary, the technique was first to expose a proper name as a disguised description (sometimes on tenuous and unreliable evidence) and then ruthlessly to eliminate it.

We thus reduce the exciting uncertainties of:

Socrates is a man.

to the banality of:

All men are mortal.

The demonstratives were still there, but they were so gross they could be ignored.

Lately, under the pressure of the new interest in singular propositions generated by intensional logic, the verities of the Golden Age are breaking down. Once logicians became interested in formalizing a logic of necessity, belief, knowledge, assertion, etc., traditional syntactical ways quickly led to formulas like

John asserted that x is a spy.

with free ' x ' and then with ' x ' bound to an anterior operator. Under what

circumstances does a given individual, taken as value of 'x', satisfy this formula? Answer: If the appropriate singular proposition was the content of John's assertive utterance.

It seems that in at least certain speech acts, what I am trying to express can't quite be put into words. It is that proposition of Russell's with John trapped in it.

The property of being tall is exactly expressed by 'is tall', and the concept of the unique spy who is shorter than all other spies is exactly expressed by 'the shortest spy'; but no expression exactly expresses John. An expression may express a concept or property that, in reality, only John satisfies. There are many such distinct concepts; none of which is John himself.

I would like to distinguish between the kind of propositions which were considered by Aristotle (*all S is P, some S is not P*, etc.) and the kind of proposition considered by the early Russell. I call the former *general propositions* and the latter *singular propositions*. Suppose, just for definiteness, that we fix attention on sentences of simple subject-predicate form. The following are examples:

- (1) A spy is suspicious.
- (2) Every spy is suspicious.
- (3) The spy is suspicious.
- (4) John is suspicious.

Now let us think of the proposition associated with each sentence as having two components. Corresponding to the predicate we have the property of being suspicious; and corresponding to the subject we have either what Russell in 1903 called a *denoting concept* or an individual. Let us take the proposition to be the ordered couple of these two components.

Again, to fix ideas, let us provide a possible-world style of interpretation for these notions. We think of each total or complete possible state of affairs as a possible world. The possible worlds are each continuants through time and may in fact overlap at certain times. For example, a possible world may agree with the actual world up to the time at which some individual made a particular decision; the possible world may then represent an outcome of a decision other than the one actually taken. (In science fiction, such cases are called *alternate time lines*.)

Within this framework we can attempt to represent a number of the semantic notions in question. We might represent the property of *being suspicious* by that function *P* which assigns to each possible world *w* and each time *t* the set of all those individuals of *w* which, in *w*, are suspicious at

t. We might represent the denoting concepts expressed by the denoting phrases 'A spy', 'Every spy', and 'The spy' as, say, the ordered couples: $\langle 'A', S \rangle$, $\langle 'Every', S \rangle$, $\langle 'The', S \rangle$ where *S* is the property (represented as above) of *being a spy*.¹ The fact that the logical words 'A', 'Every', and 'The' are just carried along reflects our treatment of them as *syn-categorematic*, i.e. as having no independent meaning but as indicators of how to combine the meaning-bearing parts (here 'spy' and the predicate) in determining the meaning of the whole. For (1), (2), and (3) the corresponding propositions are now represented by:

- (5) $\langle \langle 'A', S \rangle P \rangle$
- (6) $\langle \langle 'Every', S \rangle P \rangle$
- (7) $\langle \langle 'The', S \rangle P \rangle$

It should be clear that each of (5)–(7) will determine a function which assigns to each possible world *w* and time *t* a truth value. And in fact the truth value so assigned to any *w* and *t* will be exactly the truth value in *w* at *t* of the corresponding sentence. For example: (6) determines that function which assigns truth to a given *w* and *t* if and only if every member of *S(w,t)* is a member of *P(w,t)*. Notice that the function so determined by (6) also correctly assigns to each *w* and *t* the truth value in *w* at *t* of (2). (For the purpose of (7), let us take * to be a "truth value" which is assigned to *w* and *t* when *S(w,t)* contains other than a single member.)

The proposition corresponding to (4) would be:

- (8) $\langle \langle 'John', S \rangle P \rangle$

not $\langle \langle 'John', P \rangle$ mind you, but $\langle \langle 'John', P \rangle \rangle$. And (8) will determine that function *F* which assigns Truth to *w* and *t* if and only if John is a member of *P(w,t)*. If John is an individual of *w* at the time *t* (i.e. John exists in *w* and is alive at *t*) but is not a member of *P(w,t)*, then *F(w,t)* is falsehood; and if John is not an individual of *w* at the time *t*, then *F(w,t)* is *.

This brief excursion into possible world semantics is only to fix ideas in a simple way within that framework (I will later make further use of the framework) and is not put forward as an ideal (in any sense; generalizability, elegance, etc.) representation of the semantic notions of property, proposition, denoting concept, etc. My main motivation is to present a representation which will clearly distinguish singular and general propositions.

It would, of course, have been possible to supply a representation of the

¹ Both 'denoting concept' and 'denoting phrase' are Russell's terms used in Russell's way.

proposition expressed by (4) which is, in a sense, formally equivalent to (8) and which blurs the distinction I wish to emphasize. I do it now lest anyone think that the possibility is a relevant refutation of my later remarks. Let us clearly depart from Russell by associating a denoting concept:

$$(9) \quad \langle \text{'Proper Name'}, J \rangle$$

where J is what we might call *John's essence*, the property of *being John*, namely, that function which assigns to each possible world w and time t the set $\{\text{John}\}$ if John is an individual of w and is alive in w at t and the empty set otherwise. The analogue to (8) is now

$$(10) \quad \langle \langle \text{'Proper Name'}, J \rangle P \rangle$$

It will be noted that we have now treated the proper name 'John' rather like the definite description 'The John', in which the proper name plays the role of a common noun. Accordingly the function from possible worlds and times to truth values which is determined by (10) is identical with that determined by:

$$(11) \quad \langle \langle \text{'The'}, J \rangle P \rangle$$

There are certainly other representations of these propositions which ally various subgroups. In fact, once any formal structure is established, the production of isomorphic structures satisfying specified "internal" conditions is largely a matter of logical ingenuity of the "pure" kind.²

To return to the point, I have represented propositions in a way which emphasizes the singular-general distinction, because I want to revive a view of language alternate to that of the Golden Age. The view of the Golden Age is, I believe, undoubtedly correct for a large portion of language behavior, in particular, communication by means of general propositions. But the alternate view accounts for a portion of language behavior not accommodated by the view of the Golden Age.

The alternate view is: *that some or all of the denoting phrases used in an utterance should not be considered part of the content of what is said but should rather be thought of as contextual factors which help us to interpret the actual physical utterance as having a certain content*. The most typical of such contextual factors is the fact that the speaker's utterance is to be

² An example is the possibility of producing set theoretical representations of the system of natural numbers which make all even numbers alike in certain set theoretical features, (distinct from such numerical features as divisibility by two) and all odd numbers alike in other set theoretical features, or which provide simple and elegant definitions (i.e., representations) of certain basic numerical operations and relations such as *less than* or *plus*, etc.

taken as an utterance of some specific language, say, English. When I utter 'yes', which means *yes* in English and *no* in Knoh, you must know I am speaking Knoh to know I have said *no*. It is no *part* of what I have said that I am speaking Knoh, though Knoh being a complete tongue, I could add that by uttering 'I am speaking English'. Such an utterance is of doubtful utility in itself; but, fortunately, there are other means by which this fact can be ascertained by my auditor, e.g. by my general physical appearance, or, if I am not a native Knoh, by my pointing to Knoh on a celestial globe. A homelier example has a haberdasher utter to a banker, 'I am out of checks'. Whether the utterance takes place in the store or at the bank will help the banker to determine what the haberdasher has said. In either case it is no *part* of what was said that the haberdasher used 'checks' to mean bank checks rather than suits with a pattern of checks. Of course the haberdasher could go on, if he desired, to so comment on his past performance, but that would be to say something else. Still closer to home is my wife's utterance: 'It's up to you to punish Jordan for what happened today.' It is by means of various subtle contextual clues that I understand her to be charging me to administer discipline to our son and not to be calling on me to act where the United Nations has failed. Again, should I exhibit momentary confusion she might, by a comment, a gesture, or simply some more discourse on the relevant naughtiness, assist me in properly decoding her first utterance so that I could understand what she was, in fact, saying. There are other ways—more controversial than the intentional resolution of the reference of a proper name among the many persons so dubbed—in which contextual factors determine the content of an utterance containing a proper name; but I am reserving all but the most blatantly obvious remarks for later.

Now let us narrow our attention to utterances containing *singular denoting phrases* (i.e. denoting phrases which purport to stand for a unique individual, such as 'the spy', 'John', ' $\sqrt{2}$ ', etc.).³

How can contextual factors determine that part of the content of an utterance which corresponds to a singular denoting phrase? Two ways have already been mentioned: by determining what language is being spoken and by determining which of the many persons so dubbed a proper name stands for. But the most striking way in which such contextual factors enter is in

³ It is not too easy to single out such phrases without the help of some theory about logical form or some semantical theory. I suppose what I am after is what linguists call syntactical criteria. But I have had difficulty in finding one which will not let in phrases like 'a spy'. Another difficulty is connected with phrases like 'John's brother' which seem to vary in their uniqueness suppositions. "John's brother is the man in dark glasses" carries, for me, the supposition that John has just one brother; whereas "The man in dark glasses is John's brother" does not. In fact the latter seems the most natural formulation when suppositions about the number of John's brothers are completely absent, since both "The man in dark glasses is one of John's brothers" and "The man in dark glasses is a brother of John" suppose, for me, that John has more than one brother.

connection with *demonstratives*: 'this', 'this spy', 'that book', etc. In at least some typical uses of these phrases, it is required that the utterance be accompanied by a *demonstration*—paradigmatically, a pointing—which indicates the object for which the phrase stands.⁴ I will speak of a *demonstrative use* of a singular denoting phrase when the speaker intends that the object for which the phrase stands be designated by an associated demonstration.⁵

Now we can add another example of a subject-predicate sentence to those of (1)–(4):

(12) He [the speaker points at John] is suspicious.

I am adopting the convention of enclosing a description of the relevant demonstration in square brackets immediately following each denoting phrase which is used demonstratively.⁶

What shall we take as the proposition corresponding to (12) (which I also call the *content of the utterance* (12))? In line with our program of studying contextual factors which are not *part* of what is said but whose role is rather to help us interpret the utterance as *having* a certain content, we shall take the component of the proposition which corresponds to the demonstrative to be the individual demonstrated. Thus the varying *forms* which such a demonstration can take are not reflected in the content of the utterance (i.e. the proposition). The demonstration "gives us" the element of the proposition corresponding to the demonstrative. But *how* the demonstration gives that individual to us is here treated as irrelevant to the content of the utterance; just as the different *ways* by which I might have come to understand which Jordan was relevant to my wife's utterance, or the different *ways* by which one might come to understand that a speaker is speaking Knob rather than English, do not alter the content of those utterances. Thus, for example, the utterances (in English):

⁴ The question of whether all uses of demonstratives are accompanied by demonstrations depends on a number of factors, some empirical, some stipulative, and some in the twilight zone of theoretical ingenuity. The stipulative question is whether we use 'demonstrative' to describe certain phrases which might also be described by enumeration or some such syntactical device, e.g. all phrases beginning with either 'this' or 'that' and followed by a common noun phrase; or whether we use 'demonstrative' to describe a certain characteristic *use* of such phrases. In the latter case it may be stipulatively true that an utterance containing a demonstrative must be accompanied by a demonstration. In the former case, the question turns both on how people in fact speak and on how clever our theoretician is in producing *recherché* demonstrations to account for apparent counterexamples.

⁵ This formulation probably needs sharpening. Don't take it as a definition.

⁶ It should not be supposed that my practice indicates any confidence as to the nature and structure of what I call *demonstrations* or the proper form for a *demonstration-description* to take. Indeed, these are difficult and important questions which arise repeatedly in what follows.

(13) He [the speaker points at John, as John stands on the demonstration platform nude, clean shaven, and bathed in light] is suspicious.

(14) He [the speaker points at John, as John lurks in shadows wearing a trenchcoat, bearded, with his hat pulled down over his face] is suspicious.

are taken, along with other refinements of (12), as expressing the same proposition, namely:

(15) ⟨John, P⟩.

It should immediately be apparent that we are in store for some delightful anomalies. Erroneous beliefs may lead a speaker to put on a demonstration which does not demonstrate what he thinks it does, with the result that he will be under a misapprehension as to *what* he has said. Utterances of identity sentences containing one or more demonstratives may express necessary propositions, though neither the speaker nor his auditors are aware of it. In fact, we get extreme cases in which linguistic competence is simply insufficient to completely determine the content of what is said. Of course this was already established by the case of the Knob–English translation problem, but the situation is more dramatic using the demonstratives.

The present treatment is not inevitable. An alternative is to incorporate the demonstration in the proposition. We would argue as follows: Frege's (1892) *sense and denotation* distinction can be extended to all kinds of indicative devices. In each case we have the object indicated (the "denotation") and the manner of indication (the "sense"). It is interesting to note that (at least in Feigl's translation) Frege wrote of "the sense (connotation, meaning) of the sign in which is contained the *manner and context* of presentation of the denotation of the sign" (Frege 1892).⁷ I think it reasonable to interpret Frege as saying that the sense of a sign is what is grasped by the linguistically competent auditor, and it seems natural to generalize and say that it is the "sense" of the demonstration that is grasped by the competent auditor of utterances containing demonstratives. Thus we see how the drawn-out English utterance:

(16) That [the speaker points at Phosphorus in early morning] is the same planet as that [the speaker points at Hesperus in early evening].

could be both informative and true.

⁷ From "Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung" (emphasis added).

Let us call the preceding a *Fregean treatment of demonstratives*. It is worth developing (which means primarily working on the ontology (metaphysics?) of demonstrations and the semantics of demonstration descriptions) but, I believe, will ultimately be unsatisfactory. For now I'll just outline some of the reasons. The demonstrative use of demonstratives plays an important role in language learning, in general, in the learning and use of proper names, in our misty use of *de re* modalities, in our better grounded use of what Quine (1955) calls the *relational* senses of epistemic verbs (i.e. the senses of those intensional verbs that permit quantification in). And, in general, I believe that we can sharpen our epistemological insights in a number of areas by taking account of what I call the demonstrative use of expression. Such uses are far more widespread than one imagined.

I earlier called the Fregean treatment of demonstratives "unsatisfactory." I would be more cautious in saying that it was wrong. (Though I do think an empirical argument from linguistic behavior could be developed to show that it is wrong. I take Donnellan's study of the phenomenology of what he calls referential use to be an excellent start in that direction.) What I am confident of is that if we force all phenomena that suggest a special *demonstrative* use of language, along with what I regard as a corresponding feature—a special *singular* form of proposition—into the Fregean mold of linguistic elements with a sense and a denotation, the sense being the element which appears in the proposition (thus leaving us with only general propositions), then important insights will be lost. I don't deny that on a phenomenon-by-phenomenon basis we can (in some sense) keep stretching Frege's brilliant insights to cover. With a little ingenuity I think we *can* do that. But we shouldn't.

Now let me offer a slightly different and somewhat *a priori* justification for studying the phenomena of demonstrative uses of expressions and singular propositions. I leave aside the question of whether we have correctly analyzed any actual linguistic behavior, whether concerned with the so-called demonstrative *phrases* or otherwise.

Having explained so clearly and precisely what such a use of language would amount to, in terms of a possible-world semantics, I can simply resolve to so use the word 'that' in the future. At a minimum I could introduce the *new* word 'dthat' for the demonstrative use of 'that'. Couldn't I? I can, and I will. In fact, I do.

I like this intentional (i.e. stipulative) way of looking at the use of 'dthat' because I believe that in many cases where there are competing Fregean and demonstrative analyses of some utterances or class of utterances the matter can be resolved simply by the intentions of the speaker (appropriately conveyed to the auditor?). Thus in the case of proper names (to which I will return below) I might simply resolve to use them demonstratively (i.e. as demonstrating the individual whom they are a name of, in the nomenclature

of an earlier paper (Kaplan 1968)⁸, on certain occasions and in a Fregean way⁹ on other occasions. Of course one who did not have a clear understanding of the alternatives might have difficulty in characterizing his own use, but once we have explored each choice there is nothing to prevent us from choosing either, "unnatural" though the choice may be.

It should probably be noted that despite the accessibility of the semantics of 'dthat' our *grasp* of the singular propositions so expressed is, in John Perry's apt phrase, a bit of *knowledge by description* as compared with our rather more direct acquaintance with the general propositions expressed by nondemonstrative utterances.

Armed with 'dthat' we can now explore and possibly even extend the frontiers of demonstrations.

When we considered the Fregean analysis of demonstrations, we attempted to establish parallels between demonstrations and descriptions.¹⁰ Insofar as this aspect of the Fregean program is successful, it suggests the possibility of a demonstrative analysis of descriptions. *If pointing can be taken as a form of describing, then why not take describing as a form of pointing?* Note that our demonstrative analysis of demonstrations need not, indeed should not, deny or even ignore the fact that demonstrations have both a sense and a demonstratum. It is just that according to the demonstrative analysis the sense of the demonstration does not appear in the proposition. Instead the sense is used only to fix the demonstratum which itself appears directly in the proposition. I propose now to do the same for descriptions. Instead of taking the sense of the description as subject of the proposition, we use the sense only to fix the denotation which we then take directly as subject component of the proposition. I now take the utterance of the description as a demonstration and describe it with the usual quotation devices, thus:

(17) Dthat ['the spy'] is suspicious.

⁸ I will attempt below to press the case that this use of proper names, which involves no waving of hands or fixing of glance, may be assimilated to the more traditional forms of demonstrative use.

⁹ "In the case of genuinely proper names like 'Aristotle' opinions as regards their sense may diverge. As such may, e.g., be suggested: Plato's disciple and the teacher of Alexander the Great. Whoever accepts this sense will interpret the meaning of the statement 'Aristotle was born in Stagira' differently from one who interpreted the sense of 'Aristotle' as the Stagirite teacher of Alexander the Great" (from Feigl's translation of Frege's "Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung").

¹⁰ A third kind of indicative device is the picture. Consideration of pictures, which to me lie somewhere between pointing and describing, may help to drive home the parallels—in terms of the distinction between the object indicated and the manner of indication—between description, depiction, and demonstration.

For fixity of ideas, let us suppose, what is surely false, that in fact, actuality, and reality, there is one and only one spy, and John is he. We might express this so:

(18) 'the spy' denotes John.¹¹

In the light of (18), (17) expresses:

(19) ⟨John, P⟩

(also known as '(8)' and '(15)').

Recollecting and collecting we have:

(3) The spy is suspicious.

(4) John is suspicious.

(7) ⟨⟨'The', S⟩ P⟩

(12) He [the speaker points at John] is suspicious.

or, as we might now write (12):

(20) Dhe [the speaker points at John] is suspicious.¹²

Earlier we said that an utterance of (3) expresses (7), and only an utterance of (12) [i.e. (20)] or possibly (4) expresses (19). I have already suggested that an utterance of (4) may sometimes be taken in a Fregean way to express something like (7), and now I want to point out that for want of 'dthat' some speakers may be driven to utter (3) when they intend what is expressed by (17).

If an utterance of (3) may indeed sometimes express (19), then Donnellan was essentially correct in describing his referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions as a "duality of function." And it might even be correct to describe this duality as an *ambiguity* in the sentence type (3). I should note right here that my demonstrative use is not quite Donnellan's referential use—a deviation that I will expatiate on below—but it is close enough for present purposes.

¹¹ That all utterances are in English is a general and implicit assumption except where it is explicitly called into question.

¹² 'Dhe' is really a combination of the demonstrative with a common noun phrase. It stands for 'dthat male'. More on such combinations below.

The ambiguity in question here is of a rather special kind. For under no circumstances could the choice of disambiguation for an utterance of (3) affect the truth value. Still there are two distinct propositions involved, and even two distinct functions from possible worlds and times to truth values, determined by the two propositions.

Before continuing with the ambiguity in (3), it would be well to interject some remarks on sentence types and sentence tokens (of which utterances are one kind) especially as they relate to demonstratives.

Sentences types vary considerably in the degree to which they contain implicit and explicit references to features of the context of utterance. The references I have in mind here are those which affect the truth value of the sentence type on a particular occasion of utterance. At one extreme stand what Quine (in *Word and Object*) called *eternal sentences*: those in which the feature linguists call *tense* does not really reflect a perspective from some point in time, which contain no *indexicals* such as 'now', 'here', 'I', etc., and whose component names and definite descriptions are not understood to require contextual determination as did the 'Jordan' of our earlier example. Quine describes such sentences as "those whose truth value stays fixed through time and from speaker to speaker." (1960: 193) But I prefer my own vaguer formulation: *those sentences which do not express a perspective from within space-time*. Quine and I would both count 'In 1970 American women exceed American men in wealth' as eternal; he would (presumably) also count 'The UCLA football team always has, does, and will continue to outclass the Stanford football team' as eternal. I would not.

Truth values are awarded directly to eternal sentences without any relativization to time, place, etc.¹³ But for the fugitive sentence no stable truth value can be awarded. Let us consider first tensed sentences, e.g.:

(21) American men will come to exceed American women in intelligence.

Without disputing the facts, if (21) were true at one time, it would fail to be true at some later time. (Since one doesn't come to exceed what one already exceeds.)

Now let's dredge up the possible worlds. We associate with (21) a function which assigns to each possible world and time a truth value. Such a

¹³ There are, of course, two hidden relativizations involved even for eternal sentences. One is to a *language*, i.e. an association of meanings with words. The Knob—English example was meant to dramatize this relativization. The other is to a possible world. There is always the implicit reference to the actual world when we just use the expression 'true'. If the analogy between moments of time and possible world holds—as some philosophers think—then maybe we should begin our classification of sentences not with explicitly dated eternal sentences like 'in 1970 . . .' but with 'perfect' sentences like 'In the possible world Charlie in 1970 . . .'.

function seems to represent, for reasons which have been much discussed, at least part of the meaning of (21) or part of what we grasp when we understand (21).¹⁴ There is another kind of "content" associated with a fugitive sentence like (21), namely, the content of a particular utterance of (21). In a sense, any particular utterance (token) of a fugitive sentence (type) is an *eternalization* of the fugitive sentence. The relativization to time is fixed by the time of utterance. We can associate with each utterance of a fugitive sentence the same kind of function from possible worlds to truth values that we associate directly with eternal sentences.

Before becoming completely lost in a vague nomenclature, let me make some stipulations. I will call the function which assigns to a time and a possible world the truth value of a given fugitive sentence (type) at that time in that world the *meaning* of the given sentence. The meaning of a sentence is what a person who is linguistically competent grasps, it is common to all utterances of the sentence, and it is one of the components which goes into determining the *content* of any particular utterance of the sentence. The *content* of an utterance is that function which assigns to each possible world the truth value which the utterance would take if it were evaluated with respect to that world. There is some unfortunate slack in the preceding characterizations, which I will try to reduce.¹⁵

Let \emptyset be a fugitive sentence like (21); let $\bar{\emptyset}$ be the meaning of \emptyset , let W be the set of possible worlds; let T be the set of times (I assume that all possible worlds have the same temporal structure and, in fact, the very same times, i.e. a given time in one world has a unique counterpart in all others); let U be the set of possible utterances; for $u \in U$ let $S(u)$ be the sentence uttered in u ; let $T(u)$ be the time of u (when only $S(u)$ and $T(u)$ are relevant; we might identify u with $\langle S(u), T(u) \rangle$ and let u be the content of u . The relation between the meaning of a sentence (whose only fugitive aspect is its temporality) and the content of one of its possible utterances can now be concisely expressed as follows:

$$(22) \quad \Lambda u \in U \Lambda w \in W (\bar{u}(w) = \overline{S(u)} (T(u), w))$$

or, identifying u with $\langle S(u), T(u) \rangle$:

$$(23) \quad \Lambda w \in W \Lambda t \in T (\bar{\emptyset}, t)(w) = \bar{\emptyset}(t, w))$$

To put it another way, an utterance of \emptyset fixes a time, and the content of the

¹⁴ Rather than talking directly of these functions, I should really talk first of entities like $\langle \langle \text{'The'}, S \rangle P \rangle$ and only derivatively of the functions. I will do so in the next draft.

¹⁵ This is aside from the inadequacy mentioned in the previous footnote, which continues to bother me.

utterance takes account of the truth value of \emptyset in all possible worlds but *only at that time*.

From (22) and (23) it would appear that the notions of meaning and content are interdefinable. Therefore, since we already have begun developing the theory of meaning for fugitive sentences (see especially the work of Montague)¹⁶, why devote any special attention to the theory of content? Is it not simply a subtheory of a definitional extension of the theory of meaning? I think not. But the reasons go beyond simple examples like (21) and take us, hopefully, back to the main track of this paper. It is worth looking more deeply into the structure of utterances than a *simple* definition of that notion within the theory of meaning would suggest. (I stress *simple* because I have not yet really investigated sophisticated definitions.)

First we have problems about the counterfactual status of possible utterances. Are utterances *in* worlds, are they assumed to occur in worlds in which their content is being evaluated, or are they extraworldly, with their content evaluated independent of their occurrence? Consider the infamous 'I am here now', or perhaps more simply:

$$(24) \quad \text{An utterance is occurring.}$$

Is the meaning of (24) to assign to a time and world the truth value which an utterance of (24) *would take were* it to occur in that world at that time? Or does it assign simply the truth value of (24) in that world at that time? Presumably the latter. But this is to assume that utterances come complete, with the value of all of their contextually determined features filled in (otherwise the utterance alone—without being set in a world—would not have a content). I do not want to make this assumption since I am particularly interested in the *way* in which a demonstration, for example, picks out its demonstratum.

And now we are back to the ambiguity in (3). I would like to count my *verbal* demonstration, as in (17), as part of the sentence type. Then it seems that an utterance of such a sentence either must include a world, or else, what is more plausible, must be in a world. I guess what I want to say, what I should have said, is that an utterance has to occur *somewhere*, in some world, and the world in which it occurs is a crucial factor in determining what the content is. This really says something about how (I think) I want to treat (possible) demonstrations. I want the same (possible) demonstrations (e.g. ['the spy']) to determine different demonstrata in different worlds (or possibly even at different times in the same world). Now I see why I was so taken with the Fregean treatment of demonstrations. We should be able to

¹⁶ The most relevant works are "Pragmatics" (1968) and "Pragmatics and Intensional Logic" (1970), both reprinted in Montague 1974.

represent demonstrations as something like functions from worlds, times, etc., to demonstrata. Thus, just like the meaning of a definite description. The difference lies in how the content of a particular utterance is computed.

I realize that the foregoing is mildly inconsistent, but let us push on. Let u be an utterance of (17) in w at t , and let u' be an utterance of (3) in w at t . Let's not worry, for now, about the possibility of a clash of utterances. If we look at the content of u and the content of u' we will see that they differ—though they will always agree in w . The content of u is like what I earlier called a singular proposition (except that I should have fixed the time), whereas the content of u' is like what I earlier called a general proposition. For the content of u to assign truth to a given world w' , the individual who must be suspicious in w' at t is not the denotation of 'the spy' in w' at t , but rather the denotation of 'the spy' in w at t . The relevant individual is determined in the world in which the utterance takes place, and then that same individual is checked for suspicion in all other worlds, whereas for the content of u' , we determine a (possibly) new relevant individual in each world.¹⁷

What is especially interesting is that these two contents must agree in the world w , the world in which the utterance took place.

Now note that the verbal form of (3) might have been adopted by one who lacked 'dthat' to express what is expressed by (17). We seem to have here a kind of *de dicto - de re* ambiguity in the verbal form of (3) and without benefit of any intensional operator. No question of an utterer's intentions have been brought into play. There is no question of an analysis in terms of scope, since there is no operator. The two sentence types (3) and (17) are such that when uttered in the same context they have different contents but always the same truth value where uttered. Donnellan vindicated! (Contrary to my own earlier expectations.)

I am beginning to suspect that I bungled things even worse than I thought in talking about meanings, contents, etc. The meaning of a sentence type should probably be a function from utterances to *contents* rather than from something like utterances to truth values. If this correction were made, then we could properly say that (13) and (17) differ in meaning.

It would also give a more satisfactory analysis of a sentence type like:

(25) Dthat ['the morning star'] is identical with dthat ['the evening star'].

Although it expresses a true content on some possible occasions of use and a false content on others, it is not simply contingent, since on all possible

¹⁷ I am still bothered by the notion of an utterance at t in w , where there is no utterance at t in w .

occasions its content is either necessary or impossible. (I am assuming that distinct individuals don't merge.) Even one who grasped the meaning of (25) would not of course know its truth value simply on witnessing an utterance. Thus we answer the question of how an utterance of an identity sentence can be informative though *necessary*!

Another example on the question of necessity. Suppose I now utter:

(26) I am more than thirty-six years old.

What I have said is true. Is it necessary? This may be arguable. (*Could* I be younger than I am at this very same time?) But the fact that the sentence, if uttered at an earlier time or by another person, could express something false is certainly irrelevant. The point is: to simply look at the spectrum of *truth values* of different utterances of (25) and (26) and not at the spectrum of *contents* of different utterances of (25) and (26) is to miss something interesting and important.

I earlier said that my demonstrative use is not quite Donnellan's referential use, and I want now to return to that point. When a speaker uses an expression demonstratively he *usually* has in mind—so to speak—an intended demonstratum, and the demonstration is thus *teleological*. Donnellan and I disagree on how to bring the intended demonstratum into the picture. To put it crudely, Donnellan believes that for most purposes we should take the demonstratum to be the intended demonstratum. I believe that these are different notions that may well involve different objects.

From my point of view the situation is interesting precisely because we have a case here in which a person can fail to say what he intended to say, and the failure is not a linguistic error (such as using the wrong word) but a factual one. It seems to me that such a situation can arise only in the demonstrative mode.

Suppose that without turning and looking I point to the place on my wall which has long been occupied by a picture of Rudolf Carnap and I say:

(27) Dthat [I point as above] is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.

But unbeknownst to me, someone has replaced my picture of Carnap with one of Spiro Agnew. I think it would simply be wrong to argue an "ambiguity" in the demonstration, so great that it can be bent to my intended demonstratum. I have said of a picture of Spiro Agnew that it pictures one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. And my speech and demonstration suggest no other natural interpretation to the linguistically competent public observer.

Still, it would be perhaps equally wrong not to pursue the notion of the intended demonstratum. Let me give three reasons for that pursuit:

1. The notion is epistemologically interesting in itself.
2. It may well happen—as Donnellan has pointed out—that we succeed in communicating what we intended to say in spite of our failure to say it. (E.g. the mischievous fellow who switched pictures on me would understand full well what I was intending to say.)
3. There are situations where the demonstration is sufficiently ill-structured in itself so that we would regularly take account of the intended demonstratum as, *within limits*, a legitimate disambiguating or vagueness-removing device.

I have two kinds of examples for this third point. First, there are the cases of vague demonstrations by a casual wave of the hand. I suppose that ordinarily we would allow that a demonstration had been successful if the intended object were *roughly* where the speaker pointed. That is, we would not bring out surveying equipment to help determine the content of the speaker's assertion; much more relevant is what he intended to point at. Second, whenever I point at something, from the surveyor's point of view I point at many things. When I point at my son (and say 'I love dthat'), I may also be pointing at a book he is holding, his jacket, a button on his jacket, his skin, his heart, and his dog standing behind him—from the surveyor's point of view. My point is that if I intended to point at my son and it is true that I love him, then what I said is true. And the fact that I do not love his jacket does not make it equally false. There are, of course, limits to what can be accomplished by intentions (even the best of them). No matter how hard I intend Carnap's picture, in the earlier described case, I do not think it reasonable to call the content of my utterance true.

Another example where I would simply distinguish the content asserted and the content intended is in the use of 'I'.¹⁸ A person might utter:

(28) I am a general.

intending—that is “having in mind”—De Gaulle, and being under the delu-

¹⁸ 'I' is, of course, a demonstrative; as opposed, e.g. to 'the person who is uttering this utterance', which contains only the demonstrative 'this utterance'. Let us compare utterances of:

(i) I am exhausted.
 (ii) The person who is uttering this utterance
 is exhausted.

both uttered by *s* on the same occasion (!): To find the truth value of the content of (ii) in *w'* we must first locate the same utterance in *w'* (if it exists there at all) and see who, if anyone, is uttering it. Since *s* could well be exhausted silently in *w'*, the two contents are not the same.

sion that he himself was De Gaulle. But the linguistic constraints on the possible demonstrata of 'I' will not allow anyone other than De Gaulle to so demonstrate De Gaulle, no matter how hard they try.

All this familiarity with demonstratives has led me to believe that I was mistaken in “Quantifying In” in thinking that the most fundamental cases of what I might now describe as a person having a propositional attitude (believing, asserting, etc.) toward a singular proposition required that the person be *en rapport* with the subject of the proposition. It is now clear that I can assert of the first child to be born in the twenty-first century that *he* will be bald, simply by assertively uttering,

(29) Dthat ['the first child to be born in the twenty-first century']
 will be bald.

I do not now see exactly how the requirement of being *en rapport* with the subject of a singular proposition fits in. Are there two kinds of singular propositions? Or are there just two different ways to know them?

EXCITING FUTURE EPISODES

1. Making sense out of the foregoing.
2. Showing how nicely (3) and (17) illustrate an early point about the possibility of incorporating contextual factors (here, a demonstration) as part of the content of the utterance. Another example compares uses of 'the person at whom I am pointing' as demonstration and as subject.
3. Justifying calling (17) a *de re* form by showing how it can be used to explicate the notion of modality *de re* without depending on scope.
4. Extending the demonstrative notion to indefinite descriptions to see if it is possible to so explicate the ± specific idea. (It isn't.)
5. Improving (by starting all over) the analysis of the relation between Montague's treatment of indexicals and my treatment of demonstratives.
6. Showing how the treatment of proper names in the Kripke–Kaplan–Donnellan way (if there is such) is akin (?) to demonstratives.
7. Discussion of the role of common noun phrases in connection with demonstratives, as in:

(30) Dthat coat [the speaker points at a boy wearing a coat]
 is dirty.

8. Quine's contention that the content of any utterance can also be expressed by an eternal sentence. Is it true?
9. Much more to say about the phenomenology of intending to demonstrate *x*, and also about its truth conditions.

10. Demonstratives, dubbings, definitions, and other forms of language learning. Common nouns: what they mean and how we learn it. This section will include such pontifications as the following:

It is a mistake to believe that normal communication takes place through the encoding and decoding of general propositions, by means of our grasp of *meanings*. It is a more serious mistake, because more pernicious, to believe that other aspects of communication can be accounted for by a vague reference to "contextual features" of the utterance. Indeed, we first learn the meanings of almost all parts of our language by means quite different from those of the formal definitions studied in metamathematics; and the means used for first teaching the meanings of words, rather than withering away, are regularly and perhaps even essentially employed thereafter in all forms of communication.

WARNING

This paper was prepared for and read at the 1970 Stanford Workshop on Grammar and Semantics. Peter Cole has persuaded me—against my better judgment—that it has aged long enough to be digestible. The paper has not been revised other than to remove the subtitle comment "[Stream of Consciousness Draft: Errors, confusions and disorganizations are not to be taken seriously]." That injunction must still be strictly obeyed. Some parts of this ramble are straightened out in the excessive refinements of "Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice" (which appeared in the proceedings for which this was destined: Hintikka et al., 1973). A more direct presentation of the resulting theory along with some of its applications is to be found in Kaplan (1977).

"DTHAT" is pronounced as a single syllable.

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