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Author(s): John Martin Fischer

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minor theme, at the very end of his work, so minor that it has been suggested he was not really a believer in Christianity.

Sanches's text is feisty and spritely written, full of wit and sarcasm. This comes through nicely in the fine translation by Douglas F. S. Thomson. The Latin original is printed before the translation. I think contemporary readers will find Sanches closer to the modern idiom than either Bacon or Descartes, and will find many twentieth-century ideas anticipated by him. Contemporary readers will also find that there are many suggestive influences to be followed out, since from the material Limbrick presents in the Introduction, it appears that Sanches's text was known or probably known to Descartes, Gassendi, Mersenne, the Dutch opponents of Descartes, Voet and Schoock, and some of the German scholastics who influenced young Leibniz. Having his text available in such a rich edition should help to place Sanches in his proper place for the English-reading public in the history of philosophy and in the history of skepticism. He was a major figure in his time who deserves to be studied and remembered, and he is one of those who led to the transformation to modern philosophy in the seventeenth century. This text and edition is fittingly dedicated to the late Charles B. Schmitt, who did so much to clarify and illuminate our knowledge of Renaissance philosophy, and to show its relevance for understanding modern thought.

RICHARD H. POPKIN

Washington University
University of California, Los Angeles

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ON DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE (PART IV OF THE CONCORDIA). By
LUIS DE MOLINA. Translated, with an introduction and notes, by ALFRED
J. FREDDOSO. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. xii, 286.

This is a brilliant piece of scholarship.¹ Freddoso's translation makes accessible a very important work on the topics of grace, predestination, freedom, and foreknowledge. Further, Freddoso's introduction and notes are a *tour de force* of scholarship: they are remarkably comprehensive and highly illuminating. Freddoso not only clarifies the complex doctrines of Molina, but he offers incisive philosophical analysis. This book is indis-

¹My review will pertain only to the introduction and notes and the readability of the translation; I cannot address the adequacy of the translation.

pensable to philosophers who wish to come to grips with the cluster of issues pertinent to God's omniscience and human freedom.

Molina and Suarez were sixteenth-century Jesuits who developed a complex and systematic theory of God's knowledge and human freedom. They were concerned to argue against both the reigning Thomistic picture and the theory of the Dominicans (whose leading figure was Domingo Banez). Aquinas had a perceptual model of God's knowledge. On this model it might appear that God is a *passive* recipient of information about the world. This passive picture of God is indeed contrary to Aquinas's intention, and it is rejected by both the Dominicans and the Jesuits.

But in replacing the perceptual model, the Dominicans and Jesuits went in slightly different directions. Very roughly put, the Dominicans retained a more robust notion of God's providential activity, whereas the Jesuits emphasized human freedom. More carefully, although both Banez and Molina believed that God has prior knowledge of conditional future contingents (involving human free actions), Molina held that such knowledge is *prevolitional* (i.e., based on facts which antedated God's volitional activity), whereas Banez held that such knowledge is *postvolitional*.

Molina believed in the possibility of "middle knowledge." This is knowledge "midway" between "natural knowledge" (which includes knowledge of possible circumstances) and "free knowledge" (which includes knowledge of what humans will do). Middle knowledge includes knowledge of conditional future contingents ("counterfactuals of freedom"): statements about what humans would freely do in certain circumstances. On Molina's theory, God employs his prevolitional natural knowledge and middle knowledge to help him decide which circumstances to actualize; having made this decision, he has postvolitional free knowledge of future human free action. While both Banez and Molina attribute to God knowledge of conditional future contingents, only Molina attributes to God "middle knowledge" (insofar as middle knowledge is by definition prevolitional).

In his introduction, Freddoso lays out a version of the basic argument for the incompatibility of God's omniscience and human freedom (53ff.). He briefly presents (and rejects) the responses suggested by Aristotle, Aquinas and Boethius, Ockham (and others). He presents Molina's solution to the problem and defends it against certain objections. One of the great strengths of the introduction is that Freddoso points out that any solution to the puzzle about God's foreknowledge and human freedom must fit with a picture of the *sources* of God's foreknowledge. That is, an adequate answer to the basic argument for incompatibilism must be consistent with a plausible account of *how* God knows what He knows.

I shall now lay out Freddoso's presentation and motivation of Molina's response to the incompatibilist's argument. I shall do so briefly and to

some extent in my own vocabulary. Then I shall express some reservations.

In section 2 Freddoso discusses a case in which it appears as if an agent acts freely even though she is not free to do otherwise (26ff.). This case is a “Frankfurt-type case” in which there is a counterfactual intervener whose presence ensures the actual result but who plays no role in the actual sequence leading to the agent’s decision and action. On the basis of such cases, Freddoso attributes to Molina the view that an agent can act freely insofar as her act is not the result of a causally deterministic sequence of a certain sort (27). Presumably, the lack of such a causal history is consistent with the presence of a counterfactual intervener of the sort envisaged.

Later (in section 4) Freddoso presents the following argument. Suppose that Peter sins at T_2 . Then God believed at T_1 that Peter would sin at T_2 . Can Peter nevertheless refrain from sinning at T_2 ? Peter cannot at T_2 contribute causally to God’s not believing at T_1 that he would sin at T_2 . Thus, God’s actual belief at T_1 —that Peter would sin at T_2 —is “accidentally necessary” at T_2 (for accidental necessity is defined in terms of causal contribution). But Peter can certainly meet the conditions for acting freely developed in section 2, which posit the lack of causal determination in the actual sequence leading to the decision and action. Now if Peter freely sins at T_2 , then (according to Molina) he is able to refrain from sinning at T_2 . (Freddoso attributes this view to Molina on pages 24ff., and he clearly is relying on this view in his argument in section 5.) So Peter can refrain from sinning at T_2 (insofar as he meets the conditions for sinning freely at T_2). It follows that Peter has it in his power at T_2 so to act (i.e., refrain from sinning) that God would not have believed at T_1 that Peter would sin at T_2 . (This is *not* to say that Peter has the power at T_2 to causally contribute to God’s not believing at T_1 that he would sin at T_2 .) Also, it follows that accidental necessity is *not* closed under entailment, for “God believes at T_1 that Peter will sin at T_2 ” entails “Peter sins at T_2 .” Finally, if Peter has the power in question and God’s belief at T_1 is a hard (viz., temporally non-relational) fact about T_1 , then Peter has the power at T_2 so to act that some hard fact about the past would not have been a fact.

Freddoso further claims that the Molinist strategy can be applied to the problem of prophecy. If Christ prophesies at T_1 that Peter will sin at T_2 , then Peter cannot at T_2 causally contribute to Christ’s not having uttered the words in question at T_1 . But nevertheless Peter may be able at T_2 so to act that Christ would never have uttered the relevant words at T_1 . Thus, Freddoso attributes to Molina the view that accidental necessity is not closed under entailment and agents can sometimes have it in their power to perform actions which are such that if they were to perform them, the

past (including temporally nonrelational facts) would have been different.²

I wish to take issue with the way in which Freddoso motivates Molinism. He first adduces a case in which the relevant agent (Katie) is alleged to act freely even though (in virtue of the existence of the counterfactual intervener) she is not able to do otherwise. Freddoso then formulates conditions on acting freely which seem adequate to the example. Later he points out that an agent can satisfy these conditions on acting freely even though some temporally nonrelational past fact (God's knowledge) *entails* that the agent performs the act in question. He then employs the "libertarian" assumption that acting freely implies freedom to do otherwise to get to the conclusion that one can be free to do otherwise even if there is some temporally nonrelational past fact which entails that one behaves as one actually does. He concludes that one can sometimes so act that some temporally nonrelational fact which obtained in the past would not have obtained.

But this transition is clearly dialectically inappropriate. The example on the basis of which the conditions on acting freely were formulated was one in which it was assumed that the agent is *not* free to do otherwise. Thus, the conditions on acting freely can be met without the agent's being free to do otherwise. But then it is clearly unfair later to employ the principle that acting freely implies freedom to do otherwise to get to the result that an agent can have the relevant sort of power over nonrelational facts about the past. Thus, whether or not Molinism is acceptable, the way in which Freddoso motivates it is problematic.

I think that it is plausible to suppose that causal determinism rules out freedom to do otherwise. This is because a compatibilist must say that we can sometimes have counterfactual power over the past (given that we do not have power over the natural laws). Molina must deny that causal determinism rules out freedom to do otherwise for this reason. He then has to supply some other reason to think that causal determinism rules out freedom to do otherwise; this strategy does not seem promising to me. Alternatively, he could claim that causal determinism does not rule out freedom to do otherwise, even though it does rule out acting freely.

I think that the Molinist has it just backwards here. I think that the reason causal determinism threatens freedom to do otherwise is precisely

²In Hasker's terms, Freddoso attributes to Molina the view that agents can have counterfactual power over the past, even though they cannot bring about the past (William Hasker, *God, Time, and Knowledge* [Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989].) In Plantinga's terms, Freddoso attributes to Molina the view that agents can sometimes "weakly actualize" states of affairs in the past, even if they cannot "strongly actualize" such states of affairs (Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974].)

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the fixity of temporally nonrelational features of the past. But this reason is not a reason to think that causal determinism rules out acting freely (and moral responsibility), because acting freely need not require freedom to do otherwise.³

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER

University of California, Riverside

³The view that free action and moral responsibility are compatible with causal determinism even if causal determinism rules out freedom to do otherwise is “semicompatibilism”; semicompatibilism is a sort of “reverse-Molinism.” I develop a sketch of a semicompatibilistic theory in my “Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility,” in *Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions*, ed. F. Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 81–106.

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ROUSSEAU: AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS PSYCHOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL THEORY. By N. J. H. DENT. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988. Pp. ix, 258.

In the *Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau represents human nature as containing two basic sources of motivation: concern for one’s own well-being—*amour-de-soi*—and compassion for the suffering of others. Humans are naturally good because there is nothing in these two sources of motivation alone that causes human beings to mistreat each other. Through division of labor, however, humans become dependent upon each other and material inequality begins to arise. These new circumstances cause people to compare themselves and to worry about their relative status. A person’s sense of self-worth begins to hinge upon the regard in which he is held by others; and this new concern with one’s relative status—*amour propre*—motivates one to dominate others in order to command their respect. Society thus engenders *amour propre* and *amour propre* leads to conflict and misery.

This story poses Rousseau’s fundamental problem: how people can live in society without making each other miserable. It is not obvious, however, that the problem is soluble as Rousseau sets it out. For while perhaps in some sense naturally good, people are corrupted as soon as they enter into productive relations with each other. How, then, is it possible for people to live in society without making each other miserable?

The major contribution of Dent’s *Rousseau* is to address this question by offering a new interpretation of *amour propre*. The keystone of this inter-