18

Afterthoughts

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Demonstratives is now being published, after all these years, in the form in which it was written and circulated for all these years.[2] It is manifestly unfinished. It still retains bracketed metacomments like "[My current inclination is to drop this whole section from the final draft.]." So why have I not cleaned it up and finished it?

Two reasons: a small one and a big one. First and least, I don't know exactly how to fix some of the sections that now seem wrong, and I don't yet see exactly how to connect my current thinking, about propositional attitudes and proper names, with indexicals. Last and most, the spirit

of the work—the enthusiasm, the confidence, the hesitations—has an integrity that I regard fondly. It reflects its time, the time described in the preface. My own concerns have moved to other topics. I have even felt a resurgence of atavistic Fregeanism. For me to revise *Demonstratives* now would be the intrusion of a third party between the author and his audience.

I had thought of responding to criticisms, of which there have been many over the past decade, several in this very volume, and some quite technically challenging. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to agree in detail with all of them. So instead I have decided to try to look more closely at a few of *Demonstratives'* central concepts.

My reflections are divided into four sections, each of which is intended to be more or less coherent (though I must confess that tangent avoidance has never been my strong suit). The separate sections are somewhat disconnected, as one's afterthoughts tend to be.

Table of Contents

I. What is Direct Reference?

Demonstratives was written against my own Fregean upbringing, as was its progenitor "Dthat".[3] I aimed to challenge several tenets of Fregean semantics. In particular, I argued that Fregean *Sinn* conflates elements of two quite different notions of meaning. One, which I called *character*, is close to the intuitive idea of linguistic meaning (and perhaps of cognitive content). Another, which I called *content*, is what is said or expressed by an expression in a particular context of use. The *content* of an utterance of a complete sentence is a truth-bearing proposition. Where indexicals are involved, the difference between character and content is quite clear. The *content* of the sentence "Today is my birthday" will vary with speaker and day of utterance. The *character* of the sentence is the common meaning which each language user can deploy to speak of himself and of the day of utterance. It is this common character that determines how the content adapts in the varying contexts of use.

The idea of Content—the what-is-said on a particular occasion—is central to my account. It is this notion that I saw, and continue to see, as the primary idea behind Frege's *Sinn*.[4] For what I call *directly referential* expressions, among which are indexicals and demonstratives, I argue that the Fregean picture of the relation between *Sinn* (content) and *Bedeutung* (referent) is entirely wrong.

Directly referential expressions are said to refer directly without the mediation of a Fregean *Sinn*. What does this mean? There are two things it might mean. It might mean that the relation between the linguistic expression and the referent is not mediated by the corresponding propositional component, the content or what-is-said. This would be directly contrary to Frege, and it *is* what I meant. But it also might mean that *nothing* mediates the relation between the linguistic expression and the individual. So stated, this second interpretation is a wildly implausible idea. And it is contrary to the development of the notion of character which occurs in the text. This is *not* what I meant.[5]

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[3] "Dthat" was written and read in 1970, published in *Syntax and Semantics*, vol. 9, ed. P. Cole (New York: Academic Press, 1978); and reprinted in *The Philosophy of Language*, ed. A. P. Martinich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

[4] My own analysis of the notion, however, is closer to Russell's *signification*, than to Frege's *Sinn*. I have written more recently on the difference between the semantics of Russell and Frege in section VII of "Opacity" (in *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, ed. L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp (Illinois: Open Court, 1986)).

[5] Nor did I mean that whatever mediation takes place is nondescriptional. The question whether some sort of description can be fashioned to give the correct reference for a term is not decisive for direct reference (but see footnote 24 below).

The "direct" of "direct reference" means unmediated by any propositional component, not unmediated *simpliciter*. The directly referential term goes directly to its referent, *directly* in the sense that it does not first pass through the proposition. Whatever rules, procedures, or mechanisms there are that govern the search for the referent, they are irrelevant to the propositional component, to content. When the individual is determined (when *the reference is fixed*, in the language of Saul Kripke[6]), it is loaded into the proposition. It is this that makes the referent prior to the propositional component, and it is this that reverses the arrow from propositional component to individual in the Direct Reference Picture of the Preface to *Demonstratives*.

How does rigid designation come in?

If the individual is loaded into the proposition (to serve as the propositional component) before the proposition begins its round-the-worlds journey, it is hardly surprising that the proposition manages to find that same individual at all of its stops, even those in which the individual had no prior, native presence. The proposition conducted no search for a native who meets propositional specifications; it simply 'discovered' what it had carried in. In this way we achieve rigid designation. Indeed, we achieve the characteristic, direct reference, form of rigid designation, in which it is irrelevant whether the individual exists in the world at which the proposition is evaluated. In *Demonstratives* I took this to be the fundamental form of rigid designation.

So certain was I that this *was* the fundamental form of rigid designation, that I argued (from "systematic considerations") that it must be what Kripke had *intended* despite contrary indications in his writing.[7]

It was not. In a letter (asking that I take his remarks into account in these afterthoughts), Kripke states that the notion of rigid designation he intended is that "a designator *d* of an object *x* is *rigid*, if it designates *x* with respect to all possible worlds where *x* exists, and *never designates an object other than x with respect to any possible world*." This definition is designed to be neutral with regard to the question

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[6]Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," in *Semantics of Natural Language*, ed. G. Harman and D. Davidson (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972); revised edition published as a separate monograph, *Naming and Necessity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980). References are to the revised edition. Also see Saul Kripke, "Identity and Necessity," in *Identity and Individuation*, ed. M. K. Munitz (New York: New York University Press, 1971).

[7]Footnote 16, *Demonstratives*.

whether a designator can designate an object at a world in which the object doesn't exist. It was motivated, he says, by the desire to avoid getting bogged down in irrelevant discussions of the existence question.[8]

My own discussion of rigid designation was motivated by the desire to highlight the features of rigidity that are associated with direct reference. In the first draft of *Demonstratives* I had actually used the expression "rigid designation" where I now use "direct reference". I thought of my work as delving into the phenomena identified by Donnellan, Putnam, Kripke, and by me in "Dthat". Direct reference was supposed to provide the deep structure for rigid designation, to underlie rigid designation, to explain it. It would never have occurred to me to be 'neutral' about existence.[9] Existence problems would simply disappear

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[8] The view I thought of as manifest in his texts, what I called "the more widely held view," is stated on page 146 of "Identity and Necessity" (I&N) in the words, "In a situation where the object does not exist, then we should say that the [rigid] designator has no referent and that the object in question so designated does not exist." Kripke asserts that this view should not be attributed to him and that it occurs nowhere, explicitly or implicitly, in *Naming and Necessity* (N&N). Regarding the statement in I&N, he writes that it would be somewhat odd if "there was a mysterious change of position between my explicit view in *Naming and Necessity* and 'Identity and Necessity', delivered a month or so later." (This was the reason I used the remark in I&N to resolve the uncertainties of N&N.) He then questions the accuracy of the language of I&N (quoted above), writing "It is also possible, I think, that the sentence is mistranscribed from the tape of the talk. A simple change of 'and' to 'or' in the sentence would make it entirely consistent with what I said in *Naming and Necessity*.... The corrected version would read even better if 'so' were changed to 'though' (an easy mistake in the transcription of an oral presentation)."

It is good to know his mind on this matter, and I regret misrepresenting his views. I cannot, however, feel embarrassed by my reading of the textual evidence. In the course of my discussion of rigid designation in *Demonstratives*, I was careful to cite all the relevant passages. The neutral definition he intended, containing the clause "and never designates an object other than x," does not occur in N&N, I&N, or the new preface to N&N written ten years after the lectures were given. I continue to think that 'the more widely held view', now seen not to be *Kripke's view*, *is* the more widely held view.

Proper names are the main topic of N&N. Regarding the rigid designation of proper names, Kripke tells us in the new preface that "a proper name rigidly designates its referent even when we speak of counterfactual situations where that referent would not have existed." It is this view of rigid designation that I had thought he intended all along.

[9] That is, to be neutral on such questions as whether a designator can designate an object at a world in which the object doesn't exist or whether a name from fiction such as "Pegasus" might designate a merely possible object that exists in another possible world. I had stated my views strongly on these issues in appendices X and XI of "Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice," in *Approaches to Natural Language*,

when the underlying, direct reference structure was seen. How could rigid designation not be based on some deeper semantical property like direct reference? It couldn't be an *accident* that names were rigid and descriptions were not.[10]

It all seemed of a piece to me: the singular propositions, the direct reference, the rigid designation. And all of it could be illustrated by the case of indexicals, in which the mechanism of direct reference was understood. When I set out to revise the section distinguishing Kripke's notion from mine, I realized that it is easier to explain the difference between A and B if they are not both named "A". I therefore determined to introduce a new expression, and so coined the phrase "direct reference".

If we call a designator that designates the same object at all worlds, irrespective of whether the object exists there or not, an *obstinately* rigid designator,[11] then in the usual modal semantics, all directly referential terms will be obstinately rigid (though not every obstinately rigid term need be directly referential).[12] It is obstinate rigidity that I took as the fundamental form of rigidity in *Demonstratives*.

The paradigm of the variable

This conception of direct reference takes the variable under an assignment of value as its paradigm.[13] In evaluating "Fx" at a world w, we do not ask whether its value exists in w, we only ask what value was *assigned* to the variable before the process of evaluation at w began. Until a value is *assigned* we have nothing to evaluate.[14] Furthermore, and this is important, it is irrelevant *how* "x" gets its value, *how* the

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ed. J. Hintikka et al. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973).

[10] It should be noted, of course, that even an accidental difference between the modal behavior of names and descriptions is sufficient to establish that names are not simply abbreviated descriptions.

[11] Following a suggestion of Nathan Salmon in *Reference and Essence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) p. 34.

[12] An example of an obstinately rigid designator that is not directly referential is given in *Demonstratives*, section IV. It has the form:

$$\text{The } n[(P \wedge n^2 = 9) \vee (\sim P \wedge 2^2 = n + 1)].$$

[13] See paragraph 3 of the Preface to *Demonstratives*.

[14] Until a value is assigned, the entity that is to be evaluated at the possible worlds, whether it be thought of as an open formula or as the content of an open formula, is incomplete. There may not yet be enough information available for it to bear a truth-value.

assignment is made, how the value of "x" is *described* when it is assigned to "x". All that matters to the evaluation is that "x" *has* a particular value.

Pronouns in natural language have often been analogized to variables. Pronouns are lexically ambiguous, having both an anaphoric and a demonstrative use.[15] An anaphoric use of a pronoun is *syntactically bound* to another phrase occurring elsewhere in the discourse. In meaningful discourse, a pronoun not used anaphorically is used demonstratively. As I saw the matter, a demonstrative use of a pronoun was simply a *syntactically free* use. Like a free occurrence of a variable, it requires something extralinguistic, a *demonstration* as I then termed it, to *assign* it a value. Demonstrative and anaphoric occurrences of pronouns can thus be seen to corresponded to free and bound occurrences of variables. What I want to stress is that the difference between demonstrative and anaphoric uses of pronouns need not be conceptualized primarily in terms of lexical ambiguity; it can also be seen in terms of the syntactical distinction between free and bound occurrences of terms. I saw the analogy between variables and pronouns as even closer than had been thought.

I believe that the case of the free pronoun, the demonstrative, can take a lesson from the case of the free variable. As in the case of the free variable, the mechanism by which a value is assigned to a demonstrative, *how* a particular demonstration demonstrates its object, is extralinguistic and thus off-the-record, so to speak. It should not figure in the *content* of what was said. (This, of course, still leaves open the possibility that it might figure in the *cognitive value* of the utterance.) All that matters to the evaluation of what is said (content) is that the demonstrative has a particular value.

Thus my vivid talk about loading the referent into the proposition comes down to this: when using a directly referential term, the *mode of presentation of the referent* (if you will allow a lapse into the Frege idiom) is no part of what is said. Only the referent itself figures in content. Directly referential expressions are *transparent*.[16] Though there may be

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[15]In "Nomoto inscribed his book" and "Each author inscribed his book," we would ordinarily take "his" to be syntactically bound to "Nomoto" and "Each author". Such syntactically bound uses of pronouns are called *anaphoric*. The same form of words can be used with "his" occurring as a demonstrative, for example, if we were to point at a third party when uttering "his".

[16]The sense of transparency I wish to evoke has nothing to do with the contrast between Quinean opacity and Russellian transparency (for which see footnote 30 of my "Opacity"). Rather, it is that of the well-designed computer program in

a complex semantical mechanism that mediates the connection between linguistic expression and referent, that mechanism is unseen in what is said.

Taxonomy: semantics and metasemantics

The inspiration for direct reference was, as reported in "Dthat", the true demonstratives. One does feel initially that in the use of a true demonstrative, not only is one trying to put the object itself into the proposition (direct reference), but that the connection between demonstrative and object, call this *reference*, is also extraordinarily direct as compared with the connection between a definite description and its denotation. Demonstratives are transparent, whereas descriptions are visibly at work, searching, searching, searching. Despite this, there is an elaborate theory of reference for demonstratives in *Demonstratives*.

How should we organize our total semantical theory so as to take account of the mechanisms of direct reference? Some have questioned whether these mechanisms even belong to semantics. I think that it is quite important to get clear on this and certain related taxonomic questions if we are to improve our understanding of the relation of semantics to thought.[17] And I am quite unclear on the subject.

There are several interesting issues concerning what belongs to semantics. The fact that a word or phrase *has* a certain meaning clearly belongs to semantics. On the other hand, a claim about the *basis* for ascribing a certain meaning to a word or phrase does not belong to semantics. "Ohsnay" means *snow* in Pig-Latin. That's a semantic fact about Pig-Latin. The *reason* why "ohsnay" means *snow* is not a semantic fact; it is some kind of historical or sociological fact about Pig-Latin. Perhaps, because it relates to how the language is *used*, it should be categorized as part of the *pragmatics* of Pig-Latin (though I am not really comfortable with this nomenclature), or perhaps, because it is a

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which the commands are 'obvious' and the user need not take account of, indeed is usually unaware of, *how* a command is executed. He knows only that to delete you press "Delete". What else?

[17] On my understanding of the controversy between Donnellan and Kripke, just such a taxonomic question is one of the central points at issue. See Keith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions," *Philosophical Review* 75 (1966): 281–304; reprinted in Martinich, op. cit.; Saul Kripke, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," in *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*, ed. P. French, T. Uehling, Jr., and H. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); Keith Donnellan, "Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora," also in *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*.

fact *about* semantics, as part of the *Metasemantics* of Pig-Latin (or per-
haps, for those who prefer working from below to working from above, as
part of the *Foundations of semantics* of Pig-Latin). Again, the fact that
"nauseous" used to mean *nauseating* but is coming to mean *nauseated* is
a historical, semantic fact about contemporary American English. But
neither the reason why the change in semantic value has taken place nor
the theory that gives the basis for claiming that there has been a change
in meaning belongs to semantics. For present purposes let us settle on
metasemantics.

Does the historical chain theory (or 'picture' as some are wont to say)
of what determines the referent of a proper name belong to semantics or
to metasemantics? The critical question seems to be: does the theory
state a semantic value of proper names, or does it rather tell us the basis
for determining a semantic value for a proper name. Those who believe
that the semantic function of a name is completely exhausted by the fact
that it *has* a particular referent will regard the historical chain theory
as a part of metasemantics. Those who believe that a name *means*
something like *the individual who lies at the other end of the historical
chain that brought this token to me* will regard the historical chain theory
as a part of semantics, as *giving* the meaning rather than as telling us
how to discover it. In general, if a referent is all the meaning a name
has, then any information used to *fix* the referent is metasemantical.
If names have another kind of meaning, another kind of semantic value
(mere cognitive value, if not identified with *Sinn* or with *character*, won't
do), then the fact that certain information is used to fix the referent may
well belong to semantics.[18]

Now what about the mechanisms of direct reference? In the case of
an indexical, it seems clear that the rule that tells us how the referent
varies from one context of use to another, for example the rule that tells
us that "yesterday" always refers to the day before the day of utterance,
is a part of the meaning of the indexical. It is this kind of meaning that
I call *character*. To argue that character belongs to metasemantics,
one would have to regard indexicals as systematically ambiguous and
as having no meaning at all outside a particular context of use. This
is a view that seems reasonable for *generic names*, the kind of name
that all us Davids have in common. But it is decidedly implausible for
indexicals.

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[18] It is interesting to note that historical chains also have a use in what we might call
metasyntax. They give the basis for saying that various utterances are utterances
of the same word. I will return to historical chains in section IV.

There is also the fact that there is a *logic* of indexicals, a logic whose semantically valid arguments deviate from the classically valid. This in itself seems to argue that the mechanisms by which directly referential expressions determine their referents belong to semantics?[19]

Demonstratives seem to me a less certain case, perhaps because my views about their semantics is less certain. However, I do think that the indexical model—a common meaning for all uses of, say, "you", which then determines a referent in a particular context of use—is closer to the truth than the generic name model according to which "you" would be a meaningless symbol available to use in dubbing whoever one addresses.

This suggests a related reason for wanting to place the mechanisms of direct reference outside of semantics. It is the analogy between these mechanisms, which determine the referent of expressions that already bear meaning, and the methods available to *create* meaningful expressions from empty syntactical forms, by dubbings, definitions, and the like. Especially in the case of a true demonstrative, one may feel—wrongly, I believe—that one is *assigning* a meaning to an otherwise empty form. If content were all there is to meaning, then, since the mechanisms of direct reference do determine content, it would be reasonable to claim that such mechanisms belong to metasemantics. But in general, it is incorrect to equate meaning with content, and it is certainly incorrect in the case of indexicals.[20]

So, as between semantics and metasemantics, I remain of the view that the theory of the mechanisms of direct reference, at least as that theory is developed in *Demonstratives*, in terms of character and content, belongs to semantics.

A second interesting question is whether to call the theory of these mechanisms *semantics* or *pragmatics*. The central role of the notion *context of use* in determining content might incline one to say that the theory of character is semantics, and the theory of content is pragmatics. But *truth* is a property of contents, and one wouldn't want to be caught advocating a pragmatic theory of truth. The problem is that on my analysis, the mechanisms of direct reference operate *before* the familiar semantical notions of truth and denotation come into play. If I continue

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[19] Or does it? What *does* the fact that there is an interesting logic of indexicals tell us about the taxonomic place of character? If there is no interesting logic of names, does that tell us something?

[20] It may be correct in the case of proper names, though even there I would be more inclined to equate meaning with referent and to say that referent determines content. I will return to the distinction between the assignment of meaning and the evaluation of meaning in the final section.

to think, as Carnap taught me,[21] that the overall theory of a language should be constructed with syntax at the base, semantics built upon that, and pragmatics built upon semantics, I am faced with a dilemma. The mechanisms of direct reference certainly are not *post*semantical. But equally surely they are not syntactical. Thus I put them in the bottom layer of semantics.[22]

Whether semantics or pragmatics, it is important to emphasize that there are two roads from singular terms to individuals. The road through what is said, through the propositional component, through content. And the direct road, outside of what is said, outside content. Both roads belong to the *rules* of the language, and not to the vagaries of individual difference among language users. Both connect language to the world.

How do the two roads figure in names?

In *Demonstratives* I inquire into the semantic mechanisms whereby indexicals and demonstratives are connected to their referents. How might an analogous discussion of names proceed? Without prejudice to any ultimate issues of semantics versus metasemantics, we might begin with a frankly metasemantical inquiry into naming (what I elsewhere[23] call "dubbing") and the process by which a given name can change its referent over time (if, as seems to be the case, it can). These are matters on which, in theory, Fregeans and Direct Reference theorists might agree.

There is a second question: Does the mechanism whereby the referent of a name is determined belong to semantics, as does character, or to metasemantics, as does the mechanism of meaning change? And if the answer is "semantics", there is the third question: Is the mechanism a part of what is said when the name is used? Or, are names transparent so that only the referent itself figures in what is said? It is on this question that direct reference theorists confront Fregeans.[24]

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[21] *Introduction to Semantics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 9.

[22] The time may have come to rethink what I think Carnap taught me.

[23] In "Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice."

[24] Note that the outcome of the initial discussion may prejudice this tertiary question. Even if the mechanism by which a name is connected to its referent is taken to be a part of semantics, if the mechanism characterizes the referent from the perspective of the context of use, as does the character of an indexical, rather than from a world perspective, it may not be suitable to play the role of propositional constituent. Thus the result of the first inquiry may argue for a direct reference answer to the third question.

Finally, there is the question: Is the expression a rigid designator? This again is a matter on which we may all agree.

In this last connection it is important to see, as I earlier did not consistently see, that even one who believes that a name is connected to its referent by a description that the speaker associates with the name and who further believes that this description is *included as part of what is said when the name is used* can achieve rigidity, even obstinate rigidity, through the use of rigidifying operators. Thus, a Fregean who takes the name "Aristotle" to have as its sense *the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great* need only add something like *actuality* to the content in order to account for the rigidity of proper names. We then have something like *the actual pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great* as the propositional component. Rigid designation without direct reference.[25] Well ... not quite *entirely* without direct reference, since the rigidifying operator seems to involve some form of direct reference. But certainly the *name* has not come out directly referential.

But are names merely rigid and not transparent? I, of course, believe not. In some cases arguments that have been given for rigidity can be shown actually to support the stronger claim of transparency, but I will not take up those arguments here.

A generic argument for transparency

There is, however, one generic argument for transparency which seems to apply in many cases of alleged direct reference. It is not a *decisive* argument. Rather, it is a challenge to those who maintain a contrary view.

Many users of the so-called directly referential expressions lack a real understanding of the exact mechanism or rule of reference by which the referent is determined. Though we act *in conformity* with some such rule, we do not invariably know the rule in the sense of being able to articulate it.[26] If one could articulate all the cultural rules one conformed

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[25] I think that this form of rigidity, logical rather than mathematical or metaphysical, falls under what Kripke now calls *de jure* rigidity, which he describes as "the reference of a designator [being] *stipulated* to be a single object, whether we are speaking of the actual world or of a counterfactual situation" (*Naming and Necessity*, footnote 21 to the new Preface). Note that such descriptions can be used to stipulate the constituents of a possible world, as in "Suppose that the actual author had plagiarized the actual plagiarizer."

[26] This is contrary to my claim in *Demonstratives* that the character of pure indexicals is known to every competent speaker. There I claimed that Character = Linguistic Meaning. I still believe that Character captures an important sense of

to, anthropology would be a much easier discipline. In the case of syntax, it is even more obvious that we act in accordance with a complex set of rules which most of us could not even begin to articulate. Children certainly master the use of indexicals, demonstratives, and proper names well before they develop the rather sophisticated conceptual apparatus needed to undertake explicit semantical investigations. If we don't know what the semantical rule is, how could it be part of what we say when we use the relevant expression?

So long as we were able to cling to the illusion that words like "I" and "Aristotle" abbreviate simple descriptions that are immediately available to introspection, we could think that anyone who used such an expression knew how it secured its reference and might express this knowledge in using the word. But who still thinks that nowadays?

The notion of Content is central to my account

To recapitulate: the issue is not whether the information used to determine the referent is descriptive or not. It is rather whether the relevant information, of whatever form, is a part of what is said. Opening an alternative semantic road to reference, one that does not run through content but may nevertheless play a role in the analysis of cognition (belief, knowledge, etc.), may in the end help us all, Fregean and non-Fregean alike, to reach a deeper understanding of the puzzling phenomena that challenged Frege.

As is apparent, the notion of content is central to my way of explaining direct reference. I know that there are some who reject the notion of content. I can't prove that my way of organizing the theoretical apparatus is indispensable. Surely it isn't. But there are observations, intuitions if you will, both in the text of *Demonstratives* and in the formal logic, for which every theory must account. This *is* indispensable.

Are dthat-terms directly referential?

Some semi-technical meditations on dthat-terms may help to illuminate the notions of content and of direct reference.

As parents soon realize, any worthwhile creation quickly becomes autonomous. Recently I have found myself bemused by my own uses of "dthat".

Linguistic Meaning, but I have become more sceptical about the competence of competent speakers and about our access to what our words mean.

Two interpretations of the syntax and semantics of "dthat"

The penultimate paragraph of section IV of *Demonstratives* warns that the possible world semantics of the formal system in section XVIII obscures the distinction between direct reference and rigid designation. The representation of content as a function from possible worlds does not allow us to distinguish between a directly referential expression and one that is merely obstinately rigid. Both cases are represented by the same function, a constant function. There are two separate reasons for this. First, in this representation the content of a syntactically complex expression does not reflect that complexity. I call this the problem of *multiplying through*, as when the content of "$4\times(5+4)+8\times(7\text{-}2)+6$" is represented by a constant function to 82. Second, even for syntactically simple expressions, the functional representation captures only the obstinately rigid designation, there is no further distinction among obstinately rigid designators that marks the directly referential ones.[27]

The representation in possible world semantics tempts us to confuse direct reference and obstinately rigid designation.[28] Could anyone have confused them after the clear warning of section IV? Could I have? Yes.

This is very unfortunate, because I coined the term "direct reference" just in order to keep the distinction clear. I find the confusion most evident in connection with dthat-terms, about whose syntax and interpretation I seem to equivocate. On one interpretation, "dthat" is a directly referential singular term and the content of the associated description is no part of the content of the dthat-term. On another interpretation, "dthat" is syntactically an operator that requires syntactical completion by a description in order to form a singular term.[29]

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[27] If, as some have hypothesized, an expression is directly referential if and only if it is syntactically simple and obstinately rigid, then the second problem is spurious.

[28] If so, why use it? First, because the functional representation is *sufficient to do the work* of *Demonstratives*, namely to show that character and content must be distinguished and to develop a coherent theory within which some unconventional claims about logic, belief, and modality could be grounded. Second, because it is a precise and reliable tool, within the scope of its representational limitations.

[29] Properly speaking, since descriptions are singular terms rather than formulas, "dthat" would be a functional expression rather than an operator. But I wish I *had* made "dthat" into an operator for *this* usage. I wish I had made it into a variable binding operator for which I would write "dthat $x\,Fx$" instead of writing "dthat[the $x\,Fx$]". Then there would have been a much clearer distinction between the two uses of "dthat", and I would not have been led into temptation.

In *Demonstratives* dthat-terms are eliminable in favor of definite descriptions plus the Actually and Now operators (Remark 13, section XIX). It should be noted that this result is not fundamental. It is dependent on the possibilist treatment

If "dthat" is an operator

If "dthat" is an operator, and if the description, which constitutes the operand and thus syntactically completes the singular term, induces a complex element into content, then the correct way to describe "dthat" is as a rigidifier. Complete dthat-terms would be rigid, in fact *obstinately* rigid. In this case the proposition would not carry the individual itself into a possible world but rather would carry instructions to run back home and get the individual who there satisfies certain specifications. The complete dthat-term would then be a rigid description which induces a complex 'representation' of the referent into the content; it would not be directly referential. The *operator* "dthat" might still be regarded as *involving* direct reference, though its own referent would not be the individual denoted by the complete dthat-term, but, like that of all operators, would be of an abstract, higher-order functional type.[30]

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of variables in the formal semantics. The variables range over all possible individuals, and a primitive predicate of existence is introduced to represent the varying domains of the different possible worlds. This form of language is more expressive than one in which at each world, the variables range only over the individuals of that world and $\ulcorner \beta\, exists \urcorner$ is expressed by $\ulcorner \exists x\, x = \beta \urcorner$. I now incline toward a form of language which preserves the distinction between what *is* (i.e., what the variables range over) and what *exists*, but which does not automatically assume that all possible individuals have *being* (i.e., does not assume that the variables range over all possible individuals).

[30] The operators "it is actually the case that" and "it is now the case that" could also be thought of as rigidifiers on this model. In all three cases I am somewhat uncomfortable calling the *operator* directly referential, though they certainly seem to contain a directly referential *element*. Perhaps, in view of the highly abstract nature of their content, the content should be thought of as a complex, only one part of which is induced by direct reference. The operator "it is now the case that" would then be seen as a syntactically complex application of the grammatical formative, "it is the case at ___ that" to the directly referential term "now". And similarly for the operator "it is actually the case that", which would be seen as a syntactical combination involving application of the same grammatical formative to the term "actuality". Such a treatment would comport better with the suggestion that only names, including "now", "actuality", etc., are directly referential.

Nathan Salmon points out that if one wished to treat species names like "horse" as directly referential, and as having the species *Equus caballus* as referent, it would be required to adopt a similar device regarding the predicate "is a horse", treating it as a syntactically complex application of the grammatical formative "is a" (a kind of copula) to the directly referential term "horse". Salmon is sceptical, but to me this seems natural. The content of the predicate "is a horse" would then be a complex formed of copulation with the species *E. caballus*.

The desire to treat a variety of lexical items as directly referential requires more attention to the distinction between grammatical formatives and those 'pure'

If "dthat" is a demonstrative surrogate

The operator interpretation is not what I originally intended. The word "dthat" was intended to be a surrogate for a true demonstrative, and the description which completes it was intended to be a surrogate for the completing demonstration. On this interpretation "dthat" is a syntactically complete singular term that requires no *syntactical* completion by an operand. (A 'pointing', being extralinguistic, could hardly be a part of syntax.) The description completes the *character* of the associated occurrence of "dthat", but makes no contribution to content. Like a whispered aside[31] or a gesture, the description is thought of as off-the-record (i.e., off the *content* record). It determines and directs attention to what is being said, but the manner in which it does so is not strictly *part* of what is asserted. The semantic role of the *description* is pre-propositional; it induces no complex, descriptive element into content. "Dthat" is no more an operator than is "I", though neither has a referent unless semantically 'completed' by a context in the one case and a demonstration in the other. The referent of "dthat" is the individual described (rather than an abstract, higher-order function). It is directly referential.

The operator interpretation is more 'natural' for the formal system

The predominant interpretation of "dthat" in the text seems to be as demonstrative surrogate except, I am sorry to say, in the formal system. There, the natural interpretation is as rigidifying operator. The reason for this is that the 'completing' description has a syntactical reality within the formal language. It plays an essential role in the logic, for example in the theorem of Remark 13 showing that dthat-terms are eliminable. Although Frege claimed that the context of use was part of

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lexical items that might be regarded as naming an abstract object, like a species or a color. I would treat "is a bachelor" in the same way as "is a horse". While acknowledging the *metaphysical* differences between a species and *bachelorhood*, the syntactical unity of "horse" and "bachelor" suggests an analogous *semantical* treatment. Keith Donnellan makes this point in "Putnam and Kripke on Natural Kinds," in *Knowledge and Mind*, ed. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 84–104, especially section III. Also, I would go further in syntactical decomposition and first form the complex denoting phrase "a horse" (with appropriate content) before forming the predicate "is a horse".

[31] This is how Kripke characterized the description which completes a dthat-term in his lecture at the conference.

"the means of expression" of a thought,[32] he never, to my knowledge, attempted to incorporate "the pointing of fingers, hand movements, glances" into logical syntax. Can an expression such as the description in a dthat-term appear in logical syntax but make no contribution to semantical form? It would seem strange if it did. But there is, I suppose, no strict contradiction in such a language form.

If there are two different interpretations of "dthat" in *Demonstratives*, they seem to be run together in footnote 72. But maybe there aren't. *Probably* there aren't. Probably, I was just farsighted in envisioning yet-to-be-realized forms of formal semantics. I earlier held that my views were inconsistent. I now deny that my views are inconsistent![33]

II. Do Demonstrations Complete Demonstratives?

In *Demonstratives* I took the demonstration, "typically, a (visual) presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing," to be criterial for determining the referent of a demonstrative. While recognizing the teleological character of most pointing—it is typically directed by the speaker's intention to point at a perceived individual on whom he has focused—I claimed that the *demonstration* rather than the *directing intention* determined the referent.[34]

I am now inclined to regard the directing intention, at least in the case of perceptual demonstratives, as criterial, and to regard the demonstration as a mere *externalization* of this inner intention. The externalization is an aid to communication, like speaking more slowly and loudly, but is of no semantic significance.[35]

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[32] Gottlob Frege "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," *Mind* 65 (1956): p. 296. Original German publication in *Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus* (1918–19).

[33] Thanks to Nathan Salmon and Joseph Almog for help with this section.

[34] This view goes back to the case, discussed in "Dthat", of Carnap's picture. I now regard this as a rather complex, atypical case.

[35] I contrast *no* semantic significance with the fundamental idea of direct reference: that there are matters of semantic significance which do not appear in content. In my earlier treatment, I regarded demonstrations as off-the-record in terms of *content*, but as semantically relevant in determining *character*. I now regard them as totally off-the-record in regard to the semantics of demonstratives. I now see demonstrations as playing the same role for true demonstratives as does pointing at oneself when using the first-person pronoun.

   We might think of the demonstration on the model of a term in *apposition* to the demonstrative. Such a term appears to duplicate the demonstrative syntactically, but its semantic contribution is to a subordinate, side remark; its semantic contribution to the main clause seems to be only to hold targets for anaphora. (I know

I had rejected this view earlier, in part because it seemed to confound what Donnellan might call the *referential* and the *attributive* uses of a demonstrative. It seemed to me that this should not happen in a proper semantical theory. I recently realized that the distinction still held. In the case of a perceptual demonstrative, the directing intention is aimed at a perceived object. This object may or may not be the object the speaker has in mind. We can distinguish between Donnellan's kind of having-in-mind and perceptual focus.[36]

A benefit of the view that the demonstration is a mere externalization of the perceptual intention, which determines the referent, is that it offers a new perspective on one of Donnellan's most compelling cases of referential use.

> Suppose someone is at a party and, seeing an interesting looking person holding a martini glass, one asks, "Who is the man drinking a martini?" If it should turn out that there is only water in the glass, one has nevertheless asked a question about a particular person.[37]

Because of the importance of the perceptual element it is tempting to think of this case in terms of demonstratives. Here the directing intention is aimed at the interesting looking person seen holding a martini glass. Had the speaker pointed and said "Who is that man?", the case would have raised no question of referential use. But suppose, having been taught that it is rude to point at people, the normal mode of externalizing the intention is unavailable. What to do? He cannot simply say, "Who is that man?" with *no* externalization. This would baffle his auditor, who would say, "Which man?". To which the original speaker would have to reply, "The man with the martini." So he shortens the dialogue and uses the description "the man with the martini" as a substitute for the demonstration. Here the speaker might equally well have said, "Who is that man with the martini?" or, "Who is that?" followed by an appositive, parenthetical, whispered "(the man with the martini)."

Now according to my new view of what determines the referent of a demonstrative, the demonstration (here, the description) is there only to

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of no well-developed semantics of apposition; it seems a topic worth pursuing.)

[36] Just as it is possible to mis*describe* a perceived object, for example, as a martini when it is really only water in a martini glass, so it is also possible to mis*recognize* one. For example, I may have you in mind, and believing that it is you whom I see hiding under the bed, begin berating you. Even if it was not you under the bed, might it not still be you whom I criticized?

[37] Keith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions".

help *convey* an intention and plays no *semantical* role at all. We might sum up the case by saying the speaker had a demonstrative intention and, constrained by the conventions of polite behavior, substituted a description for the usual pointing.[38] The slight misdescription has no more effect on the determination of the referent of the tacit demonstrative than would a slight error in aim have had on the determination of the referent of a vocalized demonstrative accompanied by a pointing. In both cases the referent is properly determined by the perceptual intention. In neither case is anything semantical at stake in the description or the pointing. All that is at stake is the accuracy of *communicating* what was said.

What makes this analysis especially intriguing is that this classical case of the referential use of a description can be seen as an *attributive* use of a tacit perceptual demonstrative.

Not all of Donnellan's cases can be accounted for in this way. And in any case, as I have already stated, I believe the distinction between referential and attributive uses is fundamental. But still the idea of finding a role for nonsemantic, communication facilitators, and accounting for referential uses of definite descriptions in this way, is appealing. The theory of direct reference, with its prepropositional semantics, seems especially open to such off-the-record elements in language.

Occurrences

As I carefully noted in *Demonstratives*,[39] my notion of an *occurrence* of an expression in a context—the mere combination of the expression with the context—is not the same as the notion, from the theory of speech acts, of an *utterance* of an expression by the agent of a context. An occurrence requires no utterance. Utterances take time, and are produced one at a time; this will not do for the analysis of validity. By the time an agent finished uttering a very, very long true premise and began uttering the conclusion, the premise may have gone false. Thus even the most trivial of inferences, P therefore P, may appear invalid. Also, there are sentences which express a truth in certain contexts, but not if uttered. For example, "I say nothing." Logic and semantics

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[38] A quite different summary would deny the demonstrative element and say that the conventions of polite behavior constrain the speaker to use descriptions and not to use demonstratives. This yields Donnellan's original analysis. Accept my summary. (Is there a basis in the speaker's intentions for claiming that a description is, or is not, being used in apposition to a tacit demonstrative?)

[39] Section XIII.

are concerned not with the vagaries of actions, but with the verities of meanings.[40]

Problems with occurrences of true demonstratives

On the theory of true demonstratives in *Demonstratives*, a demonstration accompanies every demonstrative and determines its referent. On my current view, the referent of a true demonstrative is determined by the utterer's intention. But if occurrences don't require utterances, how can we be sure that the requisite intention exists in every possible context? We can't!

A version of this problem already existed in a proposal considered in *Demonstratives* for the formal treatment of "you".[41]   The idea is that the context simply be enriched by adding a new feature, which we might call the *addressee*. But suppose there is no addressee. Suppose the agent intends no one, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, dining alone, or surrounded by friends but not *addressing* any of them. Or, suppose the agent is hallucinatory and, though addressing 'someone', no one is there.[42]   The problem is that there is no *natural* addressee in such contexts, and thus no natural feature to provide within a formal semantics.

A refined conception of Context for true demonstratives

There are really two problems here, calling for separate solutions. The first is the case of the absent intention. In this case one would want to mark the context as *inappropriate* for an occurrence of "you", and rede-

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[40] I am unclear even as to what arguments *ought* to come out as utterance-valid (as opposed to occurrence-valid). There are different notions of utterance-validity corresponding to different assumptions and idealizations. With no idealizations, the rules of repetition and double negation become invalid. This seems hopeless. Should we assume then that utterances take no time? (We might imagine writing out premises and conclusion ahead of time and holding up the paper at the moment of assertion.) Should we assume that the agent knows the language? Should we assume that the agent *asserts* the premises and conclusion, that he *believes* them? This last is related to the question: should "*P*, but I don't believe it" (Moore's paradox) come out to be an utterance-contradiction? It certainly is not an occurrence-contradiction.

[41] Possible Refinement #4 of section XIX combined with the 'indexical theory of demonstratives' of section XVI. The idea is considered, not advocated.

[42] I have in mind the classic hallucination involving an imagined person, not a hallucination *of* an actual person who happens not to be present.

fine validity as truth-in-all-*appropriate*-possible-contexts.[43] The second is the case of the hallucinatory agent. Here the context seems appropriate enough, the agent is making no *linguistic* mistake in using "you". But the occurrence should be given a 'null' referent.[44]

Another proposal I have heard is just to *impose* an intention on the agent whether he has it or not. Put more gently, this is a logician's proposal; just *assign* a referent. There are two problems with this. First, if it is *possible* for the agent to intend the proposed addressee, there will already be a possible context in which he does. So nothing is lost by ignoring the context in which he doesn't. And if it is *not* possible for the agent to intend the proposed addressee, the imposition seems much too heavy handed. (We don't want an impossibility to come out true.) Second, if we are impatient with intention and just want to *assign* away and get on with the logic, we could formulate the expression with free variables instead of demonstratives. And we should. Why pretend that real demonstratives are nothing more than free variables? If the logic of real demonstratives turns out to be identical with the logic of free variables, well ... that's something that should *turn out*. It shouldn't be presupposed.[45]

We must make one further refinement in our conception of a context for a true demonstrative. The same demonstrative can be repeated, with a distinct directing intention for each repetition of the demonstrative. This can occur in a single sentence, "You, you, you, and you can leave, but you stay", or in a single discourse, "You can leave. You must stay." Such cases seem to me to involve an exotic kind of ambiguity, perhaps unique to demonstratives (see below). Where different intentions are associated with different syntactic occurrences[46] of a true demonstrative, we would want to use distinct symbols in our formal language in order to avoid equivocation.

Why do we not need distinct symbols to represent different syntactic occurrences of "today"?[47] If we speak slowly enough (or start just

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[43]The idea, once broached, of defining validity in terms of *appropriate* contexts might also be used to approach utterance-validity.

[44]There are several ways to accommodate this in a formal semantics. I am imagining a treatment along the lines of my use of † in section XVIII of *Demonstratives*.

[45]There are morals to be drawn from these arguments. I urge the young author of *Demonstratives* to take them to heart if he wishes to do serious work.

[46]I say *syntactic* occurrence to differentiate from my expression-in-a-context sense of "occurrence".

[47]I choose "today" rather than "now" to avoid the distracting issue of the vagueness of "now".

before midnight), a repetition of "today" will refer to a different day. But this is only because the context has changed. It is a mere technicality that utterances take time, a technicality that we avoid by studying expressions-in-a-context, and one that might also be avoided by tricks like writing it out ahead of time and then presenting it all at once. It is no part of the *meaning* of "today" that multiple syntactic occurrences must be associated with different contexts. In contrast, the meaning of a demonstrative requires that each syntactic occurrence be associated with a directing intention, several of which may be simultaneous. And if it happened to be true that we never held more than one such intention simultaneously, *that* would be the mere technicality. In fact, it is not true. In the aforementioned cases ("You, you, you, and you ..."), in which there is simultaneous perception of all addressees, I think it correct to say that are several distinct, simultaneous, directing intentions, indexed to distinct intended utterances of the demonstrative "you" (which are then voiced one at a time).

The basic fact here is that although we must face life one *day* at a time, we are not condemned to perceive or direct our attention to one *object* at a time. (If we were, the language of thought would be monadic predicate logic.)

Thus within the formal syntax we must have not one demonstrative "you", but a sequence of demonstratives, "you$_1$", "you$_2$", etc., and within the formal semantics the context must supply not a single addressee, but a sequence of addressees, some of which may be 'null' and all but a finite number of which would presumably be marked *inappropriate*.

We will need to be able to formulate sentences of the formal language in which different intentions are associated with different syntactic occurrences of a demonstrative, if we are to face the looming challenge of Frege's Problem, in which one who is simultaneously perceiving two parts of what may or may not be a single object asserts, "That$_1$ is that$_2$".[48]

The semantic role of directing intentions

What should we think of as the contextual feature relevant to the evaluation of a demonstrative? In the formal semantics, it may be taken to

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[48] Consider, for example, a magician performing the 'sawing a woman in half' illusion. The audience sees someone's head sticking out of one end of a box and what appear to be someone's feet sticking out of the other end. "Is that person really *that* person?" they wonder.

be the demonstratum. But at the preformal level, I think of it as the *directing intention*. The directing intention is the element that differentiates the 'meaning' of one syntactic occurrence of a demonstrative from another, creating the *potential* for distinct referents, and creating the *actuality* of equivocation.[49] It also seems critical for the 'cognitive value' of a syntactic occurrence of a demonstrative, at least for the speaker. Note however that it is neither character, content, nor referent. In the case of the pure indexicals, "today", "here", etc., the relevant contextual feature is always the referent, and there doesn't seem to be any role, let alone a semantic role, for a comparable entity. Curiouser and curiouser!

In *Demonstratives* I accepted "tentatively and cautiously" what I called *the Fregean theory of demonstrations*. The demonstration—a 'manner of presentation' of an individual that was separable from any particular context and could be evaluated at other contexts and circumstances—supplied the character for the associated demonstrative.[50] A reason why I favored the Fregean theory of demonstrations was that the need for a completing demonstration distinguished the true demonstratives from the pure indexicals. A second reason was that the Fregean idea that *that very demonstration* might have picked out a different demonstratum, an idea that depended on the separability of a demonstration from a particular context, seemed to track very closely the cognitive uncertainties of "$that_1$ is $that_2$". This cognitive value appears in character, and thus as an aspect of meaning.

The need for a directing intention to determine the referent of a demonstrative still allows us to distinguish the true demonstratives from the pure indexicals. The parameters for the latter are brute facts of the context, like location and time. But if directing intentions are not separable and evaluable at other points (perhaps they are), the cognitive uncertainties of "$that_1$ is $that_2$" may no longer be an aspect of meaning. Should they be?

Linking true demonstratives

It is interesting to note that in natural language every new syntactic occurrence of a true demonstrative requires not just a referent-determining intention, but a *new* referent-determining intention. When two syntactic occurrences of a demonstrative appear to be linked to a single intention,

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[49] I regard it as an equivocation whenever a new directing intention is involved, even if it directs a second syntactic occurrence of a demonstrative to the same referent.

[50] See sections XV and XVI of *Demonstratives*.

at least one must be anaphoric. When we wish to refer to the referent of an earlier demonstrative, we do not repeat the demonstrative, we use an anaphoric pronoun, "He [pointing] won't pass unless he [anaphoric pronoun] studies." The fact that demonstrative and anaphoric pronouns are homonyms may have led to confusion on this point. The case is clearer when the demonstrative is not homonymous with the anaphoric pronoun. Contrast, "This student [pointing] won't pass unless he [anaphoric pronoun] studies" with "This student [pointing] won't pass unless this student [pointing a second time at what is believed to be the same person] studies." The awkwardness of the second, shows that the way to *secure* a second reference to the referent of a demonstrative, is to use an anaphor.

This implies that it is impossible to utter an instance of the rule of Double Negation using a premise containing a demonstrative, "You stay. Therefore, it is not the case that you do not stay." We have a Hobson's choice. We can intend the "you" of the conclusion as anaphoric across the sentential barrier to the "You" of the premise (something we readily do in ordinary discourse, but are ill-prepared to do in formal logic).[51] In which case, the argument is valid, but not really an instance of Double Negation (at least not as we know and love it). Or, we can concentrate, try not to blink, and try to hold our attention on the same addressee, in the hope that we will succeed in targeting the same individual with the second demonstrative. (Can we ever be *certain* that they haven't pulled the old switcheroo?) In this case, the form of argument is really something like, "You$_1$ stay. Therefore, it is not the case that you$_2$ do not stay", and hence not valid. Even if we idealize the speed of speech, so that we are certain that they haven't pulled a switcheroo, the *form* of the argument is still not that of Double Negation because of the equivocation involved in the use of a second demonstrative.

Perhaps we should give up on Double Negation, and claim that the argument is a valid enthymeme with the implicit premise "You$_1$ = you$_2$", the premise we strove to make true by fixing our attention. "All right," said the tortoise to Achilles, "repeat the argument and this time remember to utter the additional premise."

The source of the difficulty is the principle, the correct principle,

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[51] It would be good if our formal language allowed variables to be bound to arbitrary terms both within the sentence and across the sentential barrier in the way in which anaphoric reference takes place in natural language. The problem of how to do this in a suitably smooth way seems quite interesting.

that every new syntactic occurrence of a demonstrative (one that is not a disguised anaphoric pronoun) requires its own determining intention. The problem, in a nutshell, is that where demonstratives are involved, it doesn't seem possible to *avoid* equivocation. There is an understood, harmless, systematic equivocation built into the semantics of demonstratives in natural language. It is this that I termed "an exotic kind of ambiguity, perhaps unique to demonstratives."

For purposes of logic, on the other hand, it seems essential both to avoid equivocation and to allow any well-formed expression to have multiple syntactic occurrences (in antecedent and consequent, or in premise and conclusion) *without changing its semantical analysis*. The validity of the sentence "If you stay, you stay" (with no anaphors) depends on using the same intention to determine the referent of both occurrences of the demonstrative "you". Just as multiple occurrences of "now" in a single argument must be referenced to the same time parameter, so multiple occurrences of the same demonstrative must be referenced to the same directing intention. Otherwise the language would suffer the same systemic equivocation that natural language does, and there would be no logic, at least none with Double Negation and Repetition and the like. Using the refined conception of context described above, it is easy to write semantical rules that give the same analysis to recurrences of the same demonstrative (what is hard is to write rules that don't). It seems certain that this is how we ought to proceed.

But does it leave our logic vulnerable to a charge of misrepresentation? What is it that we hope to learn from such a logic? I don't think we can regard this as an idealization comparable to that involved in referencing all occurrences of "now" to a single instant. To assume that one intention can drive two occurrences of a demonstrative seems more falsification than idealization.

I hope that there is a key to this problem in my earlier remark that logic and semantics are concerned not with the vagaries of actions, but with the verities of meanings. There is something I'm not understanding here, and it may be something very fundamental about the subject matter of logic.

III. What is Context?

Context provides parameters

Some directly referential expressions, most notably the indexicals, require that the value of a certain parameter be given before a determinate element of content is generated. Context of Use is this parameter. For example, the content of the word "today" is a function of the time of the context of use. If we think of the formal role played by context within the model-theoretic semantics, then we should say that context *provides* whatever parameters are needed.[52] From this point of view, context is a package of whatever parameters are needed to determine the referent, and thus the content, of the directly referential expressions of the language.

An assignment of values to variables is the parameter needed to determine the referent of a variable

Taking context in this more abstract, formal way, as providing the parameters needed to generate content, it is natural to treat the assignment of values to free occurrences of variables as simply one more aspect of context. My point is taxonomic. The element of content associated with a free occurrence of a variable is generated by an assignment. Thus, for variables, the assignment supplies the parameters that determines content just as the context supplies the time and place parameters that determine content for the indexicals "now" and "here".

The assignment, as I am arguing we should conceive of it, is not 'evaluating' the variable at a world, rather it is generating an element of content, and it is the content which is then evaluated at a world.[53] Content is generated at a context, and each context is associated with a particular possible world.[54] The agent, time, and place are all drawn from that world. Similarly, an assignment associated with a particular

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[52] This, rather than saying that context *is* the needed parameter, which seems more natural for the pretheoretical notion of a *context of use*, in which each parameter has an interpretation as a natural feature of a certain region of the world.

[53] I know, I know! There are other ways to treat assignments, but they obscure my point. Having returned to the semantics of free variables, it may seem that I am obsessed with the topic, but bear with me.

[54] When I revert to the standard "possible worlds" nomenclature rather than the "possible circumstance of evaluation" terminology of *Demonstratives*, it is in order to connect certain points I wish to make with the standard literature. I use the two phrases synonymously.

context may be taken to assign only values that exist in the world of the context. Once such a value is assigned, that is, once a content is determined, the content can, of course, be evaluated at worlds in which the value does not exist.

In arguing that assignments of values to variables play a theoretical role analogous to contexts, I harp upon my theme that free variable can be taken as paradigms of direct reference. Though the theme was stated in *Demonstratives*, I did not then recognize how thoroughgoing it was, because I did not then think of free variables in the robust way I now do, as demonstrative uses of pronouns. Not as real demonstratives, which require a directing intention from the agent of the context, but as a kind of *faux demonstrative*, one which looks real until you check into the origin of its value.

As remarked above, free occurrences of pronouns in meaningful discourse are demonstratives. But a free occurrence of an *anaphoric* pronoun would literally be meaningless. In our logical formalisms, variables play the anaphoric role. Thus a free occurrence of a variable is the mark of an incompletely interpreted expression. The case we are dealing with here is the free occurrence of a variable in a premise or conclusion of an argument. Do not confuse this case, the case with the interpretational gap, with the case in which a *bound* occurrence of a variable *appears* free because we are focusing attention on a subformula. It is the second case, the case of *bound* variables, for which the Tarski apparatus of *satisfaction* and *assignments* was originally designed. In that case there is no interpretational gap; it is the *quantifier* (or other variable binder) that is being interpreted, and we must get it right. So the rules for evaluating *bound* occurrences of variables are another story entirely, and an irrelevant one.

That which is interpretively unconstrained is available for office, and those familiar with logic will be aware that authors of deductive systems have chosen varying paths in their treatment of free variables. Some prohibit them entirely. Some treat them as if they were bound by invisible, outer, universal quantifiers, what is sometimes called the *generality* interpretation. Some treat them as if they were individual constants. My own treatment uses the familiar idea of an *assignment*, taken from the Tarski apparatus for the treatment of bound variables. I even confine the values of the variables to the domain of quantification (assuming the domain of quantification consists of what exists). This seems natural enough. But it does, as will be seen, have surprising consequences.

The discussion of parameters completes the analogy between free

variables and indexicals. From an abstract formal point of view, they are highly analogous. Both are *parametric*, their content varies as the parameter varies. If we package all parameters under the heading *context*, an odd but interesting thing to do, we could even claim that content varies with context, the mark of indexicality. (Note that not all directly referential expressions are parametric; proper names are not.)[55]

These formal analogies should not cause us to lose sight of the fundamental difference between free variables and indexicals.[56] Indexicals are real, meaning-bearing elements of language. Free variables are not; they are artifacts of our formalism. Assignments are *stipulative*; they have no fact-of-the-matter parameter as do the pure indexicals and true demonstratives. Indexicals are *perspectival*, their content is dependent on the speaker's point of view, the context of utterance. Free variables are not *perspectival* in any but the most attenuated metaphorical sense. It is for these reasons that I use the term *parametric* for what indexicals and free variables have in common.[57]

The rule of Necessitation fails for free variables

One of the things that delighted me about indexicals was the convincingly deviant modal logic. As shown in *Demonstratives*, the rule of Necessitation:

If ϕ is valid, then $\Box\phi$ is also valid.

fails in the presence of indexicals.[58] The same rule also fails in the presence of free variables. If our assignments to free variables draw their values from the domain of quantification, then

$$\exists y \ y=x$$

is valid, but if the domain of quantification varies from possible world to world,

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[55] Not, at least on my interpretation. One who thought of proper names as *generic* (as standing for any individual so named) until set into a context of use would be thinking of them as parametric.

[56] It should be clear that I am exploring the notion of a content-generating parameter, not insisting on one way of developing the semantics of free variables.

[57] Perhaps the closest analogy is that developed above (in the subsection: "The paradigm of the variable") between the free variable, the 'free' pronoun, and the demonstrative, whose referent must be stipulated by a directing intention. Even in this case, however, there remains the puzzling problem of the seeming semantic role of the directing intention. In the case of an assignment, it is surely only the value that matters.

[58] For example, take ϕ to be "I am here now" or "I exist."

$$\Box \exists y \ y=x$$

is not valid.[59]

Harry Deutsch points out a related feature of the logic of free variables. On the present interpretation, although the basic *quantifier* logic for variables is classical, a free logic is simulated within the scope of the necessity operator. Thus, although

$$(\forall x Fx \rightarrow Fy)$$

is valid,

$$\Box(\forall x Fx \rightarrow Fy)$$

is not. An additional antecedent that is characteristic of free logic is required within the scope of $\Box$:

$$\Box((\exists x \ x=y \land \forall x Fx) \rightarrow Fy).$$

The failure of the rule of Necessitation in the presence of free variables results from the play between context (if the assignment parameter is taken as part of context) and point of evaluation. I view it as indicating that a parametric expression, likely to be directly referential, is at work.[60]

The actual-world as an aspect of Context

The world of the context of use—what is taken for model-theoretic purposes to be the *actual-world*—plays a dual role in the logic. It is the parameter that the context provides for the indexical operator "it is actually the case that." It is thus a *generation parameter* required to fix

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[59]Using a domain of quantification that varies from world to world deviates from the formulation in *Demonstratives*. As noted earlier, in *Demonstratives* I used a fixed domain, thought of as including all 'possible' individuals, along with a predicate "*exists*" whose extension could vary from world to world.

[60]There is another, more sceptical, way to view failures of the rule—as an indicator of unclarity regarding the interpretation of free variables. This may be Kripke's outlook in his pellucid discussion of the Barcan formula in "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic," *Acta Philosophica Fennica* (1963): 83–94. His analysis assumes the generality interpretation of free variables (on which the rule of Necessitation does in fact hold). He then shows that an apparent counterinstance to the rule is based on an incorrect formulation of the rule in this environment. As a corrective he proposes to formulate the system of derivation in a way that prohibits free variables in asserted formulas. He does not question the validity of the rule. I, being familiar with other counterinstances to the rule, have no difficulty with an interpretation of free variables that simply makes the rule invalid.

a determinate content for sentences containing the indexical operator. At the same time, and quite independently, it is also an *evaluation parameter* that plays a special role in the notion of validity. The latter is its more fundamental role, a role that would be required even if the language contained no indexicals for which the actual-world was needed as a generation parameter.[61]

Validity is truth-no-matter-what-the-circumstances-were-*in-which-the-sentence-was-used*. As I would put it, *validity* is universal truth in all *contexts* rather than universal truth in all possible worlds. Where indexicals are involved we cannot even speak of truth until the sentence has been set in a context. But it may appear that for a modal language *without* indexicals, without expressions that require a parameter, the notion of a context of use has no bearing. This is not correct. Truth in every model means truth in the 'designated' world of every model. This 'designated' world, the world at which truth is assessed, plays the role of actual-world. It is all that remains of context when the generation parameters are stripped away. But it does remain.

Perhaps this is more easily seen if we add the indexical operator "it is actually the case that" to the language. It is then apparent that the 'actuality' referenced by this operator is what we have become accustomed to refer to as the "designated" world.

The notion of the *actual-world* can be obtained in either of two ways. As I did, by starting from a full-blown language containing indexicals, deriving the notion of a context of use from its role in the semantics of indexicals, and then recognizing that truth, absolute truth in a model, is assessed at the world-of-the-context, i.e., the actual-world; or alternatively, by starting from a modal language *without* indexicals, recognizing that truth, absolute truth in a model, is assessed at the 'designated' world, and noticing that if we *were* to add the actuality operator this designated world would be the actual-world. Briefly, we can come upon the notion either in its guise as 'world of the context of use' or in its guise as 'designated world'. On either approach, the notion of actual-world plays a special role in validity. It is the indispensable residue of the notion of *context*.

The terminology "context of use" evokes agents and utterances; the terminology "it is actually the case that" does not. There is, however, this common, underlying idea, one which I continue to think of as

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[61] Within the formal system of *Demonstratives*, a content is evaluated at both a world and a time. Within that system, what is said here of the world of the context also holds of the time of the context.

perspectival—the actual world is where we actually are ... now. Recognizing that there are these two faces to the one notion makes me want to differentiate the possible worlds that can play the role of actual-world from those that are 'merely' possible, for example, by requiring that the former but not the latter not be empty; but not all will agree that there should be such differentiation. It is, in the end, a question of what you want to *do* with your logic.

Why the deviant logic?

The intuitive distinction between the actual-world, in which the content is generated, and all those possible-worlds in which the content can be evaluated,[62] lies at the heart of such interesting logical phenomena as the failure of Necessitation. Any feature of a possible world which flows from the fact that it contains the context of use may yield validity without necessity. Such features need not depend on the contingent existence of individuals. For example, in the actual-world, the speaker, referred to by "I", must be located at the place referred to by "here" at the time referred to by "now". Hence "I am here now" is valid. But this requirement holds *only* in the actual-world, the world in which the content is expressed. Hence, what is expressed by the sentence need not be necessary. No 'existence questions' cloud this case.

I find it useful to think of validity and necessity as *never* applying to the same entity. Keeping in mind that an actual-world is simply the circumstance of a context of use, consider the distinction between:

(V)   No matter what the context were, ϕ would express a truth in the circumstances of that context

and:

(N)   The content that ϕ expresses in a given context would be true no matter what the circumstances were.

The former states a property of sentences (or perhaps characters): validity; the latter states a property of the content of a sentence (a proposition): necessity.

The nonstandard logic of *Demonstratives* follows from two features of the semantics of context and circumstance. The first is the possibility

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[62] Joseph Almog emphasizes this distinction in "Naming without Necessity," *Journal of Philosophy* (1986): 210–42.

that a given sentence might have a different content in different contexts. It is this that makes "I am here now" a valid *sentence*. And the second is the fact that not every possible circumstance of evaluation is associated with an (appropriate) possible context of use, in other words, not every possible-world is a possible actual-world. Though there may be circumstances in which no one exists, no possible context of use can occur in such circumstances. It is this that makes "Something exists" a valid sentence. Even if no indexical occurs in the language, the second feature puts bite into the notion of the actual-world.

These two features correspond to two kinds of a priori knowledge regarding the actual-world, knowledge that we lack for all other possible worlds. Corresponding to the first feature, there is our knowledge that certain *sentences* always express a truth regarding the world in which they are expressed. Corresponding to the second feature, there is our knowledge that certain *facts* always hold at a world containing a context. The latter is independent of the indexical resources of the language.[63]

A word for cognitive value

The contexts of *Demonstratives* are metaphysical, not cognitive. They reach well beyond the cognitive range of the agent. Any difference in world history, no matter how remote, requires a difference in context.[64]

In *Demonstratives* I tried to get at cognitive value through the notion of character.[65] When the twins, Castor and Pollux, each sincerely say, "My brother was born before I was," they are said to be in the same cognitive state but to believe different things.[66] Though the utterances of the twins have the same cognitive value (same character), they do not bear the same truth-value (nor have the same content). I found it attractive to follow Frege in using a strictly semantical concept (character), needed for other semantical purposes, to try to capture his idea of cognitive value.[67]

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[63] The preceding material of this section resulted from a conversation with Harry Deutsch and Kit Fine.

[64] As noted, the entire world history is an aspect of context; it is the parameter for the indexical "Actually".

[65] I have been told that "cognitive" is not the right word for what I have in mind. (I have also been told that what I have in mind is not the right idea for what I am trying to do.) I am not committed to the word; I take it from Frege (who probably never used it.)

[66] As indicated in *Demonstratives*, my views on this have been influenced by John Perry.

[67] Even granting that we cannot *articulate* the rules of character for all directly

As in the case of content, the possible-worlds style of formal semantics in *Demonstratives* represents character as a function, in this case as a function from possible contexts of use. I continue to believe that proper names are not parametric, i.e., the *same name*[68] does not vary in referent from context to context.[69] Thus, the characters of two distinct proper names of the same individual would be represented by the same constant function, and thus, under the functional interpretation, coreferential names would not differ in character. Since it is indisputable that distinct proper names have distinct cognitive values,[70] the project of discriminating cognitive values of proper names by character is immediately defeated.[71]

Lately, I have been thinking that it may be a mistake to follow Frege in trying to account for differences in cognitive values strictly in terms of *semantic* values. Can distinctions in cognitive value be made in terms of the message without taking account of the medium? Or does the medium play a central role? On my view, the message—the *content*—of a proper name is just the referent. But the *medium* is the name itself.[72]

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referring expressions, we may still recognize a difference in cognitive value when presented with a pair of terms of different character, there may still be a correlation between distinct characters and distinct cognitive values. Joseph Almog suggests that we might express the point by saying that cognitive value *supervenes* on character.

[68] A less obvious notion than may appear.

[69] A proposed counterinstance: If a name can change its referent over time, as "Madagascar" is said to have done, then would not that very name have had one referent in an early context and another in a recent context? (For a partial response see the discussion below of logically proper names.)

[70] It is on the rock of distinct cognitive values for distinct names that Frege erected his gossamer theory. Note that Frege's initial argument makes use only of the uninterpreted forms "a=a" and "a=b". The distinction between repetition of a single name and the use of two distinct names is already sufficient to make the points about *cognition* even before any examples (or even the notion of *Sinn*) are introduced.

[71] One could, of course, argue that distinct names do differ in character and abandon the idea that character represents only the *parametric* determination of reference, i.e., how content varies from context to context. The fact that *indexicals* are parametric, that their character can be represented as a function from possible contexts, would then be regarded as a special case. The danger of trying to find characterological differences in distinct proper names is that the notion of *character* either will slip over from semantics to metasemantics or will become an ad hoc pastiche. In either case the dignified reality of character as the fundamental semantical value for indexicals would be seriously diluted.

[2] In the case of indexicals, the character, which I took to represent cognitive value in *Demonstratives* may also be thought of as the medium by which content is generated (though character is semantic rather than syntactic in nature).

There are *linguistic* differences between "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" even if there are no *semantic* differences. Note also that the syntactic properties of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus", for example, their distinctness as *words*, are surer components of cognition than any purported semantic values, whether objectual or descriptional.

If words are properly individuated, by their world histories rather than by their sound or spelling, a name might almost serve as its own Fregean *Sinn*. The linguistic difference between "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus"—the simple difference between thinking of Venus qua *Hesperus* and thinking of it qua *Phosphorus*—may be all the difference in mode of presentation one needs in order to derive the benefits of sense and denotation theory. Words are undoubtedly denizens of cognition. If, through their history, they also provide the worldly link that determines the referent, then except for serving as content, they do all that Fregean *Sinn* is charged with. But they do it off-the-record, transparently and nondescriptively.[73]

IV. Who Can Say What?

To complete my afterthoughts regarding the semantics of direct reference, I must address certain issues on the border between metasemantics and epistemology.[74] My reflections were driven by a puzzle about Russellian 'logically proper names'. In the end I concluded that the puzzle has a simple answer (to which I will return in the end).[75] But it prompted thoughts on the more controversial issue of constraints on what an agent in a particular epistemological situation can express.

What we can't do with words: the Autonomy of Apprehension

As I understand Frege and Russell, both believed that the realm of propositions accessible to thought, i.e., those capable of being *apprehended*, is independent of and epistemologically *prior to* the acquisition of language. In using language we merely encode what was already

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[73] Here I echo an idea urged by Felicia (then Diana) Ackerman in "Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes, and Nondescriptive Connotations," *Philosophical Studies* 35 (1979): 55–69.

[74] I am indebted to Keith Donnellan for several formative discussions of this material.

[75] It has at least one simple answer; it also has several less simple answers.

thinkable.[76] Therefore, whatever can be expressed using language was already, prelinguistically, an available object of thought.[77]

I see this view of the *autonomy of apprehension* in Russell's claim that

> in every proposition that we can apprehend (i.e., not only in those whose truth and falsity we can judge of, but in all that we can think about), all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance.[78]

Perhaps it accounts for the feeling one has in reading Russell on logically proper names, and even more so in reading Frege, that, like Humpty Dumpty, everyone runs their own language. When we speak, we *assign* meanings to our words; the words themselves do not *have* meanings. These assignments are, in theory, unconstrained (except by whatever limitations our epistemic situation places on what we can apprehend). In practice, it may be prudent to try to *coordinate* with the meanings others have assigned, but this is only a practical matter.[79]

Subjectivist semantics

We may term this view, *subjectivist* semantics. Although the *entities* which serve as possible meanings may be regarded as objective, in the sense that the same possible meanings are accessible to more than one person,[80] the *assignment* of meanings is subjective, and thus the *semantics* is subjective. Since each individual user must *assign* meanings rather than receiving them with the words, each user's semantics is autonomous. What the language community does make available to each

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[76]Here we may have the foundation for the view that meaning is all in the head, or at least all already directly accessible by the head.

[77]Language, of course, aids communication, and also makes it easier, perhaps even possible, to *reason* using very complex thoughts. But the *manipulation* of thoughts is not what I am getting at here. My interest is in what can be apprehended and what can be expressed.

[78]Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," *Mind* 14 (1905): 479–93.

[79]Prudential considerations of this kind will not, of course, affect a free spirit like H. Dumpty. An analogy: the concept of driving a car in traffic does not imply obedience to the conventions (sometimes called "rules" or "laws") whereby the movement of different drivers is coordinated. But it is usually (often?, occasionally?) prudent to so act. Dumpty's friend Dodgson appears to have shared his views. See Lewis Carroll (with an Introduction and Notes by Martin Gardner), *The Annotated Alice* (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1963), especially the notes on pages 268–69.

[80]This was certainly the view of Frege and sometime the view of Russell.

of its members is a syntax, an *empty* syntax to which each user must add his own semantics.

The individual can express only those propositions that were already available to him as thoughts before receiving the benefits of linguistic communion. We cannot enlarge the stock of possible meanings that are available to us by drawing on the total stock of meanings extant in the language community. In this sense there is no semantic sharing. What each user can express is independent of the resources of other members of the language community, and in this sense what each user can express is *independent of language*.

There are differences between Frege and Russell in the way in which one's epistemic situation is seen to influence the propositions one can apprehend. Frege suggests that all mankind has access to the same thoughts. Thus that differences in our experience, our location in space and time, our culture (including in particular our linguistic community), do not affect what propositions we can apprehend.[81]

Russell's view was plainly different. He believed that our idiosyncratic experiences *do* affect what propositions we can apprehend. For Russell one can apprehend a proposition containing an individual x as a component if and only if one is directly acquainted with x. And it is clear that what one is directly acquainted with is a function of one's experience.[82]

A fixed point of all such Russellian theories is that we may be so situated as to be able to *describe* a certain individual x but not to *apprehend* it; whereas a friend may be able to *apprehend* that selfsame individual. The friend can dub x with a logically proper name n, and try to communicate his thought using n. No use. We cannot just accept n with his meaning, we must assign it our own meaning, and in this case his meaning (namely, x) is not available to us for assignment. Sigh![83]

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[81] In "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," his discussion of the first-person pronoun indicates some ambivalence regarding this view. His suggestion that context of use is a partial determinant of the *Sinn* of an indexical may also indicate ambivalence if it implies (what I believe to be true) that persons in different contexts have access to different (indexical) thoughts.

[82] Let different views of how direct *direct acquaintance* must be reflect different *Theories of Apprehension*. Russell suggests in the beginning of "On Denoting" that we may be acquainted with other people's *bodies* though we are not acquainted with other people's minds "seeing that these are not directly perceived." This suggestion does not accord with Russell's later views, and some think that this was not his *true* view even at the time of "On Denoting".

[83] This is the situation in which we are forced to assign a descriptive meaning to the word our friend used as a name. Bad coordination, but unavoidable accord-

Consumerist semantics

Contrast the view of subjectivist semantics with the view that we are, for the most part, language *consumers*. Words come to us prepackaged with a semantic value. If we are to use *those words*, the words we have received, the words of our linguistic community, then we must defer to *their* meaning. Otherwise we play the role of language *creators*.[84] In our culture, the role of language creators is largely reserved to parents, scientists, and headline writers for *Variety*; it is by no means the typical use of language as the subjectivist semanticists believe. To use language as language, to express something, requires an intentional act. But the intention that is required involves the typical consumer's attitude of compliance, not the producer's assertiveness.[85]

There are two senses of "naming": dubbing and referring. To the consumerist, subjectivist semanticists have not adequately distinguished them.

To some, subjectivist semantics will seem a right and proper conservatism: Practice self-reliance—there is no such thing as a free thought! But it should be recognized that the view is incompatible with one of the most important contributions of contemporary theory of reference: the historical chain picture of the reference of names.

The notion of a historical chain of acquisition by which a name is passed from user to user, was first used to facilitate abandonment of the classical, description theory of proper names found in Frege and Russell.[86] The notion of a historical chain does this by offering an al-

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ing to Russell. Frege's theory of apprehension seems to *permit* perfect coordination, which he urges for scientific discourse while recognizing that we don't always achieve it in ordinary discourse.

[84] We may, like the prudent subjectivist semanticist, always attempt to give a known word the same meaning as that *commonly given* to it. We would still be playing the role of language creators, though without the creativity of someone like H. Dumpty.

[85] I would like to formulate the relevant intention as one to use the word with *its* meaning, rather than with the meaning *assigned* by the person from whom the consumer heard (first heard?) the word. The immediate source from which the word was received seems to me to be primarily relevant to question of which word it is (among homonyms), rather than to the question of what meaning it has.

[86] The idea, and its use in the argument against description theory, first appears in print in Keith Donnellan's "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions," *Synthese* 21 (1970): 335–58; reprinted in *Semantics of Natural Language*, ed. D. Davidson and G. Harman (Humanities Press, 1972). It then appears in Kripke's *Naming and Necessity*, which, coincidentally, was first published in the same collection in which Donnellan's article is reprinted (*Semantics of Natural Language*). Kripke notes, "the historical acquisition picture of naming advocated here is apparently

ternative explanation of how a name in local use can be connected with a remote referent, an explanation that does not require that the mechanism of reference is already in the head of the local user in the form of a self-assigned description. In determining the referent of the name "Aristotle", we need not look to the biography's *text*, instead we look to its *bibliography*.

A role for language in thought: Vocabulary Power as an epistemological enhancement

There is another, possibly more fundamental, use of the notion: to tilt our perspective on the *epistemology* of language away from the subjectivist views of Frege and Russell and toward a more communitarian outlook.[87] The notion that a referent can be carried by a name from early past to present suggests that the language itself carries meanings, and thus that we can *acquire* meanings through the instrument of language. This frees us from the constraints of subjectivist semantics and provides the opportunity for an *instrumental* use of language to broaden the realm of what can be expressed and to broaden the horizons of thought itself.

On my view, our connection with a linguistic community in which names and other meaning-bearing elements are passed down to us enables us to entertain thoughts *through the language* that would not otherwise be accessible to us. Call this the *Instrumental Thesis*.[88]

The Instrumental Thesis seems to me a quite important, though often tacit, feature of contemporary theories of reference, and one that distinguishes them from many earlier views. It urges us to see language,

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very similar to views of Keith Donnellan" (addenda to *Naming and Necessity*, p. 164).

[87] The two uses of the notion of a historical chain of communication are related. It is hard to see how to avoid some version of a description theory of proper names, at least for names of individuals we are not acquainted with, if one maintains a subjectivist semantics. Thus the attack on description theory (by which I mean not just the attack on *classical* description theory but the claim that descriptions are not even required as reference fixers) is *a fortiori* an attack on subjectivist semantics.

[88] Given the wide acceptance of some version of the historical chain explanation for the mechanism of reference for proper names, it is surprising that there has been so little explicit discussion of the epistemological issues to which the Instrumental Thesis is addressed. A notable exception is the discussion of Leverrier's original use of "Neptune" in Keith Donnellan's "The Contingent *A Priori* and Rigid Designation," in *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*, ed. P. French, H. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).

and in particular semantics, as more autonomous, more independent of the thought of individual users, and to see our powers of apprehension as less autonomous and more dependent on our vocabulary.[89]

Contrary to Russell, I think we succeed in thinking about things in the world not only through the mental residue of that which we ourselves experience, but also vicariously, through the symbolic resources that come to us through our language. It is the latter—*vocabulary power*—that gives us our apprehensive advantage over the nonlinguistic animals. My dog, being color-blind, cannot entertain the thought that I am wearing a red shirt. But my color-blind colleague can entertain even the thought that Aristotle wore a red shirt.

One need not fall in love to speak of love. One need not have grieved to speak of grief. The poet who has never felt or observed love may yet speak of it *if he has heard of it*. The fact that the language to speak of it and to enable us to have heard of it exists may show that *someone* once felt love. But it need not be the poet. And as with love, so with Samarkand (and red, and Aristotle). Our own individual experience may play a dominant role in providing the conceptual resources with which we address the world, but it does not play the whole role.[90]

So how shall I apprehend thee? Let me count the ways. I may apprehend you by (more or less) direct perception. I may apprehend you by memory of (more or less) direct perception. And finally, I may apprehend you through a sign that has been created to signify you.

Does a name put us in causal contact with the referent?

I should add that I do not believe that the third category can be subsumed under the first. Apprehension through the language is not a very indirect form of perception that yields a very indirect form of acquaintance—like hearing a scratchy recording of Caruso or perhaps viewing his letters to his manager. Names are not, in general, among the causal effects of their referents. Perhaps a name should be regarded as among the causal effects of the person who *dubbed* the referent, but only in unusual cases will this *be* the referent.

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[89] How could Putnam have apprehended the dismaying thought that he couldn't tell a Beech from an Elm, without the help of his linguistic community? Could one *have* such a thought without having the *words*?

[90] My grand instrumentalist views regarding red and love go beyond a more cautious version of the Instrumental Thesis that would be limited to names like "Aristotle" and "Samarkand". I note this at the urging of friends who characterize the cautious view as "persuasive" and my view as "shocking".

Even if we granted the referent a causal role in a typical dubbing by ostension, we can introduce a name by *describing* the referent (e.g., as the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter). Such names are still directly referential and, in my view, still have the capacity to enlarge what we can express and apprehend. If we were to discover that Aristotle had been predicted and dubbed one year before his birth, or had been dubbed "Aristotle" only in medieval times, the name, like "π", would still be a *name*, with all its attendant powers.[91]

I recognize that some will find my tolerance for nonostensive dubbings unacceptable, and may insist that the mere reception of a name *is* the reception of a causal signal from the referent. The name is likened to a lock of hair, a glimpse of one far distant, uninformative, but evocative. If names were like this, if there were a simple, natural (i.e., nonintentional) relation between name and named as there is between hair and behaired, the theory of reference for proper names would be a simple thing ... and it isn't.[92]

On my view, acquisition of a name does not, in general, put us *en rapport* (in the language of "Quantifying In") with the referent. But this is not required for us to use the name in the standard way as a device of direct reference. Nor is it required for us to apprehend, to believe, to doubt, to assert, or to hold other *de dicto* attitudes toward the propositions we express using the name.[93]

The *de dicto* hedge reflects my current view that *de dicto* attitudes, even those toward propositions expressed using directly referential terms, cannot easily be translated into *de re* attitudes.[94] The reason for this lies in part with the problems that led to my original claim that we need to be *en rapport* with those toward whom we hold *de re* attitudes and in part with technical problems involving reflexivity.[95]

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[91] Howard Wettstein points out that whereas dubbing by ostension has a special Russellian flavor, dubbing by description seems the paradigm for Frege. Since both adhere to subjectivist semantics, *they* believe that their dubbings are strictly for home use and will never go on the open market. (Did either have children?)

[92] Those who see names as among the causal effects of the thing named seem to me to be insufficiently appreciative of Grice's distinction between nonnatural and natural meaning. H. P. Grice, "Meaning," *Philosophical Review* 66 (1957): 377–88.

[93] It is required, however, that we *use* the name. I would suppose that with some very exotic names we might forbear their use in favor of their mention, and conceive of the referent only as *the referent of that name*.

[94] This represents a change from the view expressed in footnote 69 of *Demonstratives*.

[95] The first sort of problem involves understanding the conditions under which we correctly ascribe to Holmes, for example, the *de re* attitude that there is someone whom he believes to have committed the murder. It seems clear that the mere fact

The proponents of connectivity urge that although the language enables us to *express* contents that would otherwise be inaccessible (thus contradicting subjectivist semantics), something more, something like being *en rapport* with the components of the content, is required to *apprehend* the content (and thus to hold attitudes toward it).[96] I think of the proposal as a requirement that we have *knowledge of* the components. This certainly does not require direct acquaintance with the components, but it may require a natural connection to the components that is stronger than that provided by a name introduced into the language by one who did not himself have *knowledge of* the object (for example, a name now introduced for the first child to be born in the twenty-first century, or for the next president of Brazil, whosoever that may be).[97] The suggestion seems to be that all names (including perhaps names of colors, natural and unnatural kinds, etc.), however introduced, carry their referent as meaning; but not all names carry *knowledge of* their referent. Those names that were properly introduced, by ostension or based on some other form of knowledge of the referent, carry and transmit the requisite epistemic connection. But in a tiny fraction of cases the connection is absent—semantics (or metasemantics) does not require it—and in these cases we have direct reference, and expressibility, but no apprehension.[98]

In theory, this is a dramatic weakening of the Instrumental Thesis, since it urges that more than a *semantic* connection needs to be established between a name and its referent before a name can attain its full powers. In practice, because only a tiny fraction of our vocabulary would lack the requisite connection, it may be almost no weakening at

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that the murderer has given himself a *nom de crime* and leaves a message using this name should not suffice. (In fact, I suspect that there are no fixed conditions, only conditions relative to the topic, interests, aims, and presuppositions of a particular discourse.)

The second sort of problem is discussed in "Opacity", appendix B: The Syntactically *De Re*.

[96] A version of this view can be found in my "Quantifying In," *Synthese* 19 (1968): 175–214; reprinted in A. P. Martinich, op. cit. Others have espoused more sophisticated versions.

[97] The second example shows that what is required is that the *knowledge of* the individual play a special role in the dubbing. It must be intended to dub the individual *as known*. If someone I know well were to turn out, to my astonishment, to be the next president of Brazil, that would not qualify. Donnellan might say that in a dubbing by description, the description must be used referentially to dub an individual that one *has in mind*.

[98] A name may later take on the required epistemic connection when the referent appears upon the scene and is recognized as the named object.

all.[99]

I am not entirely unsympathetic to this view.[100] We do distinguish knowledge from belief in part by the way in which we are connected to the object of knowledge. And thus insofar as one needs *to know what it is* that one apprehends, *to know what it is* that one believes, doubts, asserts, etc., the demand for epistemic connection may seem reasonable in analogy to that demanded for knowledge of facts (knowing-that). Note that on this view what gives us *knowledge of* the content of a name is *just* the connection, not any (new) beliefs. In fact, in this sense of knowing-what-we-apprehend, no beliefs at all are involved, only a well-connected name. In any case, a caveat must be added. To know what one apprehends is not to be able to *individuate* it. The Babylonians knew what Hesperus was, and knew what Phosphorus was, but didn't know that they were the same. Similarly, one might apprehend the proposition that Hesperus is a planet, and apprehend the proposition that Phosphorus is a planet, without knowing that they are the same proposition (if they are).

Naming the nonexistent

There are certain categories of objects which clearly have no causal effects upon us. If such objects can be given names, the view that names are among the causal effects of their referents cannot be correct. I have in mind future individuals and merely possible individuals. Such putative entities are *nonexistent*.[101]

If we can give a name to the person who *once* occupied this body ("John Doe #256"), why should we not be able to give a name to the person who *will*, in fact, arise from this fertilized egg? And if we possess an actual knock-down lectern kit, containing instructions for assembly

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[99] My own hesitations regarding *de re* attitudes (the *de dicto* hedge) can also be seen as a limit on the scope of the Instrumental Thesis, a limit comparable to that proposed by those who suggest that an epistemic connection is required. If those who demand an epistemic connection identify *de dicto* attitudes toward propositions expressed using names (singular propositions) with *de re* attitudes (as I did in *Demonstratives*), it may even be that their qualms are really qualms about *de re* attitudes. But I had better not speak for others' qualms.

[100] Not *entirely*, though I do still maintain the view of footnote 76 of *Demonstratives*.

[101] We certainly can't get *en rapport* with such individuals. Past individuals are also, in my view, nonexistent, but they do affect us causally. Some abstract objects, like numbers, do not, I think, affect us causally (in the appropriate sense), and they surely can be given names. I do not consider them because of qualms about the objectivity of such objects.

and all materials (form and matter), why should we not be able to name the unique, merely possible lectern that *would have* been assembled, if only we had not procrastinated until the need was past.

The sceptics, who take the position that an individual cannot be dubbed until it comes into existence, would insist that there is no naming the baby until the end of the first trimester (or whenever the current metaphysical pronouncements from the Supreme Court may indicate). One may, of course, express an intention to dub *whatever first satisfies certain conditions* with a particular name. Perhaps one may even *launch* the dubbing before the referent arrives. But the naming doesn't *take*, the name doesn't *name* it, one cannot *use* the name to refer to it (at least not to refer directly to it in the way names are said to refer by direct reference theorists) until the referent comes into existence.

A difficulty in the sceptical position is that in planning and in other forward-looking activities, we often wish to speak *about* such unnameables, perhaps through the use of descriptions.[102] In my experience, those who protest the possibility of *naming* the first child to be born in the twenty-first century often accept the view that the description is—how shall I put it—not *vacuous*.

Perhaps they accept quantification over such entities and just object to the practice of introducing *names* on the basis of arbitrary descriptions (for names they want connectivity). It would then be natural to add a *narrow existence predicate* to distinguish the robust being of true local existents, like you and me, from the more attenuated being of the nonexistents.

If such quantification is *not* accepted, the position seems odd. Is it assumed that there are clever ways to reformulate any sentence in which such descriptions occur so as to 'eliminate' those that appear outside the scope of a temporal operator?[103] It is not obvious to me how to do this. How would the *de dicto* sentence, "Katie owes her first- (to be) born child to Rumpelstiltskin" be reformulated?[104]

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[102] Or other 'denoting phrases' as Russell termed them.

[103] I note that if there is such a method, then there is probably a similar method for eliminating descriptions of past individuals that no longer exist.

[104] Using "Fy" for "y is a first-born child of Katie", and "Ox" for "Katie owes x to Rumpelstiltskin", we might try the following 'elimination' of the definite description from what is roughly "$O(the\ x)Fx$" (ignoring the 'if any' aspect of the description "her first-born"),

$$Future\ \exists x(Always\forall y(Fy \leftrightarrow y = x) \land Now\ Ox).$$

This symbolization would be correct for "Katie *will give* her first-born child to

What sounds like scepticism with regard to naming the nonexistent, may merely be the quite different concern that the description of the intended dubbee is insufficiently specific to select a unique nonexistent individual. Such may be the case of the possible fat man in the doorway.

Insufficient specificity seems to be Kripke's qualm in *Naming and Necessity* regarding the merely possible species Unicorn and a merely possible referent for "Sherlock Holmes".[105] However, his discussion of what he calls "the epistemological thesis" (that the discovery that there were animals with all the features attributed to Unicorns in the myth does not establish that there were Unicorns) suggests an entirely different argument, namely that *the way in which these particular names arose* (from pure myth and pure fiction) makes it impossible for *them* to name merely possible entities.[106] This argument is independent of the degree of specificity in the myth or in the fiction.[107]

Rumpelstiltskin", but not for "*owes*". The problem is that "owes" (like "needs" and "seeks") is an intensional verb with respect to its grammatical object. Even if it turns out that Katie's first-born child is her ugliest child, $Always \ \forall y(Fy \leftrightarrow Uy)$, she does not now owe Rumpelstiltskin her ugliest child. (However, if she *will give* her first-born child, then she will give her ugliest child.) The 'elimination' of the definite description transforms the predication from *de dicto* to a quantification in. And this leads to incorrect results for intensional verbs. (Note that the same sort of 'elimination' occurs automatically whenever we use first-order logic to symbolize a sentence with an indefinite description as grammatical object. Compare the symbolizations of "Katie owes a bushel of gold to Rumpelstiltskin" and "Katie will give a bushel of gold to Rumpelstiltskin". The interesting problem about indefinite descriptions as grammatical objects of intensional verbs is how to 'uneliminate' them.)

So long as there are no intensional verbs, the eliminations are not plainly incorrect. Intensional *operators*, so long as they are *sentential* operators, do not create a problem, because definite and indefinite descriptions can be eliminated from predicates while remaining within the scope of the operator.

Some think that "*owes*" can be paraphrased to produce a sentential complement where the grammatical object of "owes" appears, for example, as "Katie is now obligated that at some future time she gives her first- (to have been) born child to Rumpelstiltskin". This allows a tense operator ("at some future time") to be inserted between the new sentential operator and the old grammatical object of "owes". If you are of this view, try "Katie is thinking about her first (to be) born child", and read appendix A: Paraphrasing Into Propositional Attitudes from "Opacity".

My aim here is to indicate that there is a substantial technical problem faced by those who hope to achieve the effect of quantification over future individuals through the use of temporal operators.

[105] Addenda, pp. 156–58.

[106] As Harry Deutsch puts it, *reference is no coincidence*.

[107] In lecture, Kripke has made the intriguing suggestion that there are abstract but actual (not merely possible) *fictional individuals* that serve as the referents of

Neither insufficient specificity nor the objections concerning extant names from fiction or myth apply to the case of the first child to be born in the twenty-first century or to the case of the possible lectern, in both of which a frank attempt is made to dub what is recognized as a nonexistent object.

Logically proper names

The question that prompted all my thoughts on subjectivist semantics, the Instrumental Thesis, and vocabulary power is this: How should Russellian 'logically proper names' be accommodated in the semantics of Context and Circumstance?

Using "name" for what he sometimes called a "logically proper name," Russell writes,

> a *name* ... is a simple symbol, directly designating an individual which is its meaning, and having this meaning in

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names like "Sherlock Holmes". The admission of such entities might be accompanied by a narrow existence predicate to distinguish the fictional from the non. I am not aware of Russell's views on future individuals, but he expressed himself in opposition to fictional entities in *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*,

> If no one thought about Hamlet, there would be nothing left of him; if no one thought about Napoleon, he would have soon seen to it that someone did. The sense of reality is vital in logic, and whoever juggles with it by pretending that Hamlet has another kind of reality is doing a disservice to thought.

Despite Russell's rhetorical power, I must confess to having been persuaded by Kripke's analysis. (As Joseph Almog points out, it is not clear that Russell's insistence that Hamlet does not have "another kind of reality" would apply to what I take to be Kripke's view that Hamlet, though not a *person*, exists as a *fictional character* in *our* reality.)

If Kripke is correct, it would seem to settle the case in which an author creates a fiction 'out of whole cloth' but specifies one of the characters, which he names "Woody", to have particular characteristics which, though nothing does in fact *have* the characteristics, our favorite theory of essentialism tells us that there is exactly one possible object that *could* have them (e.g., the characteristic of having been assembled from a certain lectern kit). "Woody" would name an actual fictional entity, not a merely possible nonfictional entity.

Or should we say instead that the author made up a story *about* a particular merely possible nonfictional entity? The fairly plain distinction between an individual, *x*, *having the properties* of a character in a story and the story being *about x*, grows dim when *x* is merely possible. And if we add the difficulties of the distinction between being *about x* and being *modeled on x* (a hard enough distinction for real *x*), I lose discriminability.

its own right, independently of the meanings of all other words.[108]

It is hard to resist the idea that for Russell, such names are directly referential. However, his ideas about the existence predicate are baffling. He continues,

> The proposition "the so-and-so exists" is significant, whether true or false: but if a is the so-and-so (where "a" is a name), the words "a exists" are meaningless. It is only of descriptions—definite or indefinite—that existence can be significantly asserted; for, if "a" is a name, it *must* name something: what does not name anything is not a name, and therefore, if intended to be a name, is a symbol devoid of meaning.

His claim that it is meaningless to predicate existence of a logically proper name is plainly a mistake.[109] Far from being meaningless, such propositions are required as the objects of what Russell called *propositional attitudes*, "I regret that this pain exists", "I am pleased that Nixon exists" (taking "Nixon" and "this pain" to be logically proper names). These assertions are by no means either trivial or meaningless.

The requirement that a logically proper name *name* something seems to have the result that "a exists" ("a" a logically proper name) cannot be used to express a proposition that is false. But unless "a" names a necessary existent, the proposition expressed would not be necessary. Thus we have a seeming failure of the rule of Necessitation. This, along

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[108] From chapter 15 of *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1919), reprinted in Martinich, op. cit.

[109] I do not understand why Russell did not recognize that the intolerable existence predicate could be defined by forming the indefinite description, "an individual identical with a", and then predicating existence of the indefinite description in the way Russell finds so commendable, "$\exists x \ x = a$".

The problem with empty names should not have dissuaded him. If such names are taken to be (disguised) definite descriptions, as he usually claimed they were, then (where a is now a definite description), "$\exists x \ x = a$" is again equivalent to "a exists" according to Russell's own theory of descriptions. (As a sidelight, it is interesting to note that even if an empty name is taken to be "a symbol devoid of meaning," it is possible to develop a rigorous semantics according to which "$\exists x \ x = a$" is again equivalent to "a exists". Russell was not aware of this.)

It is not my claim that the notion of *existence* is captured by the existential quantifier; variables can have any domain. My argument is *ex concessis*. Insofar as existence can be "significantly asserted" of indefinite descriptions, it can be significantly asserted of names.

with Russell's epistemological ideas, which emphasize the special situation of the agent who uses the name, is highly reminiscent of my analysis of indexicals.

These reflections made logically proper names seem a natural topic for the apparatus I had developed in *Demonstratives*, and this drew me in deeper.

When I attempted to apply the apparatus, I was surprised by the results. I was faced with a puzzle. The principles governing logically proper names seemed to imply that a logically proper name *must* name something that exists in its context of use, but need not name a *necessary* existent. But if the referent is not a necessary existent, then there must be a world and time at which it does not exist, and if *c* is a context of use in such a world at such a time, what would be named by an "occurrence" of the name in the context *c*? Briefly, how can every possible occurrence of a name have an existent referent, if the referent isn't a necessary existent?

To make things definite, consider the puzzling case of Nixon. Suppose that I name a certain pain with which I am directly acquainted, "Nixon". We agree that Nixon does not have necessary existence. So there must be a happier world (or time) in which Nixon does not exist.[110] If I were to utter "Nixon" in this happier circumstance, what existent would I be referring to? If "Nixon exists" cannot be used to express a proposition that is false, an occurrence of "Nixon" in such circumstances must name something that exists there. This cannot be Nixon, *ex hypothesi*. What could it be?

Be clear that I am not raising questions about how to *evaluate* at the happier circumstance what is expressed by an occurrence of "Nixon exists" in the painful context of dubbing. No problem there; it's false (again, *ex hypothesi*). The question is: What is *expressed* by an occurrence of "Nixon exists" in a context in the happier circumstance? And how can it be true there?

So what *is* the referent of "Nixon" when it occurs in a context in a world and time in which Nixon doesn't exist?

We can be certain that names do not enter vocabularies through a trans-world chain of communication. If the world is one in which Nixon never exists, how is the agent of the context able to use the term

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[110]For example, the next day, when Nixon has subsided into nonexistence. Or, if you think that pains like Nixon never cease to 'exist' (in some sense) once they appear, take the day *before* Nixon came into existence. Or, better yet, take some possible world in which Nixon *never* comes into existence.

"Nixon"; was the name introduced there to dub a merely possible entity? Not likely.

The solution to the puzzle is, I think, independent of all the issues surrounding subjectivist versus consumerist semantics. As was emphasized earlier, our notion of an *occurrence* of an expression in a context does not require an *utterance* of the expression nor even that the agent of the context have the use of the expression. The apparatus of Context, Character, and Circumstance is designed to help articulate the semantics of an *interpreted* language, one for which meanings, *however derived*, are already associated with the expressions. It takes account of what the meanings are, not of how they came about. Given an interpreted language, a sentence is valid if it expresses a truth in every context, including those contexts in which the language doesn't or couldn't exist, or doesn't or couldn't have that interpretation. Thus the objection that certain meanings *could not arise* or *could not be used* in certain contexts is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to our issue: What is the content in such contexts of an expression which already carries a certain meaning?

So the answer is: Nixon. (Just as you knew all along.) The intuition that "Nixon exists" must be logically valid whenever "Nixon" is a logically proper name, is in error in tacitly assuming that to *evaluate* our language in a foreign context, the language, with its interpretation, must exist there.[111]

I see here a reaffirmation of the importance of a central distinction that I have tried to build into my very nomenclature, the distinction between what *exists* at a given point and what can be 'carried in' to be *evaluated* at that point, though it may *exist* only elsewhere. My 'Circumstances of Evaluation' evaluate contents that may have no native existence at the circumstance but can be expressed elsewhere and carried in for evaluation. What is crucial to the puzzle about "Nixon" is that my 'Contexts of Use' are also points of evaluation, they evaluate characters (meanings) that may have no native existence at the context but can also be created elsewhere and carried in for evaluation.

Where within the formal theory do I take account of the locus of *creation of character*, the *assignment* of meanings that is presupposed

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[111]This, however, suggests that there may be another interesting analysis of the puzzle about logically proper names in terms of utterance-validity. And another using the notion, from the discussion of contexts for demonstratives, of a context *appropriate* for a particular expression. These considerations may throw light on a kind of metasemantical analyticity, not the usual: truth solely in virtue of what the meaning is, but instead: truth in virtue of having come to have that meaning.

in the notion of an interpreted language?   Where within the formal theory do I take account of such metasemantical matters as constraints on the kinds of dubbings allowed? I do not.[112]