DE RE BELIEF[1]

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One of my current projects is to examine my old paper, "Quantifying In,"[2] in the light of subsequent criticisms and to try to determine what, if anything, was right about it and how best to describe what was wrong about it (for that category is certainly non-empty). I still believe that much contained in the paper is interesting and useful, but I have also revised my views on several central topics. In particular, I wish to return to the topic of what I called "suspended judgment," discussed in Section XI of the paper, for I have come to think that there are lessons in that section that have not yet been fully absorbed.

One suspends judgment when one neither believes nor disbelieves; i.e., believes the negation. Thus, to take a plausibly *de re*[3] example, you may believe the person approaching you in the distance to be wearing shoes (because you think you can see them), but you may have no view on whether or not he is wearing patterned sox (because you have no view of his sox, and no useful statistical information on the matter). In this case, I say that you suspend judgment on whether he is wearing patterned sox, you neither believe him to be wearing patterned sox, nor do you believe him not to be wearing patterned sox.

My old discussion of suspended judgment primarily concerned the form in which we report such matters, and only secondarily the cognitive state reported upon. It was intended as a challenge to the method of indirect discourse, and to what I now call "expression from below."

"Quantifying In" aims to explore the problem of interpreting quantified doxastic logic. To put it more plainly, the problem of interpreting quantification into indirect discourse belief reports, for example,

Someone x is such that Ralph believes that he, x, is a spy.

"Quantifying In" was written between 1965 and 1966 (published in 1968), well before Saul A. Kripke and Keith Donnellan on proper names,[4] and well, before my own explorations of the semantics of direct reference. It's presuppositions are broadly Fregean, but not in all details. In particular, the notions of a thinker being *en rapport* with a particular individual, and thus of the "genetic character" of a singular term, which results in the term's being *of* a particular individual, was intended to capture certain causal features of the epistemic situation of a thinker in a way that I regarded as foreign to Fregean epistemology, not necessarily inconsistent or incoherent with Fregean epistemology, but not in what I took to be the spirit of it either.

The most salient of the *Fregean* presuppositions is represented by the idea that there is no natural, primitive and pure, *de re* belief. Rather, all belief regarding objects proceeds by way of representations.

Let me illustrate this point by way of a comparison between belief and what I call "futurity," that which is expressed by the operator, *it will soon be the case that.*

Both the belief operator, *Ralph believes that*, and the futurity operator produce what Gottlob Frege called indirect (*ungerade*) contexts, in which free substitution among terms with the same customary denotation (*Bedeutung*) can affect the truth value of the whole sentence.

For belief this phenomenon is well known. We can remind ourselves of the fact that the truth of:

George IV believed that Scott was Scott.

and

Scott was the author of Waverly.

does not intuitively imply the conclusion,

George IV believed that Scott was the author of Waverly.

For futurity, note that although it was arguable in October 2000 that,

It will soon be the case that the President of the United States is a Republican.

And it was undeniable that:

The husband of Hillary Clinton is the President of United States.

It did not follow that:

· It will soon be the case that the husband of Hillary Clinton is a
    Republican.

It still could happen, but she would have to remarry. In any case, it does not follow by logic.

So one might think that the semantics of belief reports and of futurity reports are on a par. But *belief* and *futurity*—reporting aside—are *not*, I claim, on a par.

For futurity, there *is* what I call a natural, primitive and pure, *de re* notion. It makes perfectly good sense to ask of a certain individual, who happens to be

the President of the United States, and who happens to be the husband of Hillary Clinton, whether he, independently of any particular way of describing him, will soon be a Republican.

We can, by fiat, establish language forms that permit quantification in and substitution. But we cannot, by fiat, force preexisting concepts to have *de re* versions. For example, we cannot *stipulate* that it makes sense to ask of a man who has won an election, whether he independently of any particular way of conceptualizing him, might have lost. Our conception of possibility may or may not accommodate such an attribution, but we cannot resolve the matter by stipulation. Only philosophical argumentation can resolve the matter.

On the *simplest* extension of Frege's views regarding oblique (indirect, *ungerade*) contexts, substitution failure would indicate that the concept expressed by the operator that generated the substitution failure does not admit of a *de re* version. The fact that there is a natural, primitive, and pure *de re* notion of futurity messes up the power and elegance of Frege's treatment. Again, I am not saying that this fact is inconsistent or even incoherent with Frege's treatment; it is just that the result is not a pretty picture, or not *as* pretty a picture.

I hope it is clear that *my* claims about *de re* versions of the attitudes are not founded on the phenomenon of substitution failure. Substitution failure applies equally to modality, futurity, belief, and obligation.

In my paper "Opacity," there were two kinds of arguments.[5] One, rather technical, [was] about the syntactic and semantic unification of *de re* and *de dicto reporting*. This was logic and a bit of ontological creativity at work. It presupposed that the *de re* reports were metaphysically OK, that they reported *something*. The second kind of argument was metaphysical; that our fundamental notion of modality itself may well admit of *de re* cases in view of the structural similarity with futurity, which plainly admits a *de re* version. In fact, I am inclined to believe that:

> There are natural, primitive and pure, *de re* sense of all of the metaphysical operators (as opposed to the "epistemic" operators that invoke cognitive states), in spite of the fact that there are substitution failures.

Futurity was merely an example.

So I am now arguing, or perhaps merely claiming, that the metaphysical operators like those expressing notions of modality and temporality *differ from* the traditional propositional attitude operators, such as "believes that," "wishes that," "fears that," and differ from them because of a difference in the structure of the underlying concepts, a difference in what we might call the *nature* of the possibilities of objects as compared to the *nature* of belief about objects.

To raise the question again: Is there such a natural, primitive and pure, *de re* notion of belief, one that makes perfectly good sense of the claim that George IV has a belief about Sir Walter Scott independently of any particular way in which he is represented to George? I think not. And Frege, I suppose, thinks not. This position, which is presupposed in "Quantifying In," is, in a way, argued for in Section XI on suspension of judgment,[6] where it is noted that "a crucial condition of reliability—the determinateness of standard identities fails" for the representations (there called "vivid names") that are critical to *de re* belief.

What does this mean? It means that any form of representation of, or interaction with, an object that suffices for us to conceive of a thinker as having a *de re* belief regarding that object is such that a thinker could have *two* such representations of, or *two* such interactions with, the same object without realizing that they are of (or with) the same object. This, of course, does not exactly show that there must *be* such mediating representations or interactions, but the claim was meant to make overt what might have been previously unnoticed. And the fact that the existence of such mediators would nicely explain the phenomenon.

Example: I wonder, "Is this august personage with a beard standing before me really my old friend Paolo Leonardi?" Here one might think that if I could have a *de re* belief about anyone, I could have one about my old friend Paolo, with whom I have had so many vivid encounters, and whom we may imagine (counterfactually) to show signs of aging. Also, if I could have *de re* beliefs about anyone, I could have them about this person, whom I perceive to be standing here before me. So what is it that I believe, *de re*, about this individual? Do I believe that he is Paolo? Do I believe that he is standing here before me? One might say that I believe the man standing here before me to be standing here before me. On the other hand, since I suspend judgment on whether or not this is my old friend, one might say that I do *not* believe my old friend to be standing here before me. (I have other, perhaps more convincing, examples.)

For *de re* belief, which representation wins out? Must one? I think not. *And this shows that the situation regarding belief is unlike that regarding futurity.*

Some form of mediating representation is shown to intervene because for every description of a situation that would support a claim of *de re* belief (regarding a particular individual and a particular property) we extend the description by adding features to it that make it equally plausible to claim a *de re* suspension of judgment (regarding the same individual and property). Since the existence of such mediators would nicely explain this phenomenon, and since the extensions naturally go by way of explicitly citing such mediators, the hypothesis that there *are* such draws strength from the fact that such extensions always seem possible.

This was, in part, the argument of Section XI on suspended judgment, where I wrote:

Thus two (of our best candidates for *de re* representation) can represent the same person to Ralph although Ralph does not believe the identity sentence. He may simply wonder, or he may disbelieve the identity sentence and so believe of one person that he is two. Quine acknowledges that Ralph can believe of one person that he is two on Quine's own understanding of [his *de re* belief operator], when he remarks [that "Ralph believes Ortcutt to be a spy" and "Ralph believes Ortcutt not to be a spy"] do not express an inconsistency on Ralph's part." My point is that though one may quibble about whether [both perceptual representations of Ortcutt sufficed to support attributions of *de re* belief] in the particular cases as described by Quine," no plausible characterization of appropriate conditions for the attribution of *de re* belief can prevent analogous cases from arising.[7]

The epistemic fact that one can have *de re* beliefs about a given individual through various distinct mediating "representations" means that the structure of *de re* belief is fundamentally different from that of *de re* futurity, different in ways that will require greater resources for adequate reporting. Here I have used scare quotes around "representations" to emphasize, for those who may be skeptical regarding a representation theory of perception, that if the mediators were distinct causal chains rather than resulting representations, it would not change the situation. And the same would hold if the mediators were any other plausible *relation* between a thinker and a *de re* object of thought.

Let me be clear about what is going on. I am claiming that cognitive science, our theory of thought, must take account of this fact about the nature of thought.

Note that, in describing the situation with Paolo, a description from above, as I am wont to call it, I gave a *complete* description of the situation, which may leave you wondering, "Who cares what, if any, *de re* beliefs he has." But this ignores the question of *reporting* in our ordinary idioms of indirect discourse. (Or perhaps I should say, the question of *interpreting* reports in our ordinary idioms.)

This epistemic fact regarding the mediation of *de re* belief is annoying. It suggests that the clean three-place logic of,

x believes y to have the property F
(i.e., Ralph believes Ortcutt to be a spy)

requires a fourth parameter. This in itself would not be so bad if only the values of the fourth parameter were not of the unfamiliar and uncertain kind:

mediators of *de re* thoughts.

(I switch from *belief* to *thought* to emphasize that these considerations apply to a broad range of cognitions.)

In general, we do not have, in ordinary language, good and agreed upon language to refer to these entities. They are, after all, theoretical entities of cognitive science. But the seeming attribution of *de re* cognitions is an absolutely fundamental feature of our ordinary explanations of human actions.

One might try to rule out, by fiat, dual, conflicting mediators (such as on the one hand, my long-standing relationship with my old friend, and on the other hand, the visual presentation of the man standing here before me). For example, by claiming that the failure to recognize the man standing before me wipes out the *de re* character of my belief regarding my old friend, or even that it wipes out the whole belief, rather than just the *de re* character. This, however, would plainly be an extreme and artificial measure, and would not give an exact analysis of the matter (as Bertrand Russell says of Frege's method of assigning an artificial denotation to non-denoting terms).

What makes the situation with the parameter from theoretical cognitive science even worse is the fact that ordinary, apparent reports of *de re* beliefs— Ralph believes you to be a spy—seem to involve tacit quantification over these beasts! [Give more detail?][8]

So far I have been exploring a topic in what one might loosely call epistemology: What is the nature of *de re* belief?

It may be suggestive to analogize the distinction between directly referential and descriptive terms of a language with *de re* and *de dicto* representations in belief. But I would caution against it (and did in "Quantifying In"). Language lacks literal memory, intention, and perception. Furthermore, I believe that we can give a name, and thus a directly referential means of referring, to whatever we can describe. Should this imply that we can, this simply, transform our descriptive beliefs into a *de re* beliefs? At the time of "Quantifying In" I argued that although we could then name Newman 1, we could not then have *de re* beliefs regarding him (or more likely, her), for want of the causal link I called being *en rapport*. Also, there is the case of indexical "tomorrow," contextually dependant and manifestly directly referential, but, one could argue, as in the Newman 1 case, that we cannot have *de re* beliefs about its referent.

And there are cases (also discussed in "Quantifying In") in which fantasy and obsession over a woman known only descriptively, "the next Miss America," may make her so vivid an element of one's inner world that we may be inclined to acknowledge *de re* beliefs regarding her.

Right or wrong, I hope these considerations at least show that to analogize the semantic distinction to the epistemic one is a *project* not a *result*.

An extreme view of matter and would be to throw up one's hands and claim that there is no useful epistemic distinction to be made between two kinds of belief—all belief is *de dicto* (or of some third kind).

I hope ultimately to show that such a course would make *no difference at all* to the points with which I am primarily concerned (and with which "Quantifying In" was largely concerned), namely the *form* of belief *reports*, the unsuitability of the conventional indirect discourse reports, and the distinction between description from above and expression from below.

Let me turn now to a related but quite different distinction: that between two kinds of belief *reports*.

We need a terminology to distinguish the two kinds of belief *reports*. It is common to use the "*de dicto/de re*" terminology indifferently for reports as well as beliefs. But I worry about doing that because I believe that we often practice *de re* style reports of what might properly be called *de dicto* beliefs. So I will emphasize the distinction between the two kinds:

De Re Beliefs vs. *De Re* Reports

There is a substantial body of literature in which phrases such as "*de re* modality" and "*de re* belief" are used indifferently for a form of report and for the underlying concepts being reported on. The form of report is usually taken to be one which allows for substitution among co-designative singular terms, or, at a minimum, permits quantifying in. Thus it is not a syntactical form that is in question, but rather a semantic form, an interpretation of a syntactical form. In his seminal, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," Quine usefully (though unnecessarily) provides distinct syntactical forms for the distinct underlying concepts, terming what we have called "*de dicto* belief," notional belief, and what we have called "*de re* belief," relational belief.[9] But others have generally not followed his lead. Rather, they have followed Russell in using a single sentential operator that permits quantification in. When the sentential complement contains a free variable, or a "logically proper name" the operator is interpreted as representing a *de re* belief, otherwise it is interpreted as representing a *de dicto* belief.

This syntactical form comes naturally to Russell, who does not think that there are two forms of belief or two kinds of cognitive state. Russell thinks only that there are two (logical) forms for the propositions that are the objects of belief, singular propositions (those that contain as constituents the very individuals that the proposition is about) and general propositions (those that do not, usually because they are expressed by sentences in which any singular terms have been replaced by denoting phrases). Russell's theory of *de re* beliefs then appears in

the form of a discussion regarding the circumstances under which we "appre-
hend" (that is, hold a propositional attitude toward) a singular proposition.

(A side comment: in Russell's case, the view that proper names usually
abbreviated definite descriptions is entirely due to his view about what singular
propositions we can apprehend. Those singular propositions whose constituents
are individuals with which a given thinker is not "acquainted," and there certain-
ly *are* such propositions for each thinker, cannot be apprehended by that thinker.
Thus, in our mouths, a sentence containing the name "Bismarck" could not ex-
press the singular proposition it "wants" (Russell) to express. For if it did, we
couldn't apprehend, and thus wouldn't know, what we were saying. Hence, in
our mouths, "Bismarck" must abbreviate some definite description. That's the
whole argument.)

In addition to stipulative regimentations of sentential operators, writers of-
ten turn to particular syntactical forms in natural language to codify and explain
reports of *de re* belief. Russell, for example, first writes that there is an interpre-
tation, the so-called *primary* scope interpretation, of "George IV wished to know
whether Scott was the author of *Waverly*" according to which it means "One and
only one man wrote *Waverly*, and George IV wished to know whether Scott was
that man." He then adds:

> [This] might [also] be expressed by "George IV wished to know, concern-
> ing the man who in fact wrote *Waverly*, whether he was Scott." This would
> be true, for example, if George IV had seen Scott at a distance, and had
> asked "is that Scott?"

In "Opacity," I termed such natural language forms, "the syntactical *de re*,"
leaving it open whether it was correct to allow free substitution among co-desig-
native terms, and also leaving open what sort of cognitive states were represented.[10]

So there are several ideas in play here: cognitive states (are there two
forms of belief *a la* Quine, or only one, with two kinds of objects, *a la* Russell?),
stipulated language forms (two operators or only one?), truth conditions for stip-
ulated language forms (can Ortcutt be a constituent of a thought?), syntactical
forms used in natural language to report belief ("Ralph believes that the man in
the brown hat is a spy," "Ralph believes of the man in the brown hat that he is a
spy," "Ralph believes the man in the brown hat to be a spy," etc.), the interpreta-
tion; i.e., semantics, of the syntactically *de re* forms of natural language (do they
track the logically *de re* notions by permitting free substitution and quantifica-
tion in, do they track the putative cognitive notion of *de re* belief?).

I have argued, possibly contra Russell, that all directly referential expres-
sions, including most ordinary proper names, and also including indexicals and
demonstratives, must be treated semantically (but not epistemologically) like

Russell's logically proper names. Let us accept this without argument for the sake of argument.

Now let us consider an interesting example. Suppose Professor Leonardi had said to you, "The lecturer who was to speak at 2 p.m. will be a little late," and you accepted his word for it. (Suppose also that the names of speakers were not announced in advance.) Could I not have correctly reported to one who was concerned that my tardiness would disappoint expectations, "They know that I will be a little late" (note the occurrence of the directly referential indexical "I")? The idiomatic switch from "belief" to "knowledge" slightly complicates this example, but you get the idea. I believe that I could so report, not just "correctly" but truthfully.

Now the scenario is supposed to persuade you that the audience (my "they") have, at best, a *de dicto* belief regarding the lecturer who was to speak at 2 p.m., whosoever he or she may be.

So, if I am correct, true *de re reports* need not report actual *de re beliefs*. There may not *be* as many *de re* beliefs as is often thought; according to me, this is a matter of what the best theoretical constructs of cognitive science turn out to be. But there *certainly* are *de re* reports. There are both syntactically *de re* reports like "George IV wished to know, concerning the man who in fact wrote *Waverly*, whether he was Scott." And there are also semantically *de re* reports like "Ralph believes that the lying so and so is honest," in which syntax alone does not license our conclusion that liberties have been taken with the original content and character of the belief.

In "Demonstratives" I called this last, the "pseudo *de re*" because the substitutional liberties taken were not intended to suggest that a *de re* belief was being reported.[11] At that time, I thought that *de re* reports went with *de re* beliefs. I have since been persuaded by Joseph Almog and Erin Eaker that we normally regard *de re* reporting, either syntactical or semantical, as literally correct when reporting on a *de dicto* beliefs. But it should not have required the suasions of Almog and Eaker since I have long been mindful of Keith Donnellan's insights into how communicative intent shapes the form of our speech.

Note that *de re* reports of *de dicto* beliefs amount to a kind of exportation in the sense of "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes."[12] "Quantifying In" argues that such exportation is not, in general, legitimate, and proposes a structure of constraints.[13] Although the abstract structures of the two kinds of exportation may be similar, I am presently inclined to think that the driving factor that legitimizes exportation in *reporting* is communicative efficiency; whereas the driving factor that legitimizes exportation from *de dicto belief* to *de re belief* would be the usual considerations concerning the justification of scientific theories.

Spelling out our accepted practices of exportation is a formidable task, in part, I believe, because communicative efficiency is a subtle and seemingly fickle master.

Now I want to work my way back to some points about suspended judgment. Let us go back to our Kripke. (It is assumed that all are familiar with Pierre, who learned both French and English as native languages, but does not realize that "London" translates "Londres," and therefore makes claims using "Londres" that he seemingly contradicts using "London." On the basis of his avowals, we seem forced to conclude that Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty.) Isn't there a sense in which if Pierre believes that London is *not* pretty, he had better, on pain of contradiction, *not* believe that London *is* pretty?

I say this without denying that there is a sense (or a way, or a something) in which he *does* believe that London is pretty. If you ask him (in English, which, by hypothesis, he now speaks like a native) "Do you believe that London is pretty?" he will answer "No."

"Wrong!" We shout gleefully, secure in our superior knowledge of what he believes.

There is something bizarre about this performance. Surely his sincere "No," counts for *something* in mapping his cognitive state.

Perhaps our gleeful triumphalism masks a horrid inner fear. If we were to acknowledge his sincere claim that he does *not* believe that London is pretty, it is we who would be trapped in irrationality.

So here is a serious inadequacy in the expressive power of our normal means of reporting beliefs. Just as we were getting comfortable with Pierre's rational acceptance of seemingly contradictory beliefs (after all, the one belief is mediated by "Londres" the other by "London"), we see him as irrationally neglecting to *reject* a belief *whose rejection should be a logical consequence of a believe he accepts*, and we even see him as irrationally neglecting to reject this belief over his own protests that he *has* rejected it. What are we to make of *this*?

Note: this is a reiteration of a point about the expressive inadequacy of indirect discourse that I tried to make in "Quantifying In" using suspension of judgment, because in suspension of judgment cases there is no stronger claim that could be made about Pierre's (there, Ralph's) belief state. The difference affects only the rhetorical structure of the argument. In the case of Pierre, the fact that the stronger claim (that Pierre believes that London is not pretty) holds (as opposed to my original case in which Ralph suspends judgment) does not relieve us from the duty of acknowledging the weaker claim, namely, that, in some sense, he therefore does *not* believe that London *is* pretty (as he keeps trying to tell us).

This is one problem with indirect discourse reports that I now believe can be fixed, and fixed within the general style of indirect discourse reports. But it

calls for recognition of a raft of new propositional attitudes and of a rather subtle matter of scope.

I propose that we extend our normal practices of reporting belief by introducing an operator for the propositional attitude which I shall call "non-belief." (By natural extension we will need non-wishes that, non-knows that, non-fears that, etc.)

Just as Pierre's sincere avowals lead us to make belief attributions (by means of the one-way disquotation principle), his sincere demurrals, that is, his *negative* response when asked whether he regards sentence S as true, his claim that he is *not* prepared to assert it (as contrasted with the stronger claim that he is prepared to deny it), *should* lead us by an exactly analogous one-way principle to make *non*-belief attributions. In this way we avoid throwing away half the data, as if it were irrelevant to his cognitive state. "Is that man a spy?" we ask, pointing at the man at the beach. "Who knows!" he replies. (And *we* record another of his non-beliefs.)

Now note that the ordinary English sentence,

Ralph doesn't believe that the man at the beach is a spy.

could either be the negation of "Ralph believes that the man at the beach is a spy" or could mean that Ralph non-believes that the man at the beach is a spy. Recall the ambiguity of scope that Russell saw in "The present King of France is not bald." Russell thought that the negation could either take primary scope over the whole sentence or go with just the predicate. One might take a similar view about "Ralph doesn't believe that the man at the beach is a spy," seeing the negation as either taking primary scope over the whole sentence or going with just the predicate, to form non-belief.

So here is the drill: If Pierre is linguistically competent, sincere, etc. and the sentence "Y" contains no indexicals, demonstratives, etc., then,

If he accepts "Y," he believes that.
If he demurs on "Y," he non-believes that.

He introspects his cognitive state, and gives his response, and we record something *in either case*. Perhaps Pierre can be said to have a particular belief (especially a *de re* belief) without recognizing it, but one should not be said to recognize an recognize state [*sic*] without having it.

So where are we now with our indirect discourse reports on Pierre? Has the introduction of non-belief as a separate propositional attitude helped to clear the air? Here are the results:

(1) In view of his French avowals, Pierre believes that London is pretty

(2) As a consequence of his rationality, as expressed in his demurrals, Pierre non-believes that London is not pretty.

(3) In view of his English avowals, Pierre believes that London is not pretty.

(4) Again, as a consequence of his rationality, as expressed in his demurrals, Pierre non-believes that London is pretty.

Does that explain it?

It does do better justice to Pierre's rationality, and it gives us something to say when he suspends judgment. It also rounds out disquotation into a more adequate, almost bi-directional principle. But, in my view, this only allows us to see all the more that the information about Pierre's cognitive state that is simply expressed from above and that explains and justifies 1–4, is only partially, and inadequately, captured by our (extended) normal practices of reporting beliefs.

I have tried to make three points about *de re* belief. First, that there is no natural, primitive and pure, *de re* belief of the sort that there is for *de re* futurity and perhaps modality. For me, this marks a boundary between the metaphysical and the cognitive. Second, that the distinction between *de re* belief and *de re* belief *reports* is important, because, whatever the status of the putative *de re* beliefs, we regularly make such reports. Connected to this second point is the thesis that the truthfulness of a syntactically *de re* belief report in natural language is primarily driven by communicative intent, a fickle master (as I called it). Third, that the introduction of a new family of propositional attitude verbs, "non-believes," and its cousins, is called for if we are to properly account for the rationality of Pierre and Ralph.

Many years ago, I sat in my garden with Rogers [Garland] Albritton, and presented the line of argument stemming from my old discussion of suspended judgment. I presented it as a reductio of *de re* belief. I pointed out that if we accepted such forms of belief, then to avoid contradiction we would have to accept propositional attitudes such as non-belief, on equal footing with the usual propositional attitudes, and this, I asserted, was an absurdity. "Why an absurdity?" he inquired, "It seems the obvious thing to say." It now also strikes me as the obvious thing to say.

Notes

lished. In support of the *Presidential Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* project, David Kaplan generously wrote out his paper from memory for this publication in 2000. We note that the reader may notice some illustrative examples and references in the paper that were contemporary in 2000, but that had not yet occurred in 1981. I presume that other examples relevant for the time were by Kaplan as he spoke in 1981.]

2. ˙ David Kaplan, "Quantifying In," *Synthèse* 19 (1968–1969): 178–214. [*De dicto/de re*; concept from Willard Van Orman Quine; distinction between ways of understanding the logical necessity or truth of statements, either in terms "of what is said" (*de dicto*) or in terms "of the thing" (*de re*). See "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," *Journal of Philosophy* 53 (1956), 177–187.]

3. [Saul A. Kripke (1940–) has been immensely influential in a number of fields related to logic and philosophy of language. Much of his work remains unpublished or exists only as tape-recordings and privately circulated manuscripts. He is nonetheless widely considered one of the most significant philosophers alive. He is best known for his 1972 Princeton lectures published as "Naming and Necessity," in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, eds., *Semantics of Natural Languages* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), pp. 253–355, that constitute an attack on the descriptivist (Fregean, Russellian) theory of reference with respect to proper names, according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of the name's being associated with a description that the object in turn satisfies. See also Keith S. Donnellan, "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions," *Synthèse* 21 (1970): 335–358.]

4. David Kaplan, Opacity in *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1986) [Cited by Kaplan in 2000 version.]

5. Kaplan, "Quantifying In."

6. Ibid.

7. [This parenthetical remark appears to have been author's a "note to self."]

8. Willard Van Orman Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," *Journal of Philosophy* 53 (1956): 177–187.

9. Kaplan, "Opacity."

10. Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology · of Demonstratives and other Indexicals in *Themes From Kaplan*, Joseph Almog, John Perry, Howard K. Wettstein, and David Kaplan, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 481–563. [Cited by Kaplan in 2000 version.]

11. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes."

12. Kaplan, "Quantifying In."