

## Why Immortality Is Not So Bad

*John Martin Fischer*

*There's an old joke. Uh, two elderly women are at a Catskills mountain resort, and one of 'em says: 'Boy the food at this place is really terrible.' 'The other one says, 'Yeah, I know, and such... small portions.' Well, that's essentially how I feel about life. Full of loneliness and misery and suffering and unhappiness, and it's all over much too quickly.*

*Woody Allen, Annie Hall*

I

I shall begin by laying out some of the key elements of Bernard Williams's fascinating and influential discussion of immortality, 'The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality'.<sup>1</sup> Williams discusses a character in a play by Karel Čapek (which was made into an opera by Janaček.) This character had various names with the initials EM. When she was 42 years of age, her father gave her an elixir of life which rendered her capable of living forever (at the biological age of 42). At the time of action of the play, EM is aged 342. As Williams puts it, 'her unending life has come to a state of boredom, indifference and coldness. Everything is joyless... In the end, she refuses the elixir and dies, and the formula is destroyed by a young woman (despite the protests of some older men!).'

For my purposes here, it will be useful to begin by distilling from Williams's rich and intriguing discussion his general framework for analyzing models of immortality. This framework involves positing two criteria which must be met if a given model of immortality is to be appealing to an individual. First, the future person (posited by the model) must be genuinely identical to the individual. (This means not just being qualitatively similar or having several identical *properties*; it means being genuinely identical—the same particular person.) Second, the life of the future person must be attractive (in a certain way) to the individual—the life of the future person must be 'suitably related' to the goals and projects of the individual.

This framework is really very simple and natural. It says that, in order for a model of immortality to be attractive to an individual, the model must posit a future scenario in which the individual can recognize *himself*—someone genuinely identical to the individual. Further,

the life of oneself in the future must be appealing; presumably, it cannot involve constant torture, onerous labor, tedium and so forth. The two conditions presented by Williams can be dubbed the 'identity condition' and the 'attractiveness condition'.

Now the problems with EM-type immortality are supposed by Williams to pertain primarily to the second condition, although he also adduces considerations pertinent to the first.<sup>2</sup> With regard to the second condition Williams constructs a dilemma. Either EM's character (her basic goals, projects, dispositions, and interests) remain the same over time, or they change. If they remain the same, then indefinitely many experiences will lead to detachment or boredom: 'a boredom connected with the fact that everything that could happen and make sense to one particular human being of 42 had already happened to her'.<sup>3</sup> But if the character changes, it is unclear whether the second condition is satisfied, because it is unclear how to assess the new projects and goals in light of the old ones.

Williams's point is that it is not merely a contingent fact that eternal life would be unattractive; this unattractiveness is alleged to be an *essential* feature of eternal life.<sup>4</sup> Williams says:

...perhaps, one day, it will be possible for some of us not to age. If that were so, would it not follow then that, more life being *per se* better than less life, we should have reason so far as that went...to live for ever? EM indeed bears strong, if fictional, witness against the desirability of that, but perhaps she still laboured under some contingent limitations, social or psychological....Against this, I am going to suggest that the supposed contingencies are not really contingencies; that an endless life would be a meaningless one; and that we could have no reason for living eternally a human life. There is no desirable or significant property which life would have more of, or have more unqualifiedly, if we lasted for ever. In some part, we can apply to life Aristotle's marvellous remark about Plato's Form of the Good: 'nor will it be any the more good for being eternal: that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day' [*Ethica Nicomachea* 1096b4].<sup>5</sup>

## II

I wish to examine Williams's thesis that immortality is essentially unappealing for creatures like us. First, I shall briefly consider Williams's suggestions about the identity condition. Then I shall turn to the attractiveness condition. Consider the following passage from Williams's essay:

Some philosophers have pictured an eternal existence as occupied in something like intense intellectual enquiry.... The activity is engrossing, self-justifying, affords, as it may appear, endless new perspectives, and by being engrossing enables one to lose oneself.... But if

one is totally and perpetually absorbed in such an activity, and loses oneself in it, then as those words suggest, we come back to the problem of satisfying the condition that it should be me who lives for ever.<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, Williams argues against the appeal of the Spinozistic idea that intellectual activity is the most active and free state that a person could be in. Specifically, Williams argues against Stuart Hampshire's formulation of a doctrine he alleges is shared by both Spinoza and Freud, that

one's only means of achieving this distinctness as an individual, this freedom in relation to the common order of nature, is the power of the mind freely to follow in its thought an intellectual order.' The contrast to this free intellectual activity is 'the common condition of men that their conduct and their judgments of value, their desires and aversions, are in each individual determined by unconscious memories.'<sup>7</sup>

But since Williams believes that such unconscious motivations are indeed part of the self, he accuses the Spinozistic conception of freedom of aspiring to be free from the self, which entails a loss of individuality itself. Thus, again, Williams claims that to lose oneself in intellectual activity is literally to *lose oneself*. If such activity were the dominant component of immortality, it could not be of interest to an individual in the sense in which the individual is especially interested in *his or her own future*; thus, Williams is here primarily concerned with his first criterion for the desirability of immortality—the *identity* criterion. Williams goes on to say:

As those who totally wish to lose themselves in the movement can consistently only hope that the movement will go on, so the consistent Spinozist—at least on this account of Spinozism—can only hope that the intellectual activity goes on, something which could be as well realised in the existence of Aristotle's prime mover, perhaps, as in anything to do with Spinoza or any other particular man.<sup>8</sup>

But it seems to me that an activity in which it is tempting to say that one 'loses oneself' is one in which the *content* of one's experiences is focused outward: one is thinking about something besides oneself. An engrossing and absorbing activity causes one to 'lose oneself' in the sense that one is not *self-absorbed*. But it is quite another matter to claim that the experiences involved in such activities are themselves not *one's own*. Even though one has 'lost oneself' in something in the sense that one is not narcissistically focused even in part on oneself, it does not follow that one cannot look at a future with such experiences as genuinely *one's own future*.

I would suggest, then, that Williams's remarks about 'losing oneself in the movement' do not call into question the possibility of an immortal

life in which a certain particular individual continues to exist (and can envisage him or herself in the future). Even if one's life is heavily invested in activities in which one 'loses oneself', one can still understand these activities to be part of one's own future; the crucial distinction here is between the *content* of the relevant experiences and their *ownership*.

### III

I now turn to Williams's second condition—the attractiveness condition. As pointed out above, Williams here constructs a dilemma: either one's character remains fixed, or it is allowed to change over time. I shall begin with the first horn of Williams's dilemma; that is, I shall be assuming that the individual in question has roughly speaking a fixed character over time.

The specific problem with the first sort of immortality (in which character is held fixed) is its putatively inevitable tendency to become boring and alienating. Williams puts the point as follows:

In general we can ask, what it is about the imaged activities of an eternal life which would stave off the principle hazard to which EM succumbed, boredom. The Don Juan in Hell joke, that heaven's prospects are tedious and the devil has the best tunes, though a tired fancy in itself, at least serves to show up a real and (I suspect) a profound difficulty, of providing any model of an unending, supposedly satisfying, state or activity which would not rightly prove boring to anyone who remained conscious of himself and who had acquired a character, interests, tastes and impatiences in the course of living, already, a finite life.<sup>9</sup>

There are various philosophical defenses of the thesis that immortality (of the sort under consideration here) would be necessarily boring and thus would run afoul of the attractiveness condition. I certainly cannot here fully defend the idea that there are some pictures of such immortality which are *not* necessarily unattractive in this (or any other) way, but I wish to make a gesture in this direction by pointing to what appear to me to be some salient errors in Williams's defense of the thesis that such immortality is necessarily boring.

The first error can be seen to come from (or at least be encouraged by) a particular formulation employed by Williams. He says that the defenders of the desirability of immortality must provide a 'model of an unending, supposedly satisfying, state or activity which would not rightly prove boring to anyone who remained conscious of himself and who had acquired a character, interests, tastes and impatiences in the course of living, already, a finite life'.<sup>10</sup> The use of the phrase 'an unending, supposedly satisfying, state or

activity', is infelicitous insofar as it suggests (but of course does not strictly speaking *entail*) that the endless life in question must consist in a *single* state or activity. Later, Williams says that the defender of the desirability of immortality must point to 'something that makes boredom *unthinkable*... something that could be guaranteed to be at every moment utterly absorbing. But if a man has and retains a character, there is no reason to suppose that there is anything that could be that'.<sup>11</sup> Again, this passage (especially the use of the singular pronouns 'something' and 'anything') at least suggests that the endless life must consist in some *single* utterly absorbing thing. Finally, Williams considers an eternal existence occupied in activities of intense intellectual inquiry. He says that 'it seems quite unreasonable to suppose that [these activities] would have the fulfilling or liberating character that they do have for [an individual who actually engages in such activities], if they were in fact all he could do or conceive of doing'.<sup>12</sup>

But why suppose that any one *single* supposedly absorbing activity must be pursued *at the expense of all others*? Why can't such activities be part of a *package* in an immortal life, just as we suppose that they should be in a mortal life? Certainly, an immortal life could consist in a certain *mix* of activities, possibly including friendship, love, family, intellectual, artistic and athletic activity, sensual delights, and so forth. We could imagine that any *one* of these would be boring and alienating, pursued relentlessly and without some combination of the others. In general, single-minded and unbalanced pursuit of any single kind of activity will be unattractive. But of course from the fact that one's life will be *unending* it does not follow that it must be *unitary* or *unbalanced*. That one's life is endless clearly does not have the implication that one must endlessly and single-mindedly pursue some particular sort of activity.

It might be useful again to consider Williams's demand for 'something that makes boredom *unthinkable*... something that could be guaranteed to be at every moment utterly absorbing'. His claim is that 'nothing less will do for eternity'.<sup>13</sup> But the justification for this demand is unclear. Why, in particular, should there be an asymmetry (of the sort implied by the demand) in the standards for the attractiveness of a finite life and an infinite life? Surely, we think of certain mortal lives which involve considerable stretches of boredom and even pain nevertheless worth living and even very appealing. Given this, why think that an immortal life with such features would not be on balance appealing? Why think that because a life is *unending*, it must be *uniformly* pleasing in order to be on balance attractive? The inference here is not more compelling than the inference noted above from the unending nature of immortal life to some single *unitary* activity which it putatively must contain.

Suppose one says that one finds some activity 'endlessly fascinating'. This could mean various different things. First, it could mean that whenever one turns to the activity (in the normal course of one's life), one finds it on balance fascinating. Second, it could mean that whenever one turns to the activity (in the normal course of one's life), one finds it *filled with* fascinating moments—perhaps even densely packed with fascinating moments. Finally, I suppose it *could* (just possibly) mean that one pursues the activity *forever* and finds it at every moment fascinating. Thus, with regard to the schema, 'endlessly—', one must distinguish at least three different notions: *reliability*, *density*, and *infinite extensibility*.

Now imagine that an unending life contains some activity which one finds 'endlessly fascinating'. It surely does not follow from the fact that an *unending* life contains an endlessly fascinating activity that the activity must be endlessly fascinating in the sense of infinite extensibility. An unending life can contain an endlessly fascinating activity in the sense of reliability or density. Further, I see no reason simply to *assume* (as Williams seems to) that in order for an endless life to be attractive, it must contain an activity (or even set of activities) that is endlessly fascinating (or endlessly appealing in any way) in the sense of infinite extensibility. I should think that it is even an open question whether in order for an endless life to be attractive, it must contain an activity that is endlessly fascinating (or endlessly appealing in any way) in *any* of the senses.

I wish now to develop a distinction which I believe is important to assessing the appeal of immortality. Having laid out the distinction, I will suggest that the tendency to think that immortality must be boring and alienating may come in part from attending solely to one of the categories involved in the distinction; this is another mistake of the proponents of the thesis that immortality is necessarily boring.

Some pleasurable experiences, it seems, are in some sense 'self-exhausting'. In the case of these pleasures, once (or perhaps a few times) is enough. That is to say, when one experiences such pleasures one tends not to want to repeat them—even at some point relatively far in the future. Some such pleasures are frankly *disappointing*; in the case of these, we find that some highly touted or much anticipated pleasure is just not what it was made out to be, and we simply conclude that it is not worth pursuing these in the future. But there are other such pleasures which are not necessarily disappointing; rather, they may be entirely fulfilling but in some way 'complete in themselves'. More specifically, they seem to be complete in the sense that, having experienced such a pleasure, one has no desire to experience it again at any point in the future.<sup>14</sup>

I take it that everyone has had his share of disappointments, so it is not necessary to dwell on these. But it will be useful to consider some

examples of the 'non-disappointing' self-exhausting pleasures. Suppose, for instance, that you have the goal of doing something just (or at least primarily) to prove to yourself that you can do it. Imagine, for example, that you are somewhat afraid of heights, and you have been working hard to overcome this phobia. You form the goal of climbing Mt Whitney just to show yourself that you have overcome the fear—just to show yourself that you can control your life and overcome obstacles. Upon climbing the mountain, you may in fact be very pleased and proud. Indeed, you may be deeply satisfied. But also you may have absolutely no desire to climb Mt Whitney (or any other mountain) again. You have accomplished your goal, but there is no impetus toward repeating the relevant activity or the pleasure that issues from it.

I speculate that there are quite a few activities and resulting pleasures that are relevantly similar to those in the above case. Some of these are activities in which one sets out to prove something to oneself or other people. Others may be activities in which one sets a goal which is essentially 'comparative' in some way—one wants to win a race or some prize, one wants to be the brightest, most productive, most popular, fastest, and so forth (in some given context). Frequently (although certainly not invariably), upon reaching such essentially comparative goals, one finds them either disappointing or 'complete in themselves'; in any case, there is relatively little energy or impetus to repeat the accomplishments. (Of course, the energizing aspect of such accomplishments will vary with the nature of the accomplishment and the individual's personality; for some individuals, such achievements only whet the appetite for more, whereas this is not the case for others.)

I suspect, then, that the class of self-exhausting pleasures (both disappointing and not) is rather large. But these are *not* the *only* sort of pleasures. There are also 'repeatable pleasures'. Here an individual may well find the pleasure highly fulfilling and completely satisfying at the moment and yet wish to have more (i.e., to *repeat* the pleasure) at some point in the future (not necessarily immediately). Certain salient sensual pleasures leap immediately to mind: the pleasures of sex, of eating fine meals and drinking fine wines, of listening to beautiful music, of seeing great art, and so forth. These, or many of them, seem to be—at least for many people—repeatable pleasures. (Note that the distinction between self-exhausting and repeatable pleasures must be *relativized to particular individuals*; this having been said, there will presumably be some similarities across different individuals.)

It is not evident that the distinction between self-exhausting and repeatable pleasures can be understood or explained in terms of other notions. That is, it is not clear that the repeatable pleasures are 'higher', 'more noble', 'more intrinsically compelling', 'more complex', 'more intense', and so forth. It just seems to be a fact about us that we find that some pleasures are self-exhausting and some are repeatable, and it

is not clear how even to begin to give an illuminating reductive account of this distinction.<sup>15</sup>

Of course, even repeatable pleasures may become boring or unappealing if distributed too closely (or in an otherwise inappropriate pattern). I suppose that even the most delectable lobster thermidor would quickly become revolting if consumed at every meal. But, as noted above, it is a mistake to suppose that the pleasures must be experienced in this way. Given the appropriate distribution of such pleasures, it seems that an endless life that included some (but perhaps not only) repeatable pleasures would *not* necessarily be boring or unattractive. Perhaps some of the proponents of the 'necessary boredom' thesis tend to attend solely or primarily to the self-exhausting pleasures (and associated activities). But once it is seen that there are also repeatable pleasures, the prospects of a certain sort of immortality are not nearly so grim.

I wish to say a bit more about the distinction between self-exhausting and repeatable pleasures. As the discussion proceeds, I hope it will become evident just how implausible it is to deny that there are repeatable pleasures (or that there can continue to be repeatable pleasures that form part of a mix of pleasurable experiences that extends indefinitely into the future). As a help in further discussing the nature and role of repeatable pleasures, I shall now relate the story of André and his beloved goose liver.<sup>16</sup>

We had just been served the usual airline fare. The man sitting next to me, call him André, tasted his food deliberately, paused thoughtfully for a moment as if he were extracting what little pleasure could be found in the morsel, and then pronounced judgment: 'Surprising, yes this is really rather nice.' He had a cultured European accent and the appearance of a man dissipated not by wanton and reckless living, but by the civilized excess of too much of the good life. I said something to the effect that I thought all airplane food was awful and this seemed to be no exception. André looked at me with a type of patient parental disappointment. My comment had revealed how little I knew about life. 'Well, of course, this "food" is terrible— not really *food* at all. But this is an airplane, isn't it? And the point is that this turkey is much superior to what one normally finds in such environs. That is the pleasure in it.' It became clear that André's senses were far more refined than mine. He had trained himself to glean what little enjoyment could be found even in something so bland as a turkey sandwich on United.

He began to relate the various meals he had eaten at different times. And this was how we at last came to the topic of the beloved goose liver. A goose liver, you see, properly nurtured and prepared, simply is better than the best of any other food. André became quiet for a time—lost in reveries like one remembering old and dear friends.

He began slowly, reverently to recall for me the rare times when he had found his beloved goose liver. There were the times growing up in Hungary—a country which, as everyone knows, really is the best country at producing goose liver. Later there were great moments when he would return to Hungary to visit his relatives; they would scrimp and save in order to have the week's wages necessary to procure the goose liver. Certainly this was extravagant, but so great was his joy eating the meal that everyone at the table felt it was a small price to pay.

There were other rare occasions in places like Vienna and New York where André would find and become reacquainted with his beloved goose liver in new surroundings. But such moments carried with them tremendous opportunities for disappointment. Not infrequently, the prized liver would be ruined by a clumsy chef who completely lacked the proper respect for the bounty he was preparing. Once, however, André was traveling through a little town in the Swiss Alps. He happened upon an average-looking restaurant around dinnertime. There on the menu was the daily special—goose liver. He inquired after the details of the dish—was it fresh, how was it prepared, and so forth. The answers encouraged him to order the meal. Upon its arrival at his table, André was surprised beyond his wildest dreams. He exclaimed to the waitress that he must meet the chef, for there were only two or three men in the world (he knew them all) who could prepare the beloved goose liver so expertly. How was it possible that the masterpiece could be produced so casually here? Much to André's surprise, when the chef was brought to the table, he turned out to be one of the famous chefs who had prepared André a meal years earlier. (The chef had some family business in the area and was cooking in the restaurant as a favor to the owner who was his friend.) The chef was, of course, delighted to find someone who truly appreciated the treasure which had been laid before him, and the two talked late into the night. André extended his stay in the town three days. He ordered goose liver every night.

Evidently, André's enthusiasm is food. Surely, the pleasures of the goose liver are *repeatable* pleasures for André. And it seems that André does not need such exotic culinary adventures to achieve significant repeatable pleasures; indeed, he gets such pleasures from a wide variety of gastronomic experiences, both elaborate and pedestrian. Further, I see no reason to think that André's pleasures would cease to be repeatable, if part of an immortal life (in which the pleasures are appropriately distributed. Goose liver for breakfast, lunch and dinner would no doubt rather rapidly turn even André's stomach).

To extend the point. Really, it seems that there are many repeatable pleasures; when one thinks about it—and specific accounts such as that of André help to bring home the point—Williams's necessary boredom

thesis becomes very implausible. Think, for instance, of the pleasures of listening to great music. I get extraordinary pleasure from listening to Bach's Second Partita for the Unaccompanied Violin. (Whereas I am certainly not immune to gastronomical delights, Bach's Second Partita is my beloved goose liver.) And I see no reason why it would cease to be a repeatable pleasure, if part of an immortal life (in which there were an appropriate mix of activities and pleasures). Certainly, there are other such pleasures, such as the pleasures of visiting a great art museum, or a great and beautiful city, such as Paris, Venice or San Francisco. (I cannot imagine *ever* getting tired of the view of the city of San Francisco from the Golden Gate Bridge, or the feeling of the fog engulfing me in Golden Gate Park, or the beautiful plaintive sound of the foghorns in the distance. I have *no* tendency to think that these pleasures would become less compelling, unless pursued in a single-minded or compulsive fashion.)

In this section I have in a very sketchy way suggested a distinction between self-exhausting and repeatable pleasures. Although I have not analyzed or developed the distinction in detail, I have suggested that it is a mistake to suppose that all pleasures are relevantly similar to the self-exhausting sort. I wish briefly here to allude to a treatment of these issues which (like Williams's) is insufficiently attentive to the distinction in question. In Kierkegaard's pseudonymous essay 'The Rotation Method', the aesthete 'A' properly rejects the idea that there must be *one* activity which is the sole source of pleasure and which is pursued relentlessly over the course of a lifetime. Rather, 'A' endorses a system of rotating pleasures just as an efficient farmer might rotate his crops to achieve a better result. But even with the rotation method 'A' finds life boring:

Starting from a principle is affirmed by people of experience to be a very reasonable procedure; I am willing to humor them, and so begin with the principle that all men are bores. Surely no one will prove himself so great a bore as to contradict me in this.

...All men are bores. The word itself suggests the possibility of a subdivision. It may just as well indicate a man who bores others as one who bores himself. Those who bore others are the mob, the crowd, the infinite multitude of men in general. Those who bore themselves are the elect, the aristocracy; and it is a curious fact that those who do not bore themselves usually bore others, while those who bore themselves entertain others.<sup>17</sup>

But whereas Kierkegaard's hedonist 'A' avoids some of the errors discussed above by adopting the rotation method, he evidently does *not* avoid the error of ignoring or underestimating the repeatable pleasures. Given the existence of such pleasures, a life with a suitable arrangement of them need not be boring. And I do not see why an immortal life with such a mix of repeatable pleasures would necessarily be boring.

Kierkegaard wished to convince us to turn away from hedonism and toward spiritual and religious experiences. I have suggested that he ignored the possibility of a range of pleasures which clearly are accessible even to persons who do not have spiritual or religious experiences. But for those who do indeed have such experiences, there would seem to be even more reason to embrace immortal life; surely, the deep and resonant rewards of spiritual and religious experience would not somehow become wooden or etiolated, if part of an endless life. What reason is there to suppose that such experiences would change their character in such circumstances?

Williams usefully distinguishes between 'conditional' and 'categorical' desires.<sup>18</sup> The conditional desires are desires for certain things, given that one will continue to live. Someone surely will want adequate clothing, food, shelter, and so forth, on the condition that he or she will continue to be alive. But such a person may not prefer to continue to live. Preferences which imply an answer to the question of whether one wishes to be alive are categorical desires. Presumably—although Williams does not explicitly say this—there can be both 'positive' and 'negative' categorical desires. A positive categorical desire implies the desire to continue to live, whereas a negative categorical desire implies the desire not to continue to live.

Perhaps the distinction between self-exhausting and repeatable pleasures can go some distance toward illuminating Williams's claim that one would lose one's positive categorical desires in an immortal life. Granted, this might be true if one focused exclusively on self-exhausting pleasures. After a while—perhaps a long while—these desires would lose their capacity to ground categorical desires and to propel one into the future. But I see no reason to think that the repeatable pleasures would lose their energizing and 'propulsive' character. Further, spiritual and religious experiences would seem to be relevantly similar to the repeatable pleasures in this respect; they seem capable of providing the basis for positive categorical desires, even in an immortal life.<sup>19</sup>

So far I have been concerned to discuss the first horn of Williams's dilemma pertinent to the attractiveness condition (presented above). That is, I have discussed the necessary boredom thesis in the context of a relatively fixed character. Let me now say just a few very brief words about the second horn, according to which the relevant individual's character changes over time. Williams suggests that it is now unclear that the individual will find such immortality attractive, given that it is unclear that there is the appropriate relationship between the individual's current character and future goals, values, and interests.

This sort of case notoriously raises fascinating but complex issues.<sup>20</sup> But the basic point is that it seems that an individual could value such an existence if he or she felt that the change in character would result from *certain sorts of sequences*. That is, if I felt that my future character



will be different from my present one as a result of appropriate reflection at future times upon my experiences given my 'then-current' character, then I might well value such an existence. One's attitudes toward future changes of character depend on *how* and *why* the changes take place.

Surely in our ordinary, finite lives we envisage certain changes in our values and preferences over time. For example, one may currently value excitement and challenge; thus, one might wish to live in an urban area with many career and avocational opportunities (but with lousy weather and a high crime rate). Still, one might envisage a time in the future when one will be older and will prefer warm weather, serenity, and security. One can certainly envisage a time when one will prefer to live in a condominium in a warm, safe place, even if one currently thrives on life in Manhattan. And one need not look at the future stages of one's life (in which significant changes in values and preferences have taken place) as unattractive; certainly, they are not so unattractive as to render death preferable!

Thus, there are quite ordinary cases in our finite lives in which we envisage changes in our characters—our values and preferences—and which are not so unattractive as to render death preferable. Why, then, could not the same be true of immortal existence? As above, why set such radically different standards for immortal life and mortal life?

Granted, if one's character is changed by brainwashing, coercion, deception or various other methods, one might find the resultant existence thoroughly unattractive. But why assimilate all changes of character to these? And a devoted conservative republican may find it unthinkable that she become a liberal democrat, even by rather less exotic means of transformation. But it is not evident to me that such a person would actually prefer death. An even so, there is no reason to assimilate *all* changes of character to such a change; all that is required, in order to defend the thesis that immortality is not necessarily unattractive (on this horn of the dilemma), is that there be certain changes of character plausibly envisaged as part of an immortal life which would not be so unattractive as to render death preferable.

#### IV

In this essay I have explored some of the philosophical puzzles pertaining to immortality. More specifically, I have used Bernard Williams's important and influential discussion as a springboard for analyzing what I take to be certain problems with the claim that immortality is necessarily unattractive. I have argued that it is unfair to suppose that, in order for immortality to be attractive, it must consist of some *single* activity pursued at the expense of others. Further, it is unfair to demand that, in order for immortality to be attractive, it must consist

of *entirely* pleasurable or agreeable experiences; why suppose the standards for immortal life are in this respect different from the standards for mortal life? Also, one may be entirely 'lost' in an engrossing activity in the sense of not *focusing* (primarily) upon oneself; it is quite another matter to say that the relevant experiences are not *one's own*. Finally, it is important to distinguish two different kinds of pleasures: self-exhausting pleasures and repeatable pleasures. A life without repeatable pleasures might well eventually become boring. But it is a mistake to suppose that an immortal life must contain only self-exhausting pleasures at the expense of repeatable pleasures. The repeatable pleasures—perhaps together with spiritual and religious experiences—could provide a reasonable basis for positive categorical desires even in an immortal life. It has been a recurrent theme of my discussion that it is quite unfair to set radically different standards for finite life and immortal life.

#### NOTES

I am very grateful to careful and insightful comments by Mark Ravizza. Also, I have benefited from the comments of anonymous readers for the *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*. Finally, some of the material in this essay is based on ideas that also appear (in telescoped form) in the introductory essay in *The Metaphysics of Death* and 'Models of Immortality' (see notes 1 and 2).

1. Bernard Williams, 'The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality', in Bernard Williams, *Problems of the Self* (Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 82–100; reprinted in John Martin Fischer (ed.) *The Metaphysics of Death* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).

2. For a general taxonomy of models of immortality and a discussion of the bearing of Williams's two criteria on several of these models, see the appendix to this chapter.

3. Williams, op. cit. note 1, p. 90.

4. Presumably, the essential boredom thesis is meant to apply to creatures of a certain sort—creatures relevantly similar to us. Otherwise, it would follow from the thesis that God's existence is boring and unattractive (insofar as God is essentially everlasting).

5. Williams, op. cit. note 1, p. 89.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

7. *Ibid.* p. 97.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 94–5.

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. This notion of 'completeness in itself' is different from Aristotle's notion according to which certain activities—*energeiai*—are complete in themselves.

Aristotle distinguishes *energeia* from *kinesis*, which are not complete in themselves. Roughly, Aristotle's distinction corresponds to activities which are movements toward a certain product and which are not complete until the production of the product, and activities which are not so understood.

At *Metaphysics* Theta Six, Aristotle introduces the 'tense test' to distinguish *energeia* and *kinesis*. According to the tense test, if the verb 'X-ing' is an *energeia* verb, then 'I am X-ing' entails 'I have X-ed'. For example, 'I am enjoying myself' entails 'I have enjoyed myself'. If the verb is a *kinesis* verb, 'I am X-ing' entails 'I have not X-ed'. For example, 'I am learning [something]' entails 'I have not learned [the thing]'. There is an analogue of the tense test which is a non-linguistic phenomenon. The proper parts of *energeia* X are also X's: the proper parts of enjoyings are enjoyings. The proper parts of *kinesis* Y are not also Y's: the proper parts of a walking from A to B are not walkings from A to B. For some discussions of the tense test, see: J.L. Ackrill, 'Aristotle's Distinction Between *energeia* and *kinesis*', in R. Bambrough (ed.) *New Essays in Plato and Aristotle* (New York: Humanities Press, 1965); and Terry Penner, 'Verbs and the Identity of Actions—A Philosophical Exercise in the Interpretation of Aristotle', in O.P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds) *Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970).

15. It is an interesting philosophical question: *Why* are some pleasures self-exhausting and others repeatable?

16. For the story of André I am indebted to Mark Ravizza. Since the original publication of this essay, I have become aware of the cruel practices involved in producing goose liver; I would not have used Mark Ravizza's otherwise nice (and true) story, if I had known of these practices.

17. Søren Kierkegaard, 'The Rotation Method', in *Either/Or*, in *A Kierkegaard Anthology*, ed. Robert Bretall (New York: The Modern Library, 1946), pp. 21, 23–4.

18. Williams, op. cit. note 1, pp. 85–6.

19. It has been brought to my attention that there may indeed be some experiences in life that we savor and value (to the extent we actually do) precisely because we know that we will not enjoy them forever. It is difficult for me to know whether this is really the case, and to what extent (if so). But let me grant that it is true. This admission would not in itself undermine my strategy of argumentation, for even if certain pleasures are expunged or diminished, the repeatable ones may still make immortal life worthwhile. And it is also worth noting that there certainly are painful and unpleasant experiences associated precisely with the fact that we *cannot* have certain relationships and experiences forever: loss and death notoriously impose great pain and suffering upon us. I see no reason to suppose that the diminution in pleasures issuing from immortality would be greater than the diminution in pain and suffering.

20. See, for example, Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

## Appendix to Chapter 6: Philosophical Models of Immortality in Science Fiction

John Martin Fischer and Ruth Curl


Science fiction (SF) is often described as a literary genre well suited to philosophical speculation. SF and philosophy share a common interest in the question of immortality, and comparisons and contrasts can be made regarding their respective treatments of the theme. We propose here a sketchy taxonomy of different models or pictures of immortality offered by philosophers and SF writers. After noting important differences in these models, we shall suggest that some problems and concerns expressed by philosophers and SF writers alike are the result of conflating different models. It is our hope that these comparisons will provide a preliminary sense of the way SF can be said to function as philosophical discourse.

Our discussion will use as its base the analytical framework presented in Bernard Williams's influential discussion of immortality, *The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality*.<sup>1</sup> This simple and natural framework involves two criteria to make immortality truly appealing: first, there must be a future in which an individual can recognize himself or herself—someone genuinely *identical* to the individual, not just qualitatively similar or with several identical properties. Second, the future life of the individual must be *appealing* (in some way) to that individual; it cannot involve constant torture, hard labor, tedium, or the like. These conditions can be dubbed the *identity condition* and the *attractiveness condition*. With these, we can construct a taxonomy of different models of immortality (see Table 6.1).

Although our focus will be the immortality of sentient creatures or constructs, another treatment of immortality in SF is also possible: universe immortality, in which there is an attempt to overcome laws of entropy to create an immortal world, forever self-perpetuating. The center of attention here is not the immortality of sentient creatures but rather the immortality of the physical universe.<sup>2</sup> Only SF seems to deal with universe immortality; and while it is not our focus, this vision of immortality merits attention because it has no corollary in other fields of literature or philosophy.



Table 6.1. A taxonomy of immortality



We turn now to depictions of immortality pertaining to sentient entities, beginning with a distinction between *nonatomistic* and *atomistic* concepts of immortality. The former involves a kind of *fusion* of different individuals into a type of immortal entity; the latter involves the immortality of individuals. The nonatomistic model usually involves the merging of various individuals into some sort of superorganism. The individual's stream of consciousness may either be retained, as in Greg Bear's *Blood Music*, or lost, as in Arthur C. Clarke's *Childhood's End* and one episode of Robert A. Heinlein's *Methuselah's Children*.<sup>3</sup>

In *Blood Music*, a brilliant researcher, after losing his job, injects himself with lymphocytes he has genetically manipulated so that he can smuggle them out of the lab and continue his research. The altered

lymphocytes then invade the biosphere and trigger the mutation of humanity into a new organism composed of individually intelligent cells. Eventually the cells unite to form a superintelligent being. Each cell can either function separately or compartmentalize with other cells, which can then isolate themselves to work on various problems. Bear's vision of the mutation and transformation of humanity is best expressed in the novel's last lines: "Nothing is lost. Nothing is forgotten. It was in the blood, the flesh. And now it is forever" (BM 247).

In *Childhood's End*, children and adolescents transform beyond the comprehension of the rest of humanity. Clarke's vision clearly shows a complete but unintentional and uncontrollable break with human characteristics, memories, and emotions. In *Methuselah's Children*, members of the Howard Families (immortals in a mortal world) fleeing persecution on Earth and searching for a hospitable planet encounter the Little People, who "in an utterly basic sense... differed from humans in kind. They were not individuals. No single body of a native housed a discrete individual. Their individuals were multi-bodied, they had group 'souls.' The basic unit of their society was a telepathic rapport group of many parts. The number of bodies and brains housing one individual ran as high as ninety or more and was never less than thirty-odd" (MC 134-5).

Clearly, there can be different versions of the nonatomistic approach, including differences in the nature of the transition from individuals to composites, which can be a genetic mutation (as in *Blood Music*, ignoring for the moment the manipulation by Vergil) or a nonmutational evolutionary transformation (as in *Childhood's End*). And there can be differences in the nature of the composites: for example, there may be one or many composites, and the existence of the composites might be relatively desirable or undesirable.

But any sort of nonatomistic immortality—even one in which the nature of the composite's existence is relatively attractive—appears to run afoul of Williams's first criterion: the identity criterion. Arguably, the types of fusion envisaged in nonatomistic models (even ones that somehow preserve individual streams of consciousness) do not allow individuals to look forward to *their own* future existence. As such, these nonatomistic models are not very appealing models of immortality.

Is it then appropriate to eliminate nonatomistic models? When we look to the future we seem to care about the welfare of our communities and friends, the planet and its nations. We might care about the continued development of the arts, the preservation of natural beauty, the attainment of human rights and distributive justice; but we care especially about how *we ourselves* will fare—we especially look forward to future pleasurable states of ourselves and particularly reject prospective unpleasant future states of ourselves. So, for example, if we are told that some future individuals will be tortured horribly for days, we can genuinely regret this; however, if we are then told that those people

will be ourselves, we are horrified—we *especially* regret this. Thus, individuals might care to some extent about a future in which individuals have become group entities of certain sorts; indeed, it might even be desirable in some sense. But we do not and cannot look at such a prospect in the special and especially vivid way we look at future scenarios in which we exist as individuals. This special sense in which we care *particularly* about what happens to us is not engaged by nonatomistic models of immortality.

Since nonatomistic models seem to run afoul of the identity condition, let us instead turn to atomistic models of immortality. In this class there are *serial* and *nonserial* models. In serial models of immortality, the individual in question in some ways lives a series of lives; in nonserial models, the individual simply leads an indefinitely long single life.

The atomistic serial model of immortality comes in at least two versions: the *disjoint-lives serial model* and the *connected-lives serial model*. In the disjoint-lives model, one individual lives an indefinitely long series of lives without internal psychological connections: there are no significant continuities or connections of memory or other psychological states, such as values, beliefs, desires, and intentions, from one life to the next. In this view, the self is some sort of soul or bare particular without any essential mental contents. When the soul enters a new body, the person itself persists, even if there are no remaining memories, beliefs, preferences, values, or intentions. This model recalls the Hindu model of reincarnation. A possible metaphor is the tulip bulb—the different lives correspond to the different plants and flowers that spring from the bulb from one year to the next, whereas the persisting self corresponds to the essential bulb.

But, like the nonatomistic model, the disjoint-lives serial model runs afoul of the identity condition. It is unclear how an individual could recognize a future individual as genuinely identical to himself or herself if there is no psychological connection between the two (including connections of memory). We do not know if it is metaphysically coherent to suppose that persistence of personal identity means the persistence of a bare, psychologically empty soul; there are deep perplexities here into which we cannot go. Even if the model is metaphysically coherent, the identity condition does not seem to be satisfied in the relevant way, a way that makes it possible for us to *recognize* ourselves in the future scenario. That is, even if there is no insuperable ontological problem with the disjoint-lives serial picture, there is an epistemic problem: presented with a description of a future scenario, there is no way individuals can recognize or identify *themselves*. And, if the relevant future person has no psychological connection to the current individual, why should the individual care especially (in the way one cares especially about *oneself*) about this future person? Given this problem, the disjoint-lives model is unappealing—it cannot capture the sense in which we might value especially our own immortality.

Unfortunately, the connected-lives serial model fares no better. Imagine, if you can, what it would be like to lead one life—to go through childhood, adolescence, and all the stages of life—accumulate memories and associated values, and then begin again: go through a second childhood (but with memories of the previous life), a second adolescence (but with memories of the previous life plus the new childhood), and so forth. What would it be like to be a small child carrying memories of adolescence, marriage, raising a family, seeing one's children grow up, and so forth? The model of full or robust psychological connections within serial lives seems either entirely incoherent or entirely unattractive; in any case, it surely does not meet the two criteria. Nor does it seem possible to weaken the psychological connections in any natural or appealing way; in particular, it does not seem plausible that one could have only certain memories (just enough to be able to recognize oneself as a persisting entity) at certain stages of life. This would involve “blackouts” of parts of memory at some stages and not others—an almost stroboscopic and bizarre picture of memory. SF often puts a skeptical valence on this sort of connected-lives serial model. Consider Clarke's *The City and the Stars* (1956). In this novel people are reborn into new bodies without memories of previous lives; then, as they near adulthood, they gradually remember their previous lives. From the perspective of the “new” individual, it would surely be disconcerting to be suddenly flooded by a vast set of old memories of earlier lives; and—more relevant to the issue of immortality—from the perspective of the “old” individual, it would not be pleasant to stop being conscious one day, then reawaken with a new set of memories involving a new childhood and adolescence.

Thus, even though SF novels may claim that a character leads many lives, our ruminations above lead us to call this possibility into question. On closer scrutiny, these novels do not depict characters who themselves lead different lives in the senses required by the serial model. A particular character (say, Lazarus Long) does not lead many lives; rather, *he* leads *one* extended life in which many other people play roles. Many lives become part of his life when they intersect it—but Long himself does not genuinely lead a series of lives. (A life with a series of people need not be a series of lives.)

Our taxonomic trail leads finally to atomistic nonserial conceptions of immortality, of which there are various versions. Primarily, these involve different ways of *generating* or *maintaining* the indefinitely long life, and different ways of viewing the *nature* of the life (pattern and distribution of experiences, relationship to other lives, and so forth).

Let us first consider the different ways of generating or maintaining a nonserial atomistic form of immortality. There are a number of horror stories in which a vampire draws on the life force of another to continue existence. Literature and films have produced many variations

on this theme; the vampire does not always follow the Count Dracula formula. Numerous films, for example, depict beautiful young women who seduce young men to feed off their energy; and Oscar Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1897) features a protagonist who remains young while his portrait ages. In E. E. "Doc" Smith's Lensman series the Overlords live off the life force of the Velantians. In one Balzac story, an old man lives off young girls. A recent Stephen King film, *Sleepwalkers* (1992), depicts a young man who gains vitality from the innocence or purity of young virgins, whom he kills in order to devour their life force, or souls. Obviously, the topic continues to generate discussion.

In Anne McCaffrey's series comprising *Crystal Singer* (1982), *Killashandra* (1985), and *Crystal Line* (1992), humans have developed a symbiosis with a spore, which makes them extremely long-lived. Unfortunately, they must periodically return to the planet of the spores to avoid a terrible death. (This somehow resembles the need to visit one's parents regularly—at least in our families!) In McCaffrey and Jody Lynn Nye's *The Death of Sleep* (1990), the protagonist, who engages in cryogenic sleep, ages only four or five years in seventy-two. Another type of life prolongation is envisioned in Hugo Gernsback's *Ralph 124C 41+*: *A Romance of the Year 2660* (1925), in which a man reacts to a scientist's revival of a dead dog by exclaiming, "I only regret for myself that you had not lived and conducted this experiment when I was a young man, that I might have, from time to time, lived in suspended animation from century to century, and from generation to generation as it will now be possible for human beings to do."<sup>4</sup> This would not be continued conscious existence with stroboscopic memory, but rather stroboscopic consciousness of a certain sort. In some novels, cloning gives characters a form of immortality. For example, in Heinlein's *Time Enough for Love* (1973), Lazarus Long is more or less cloned as his own daughters.

Another biological method of achieving immortality consists in so-called body transfers, which presupposes the falsity of the "bodily identity" criterion of personal identity. In *The World of Null-A* (1948) and *The Players of Null-A* (1956), by A. E. van Vogt, Gosseyn's consciousness transfers from one body (when it is destroyed) to another. As long as there are bodies, he can exist forever. Of course, conceptually one can distinguish between various sorts of body transfers. In some cases the brain is transferred to a different body. In others the brain itself is not transferred, but the mental state is, as in the film *Invasion of the Body Snatchers* (1956); in some of the latter sorts of cases, there can be teleportation as well as mental transfer.<sup>5</sup>

There are also rather less exotic (though by no means mundane) biological methods of generating and maintaining immortality, as portrayed in Mary Shelley's "The Mortal Immortal" (1910) and Larry Niven's *Ringworld* (1970), *Ringworld Engineers* (1979), and *Protector*

(1973), all of which feature immortal beings. In Shelley's story, a young apprentice drinks the creation of his master and becomes immortal. In Niven's books, individuals live for centuries by using a drug especially tailored for their chemistry; without the drug, they die. Any human who eats the Spice of Life becomes a Pak Protector. Human Protectors undergo a physical change that makes them almost unrecognizable as human and a mental change that makes them protect whatever society they are in at the moment. These beings seem to be biological analogues to Isaac Asimov's robots, and they follow laws (instincts, in this case) similar to his Laws of Robotics.

There are also nonbiological methods of generating and maintaining immortality. In *Neuromancer* (1984) William Gibson creates a kind of human immortality by allowing the transfer of human mental states to computers. In Gregory Benford's *Great Sky River* (1987) the transfer is accomplished through the insertion of computer chips into the human, resulting in a combination of biological and mechanical capabilities: though the body may die, the "mind" continues. These procedures involve mental transfer ("downloading" of the "mind") not accompanied by actual brain transfer.<sup>6</sup>

Other SF authors increase human longevity or create immortality by augmenting or supplanting normal human biological capacities through mechanical means. In McCaffrey's *The Ship Who Sang* (1969), a future society trains deformed but mentally functional babies to work in cyborg-type bodies if the parents so choose. This falls under the rubric of cyborg-type models of generating and maintaining atomistic nonserial immortality. In other works, robots are created and then allegedly made sentient. Their mechanical nature makes them more or less immortal. Thus, in Asimov's Robot and Foundation series, Daneel first acquires a feel for human phenomena and then leans more and more toward the human, becoming telepathic to get a better insight into human nature and reasoning. Finally, he makes plans to transfer his knowledge and memories (which in a robot are also his essence) to the brain of a Solarian child, thereby becoming mortal. But it is a prolonged mortality because Solarians, like all Spacers, live three or four hundred years. Further, if he can perform the operation once, he can do it again, particularly because this child is a hermaphrodite who will produce at least one offspring that is for all intents and purposes "itself." So, unlike Andrew Martin in "The Bicentennial Man," Daneel leaves his "option" of immortality open.

One other nonbiological way to produce immortality (one might call it "relativistic" immortality) involves time travel, as in Joe Haldeman's *The Forever War* (1974), in which time travel paradoxes are manipulated to achieve a sort of immortality.<sup>7</sup>

Having briefly surveyed the methods of generating and maintaining immortality (in particular, atomistic nonserial immortality), we now

turn to the *nature* of immortal lives—their relationship to other lives and the pattern and distribution of their experiences.

First, consider a kind of solipsistic model. Heinlein's "'—All You Zombies—'" (1958) features an endless temporal loop in which the protagonist is a man who travels in time. But the pattern of his time travels indicates that he is in fact his own father, mother, and baby. There are other, nonsolipsistic, conceptions of the nature of atomistic nonserial immortality. One posits the "lone immortal" who lives among other individuals, all mortals. There are at least two versions of the lone immortal model—one in which the lone immortal is known by (certain) others to be immortal, and another in which the immortality is a secret. Such models appear, respectively, in Asimov's *The End of Eternity* (1955) and Shelley's "The Mortal Immortal." In another conception the immortal is not alone—perhaps others are immortal, as in *Methuselah's Children*, or perhaps everyone is immortal.

We have found problems with all models of immortality except for atomistic nonserial approaches. Nonatomistic models do not seem to meet the identity criterion, and some atomistic models—in particular the connected-lives serial models—run afoul of the attractiveness criterion (if not also the identity condition). But what about the atomistic nonserial models of immortality? Surely some methods of generating and maintaining immortality (such as feeding off the blood and vitality of others) make the resulting immortality less attractive. And some pictures of the nature of such immortality (such as the solipsistic model) make immortality unappealing. But not all methods of generating immortality are similarly problematic, and not all concepts of the nature of such immortality are straightforwardly problematic. Is there something about the nature of atomistic non-serial immortality that renders it, on reflection, *necessarily* undesirable?

Though some philosophers argue for this undesirability,<sup>8</sup> some SF models are not so pessimistic. A common trait in SF is its faith in the ability of technology to accelerate the moment in the process of history when desirable immortality can be experienced. And today, there is already the hope that the human life span can be extended (through cryonics, for example) long enough to allow us to outlive the immediate causes of death and in a sense live to see the dawn of immortality. Yet SF has negative models, too, and can be every bit as critical of positive aspirations as are many philosophers. One brief example: though some SF novels depict efforts to achieve immortality through transformation into robots or mechanical beings, perhaps an equal number offer the opposite maneuver: a reverse immortality, or "Pinocchio Syndrome," in which an immortal strives to become mortal (not to die, but to become "subject to mortality"). Somehow, even facing the prospect of immortal existence, human (mortal) qualities still retain such value that they are worth the reversal.

Despite a certain symbiosis between models in SF and philosophy, SF may be more open to the possibility of transformation of the human body and life span. But in the end, is SF any more *willing* to abandon human limits? That vast and intriguing question is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this essay.<sup>9</sup>

## NOTES

1. Bernard Williams, *The Makropulos Case: Reflections of the Tedium of Immortality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 82–100.

2. We see such concern expressed in Robert A. Heinlein's "Waldo" (1942) and Isaac Asimov's *The Gods Themselves* (1972), in which an alternate universe is discovered and energy is drawn from it, thus invalidating the law of the conservation of energy and avoiding entropy. In Poul Anderson's *Tau Zero* (1970) the universe contracts until there is too much energy contained in too small a volume and the contracting universe explodes to begin the process of expansion again. In Gregory Benford's *Timescape* (1980), tachyons—particles that travel faster than light—can make universal wave functions split into two or more universes if a causal paradox is created by the tachyonic interaction. These works all depict science fiction's underlying concern with the mortality of the universe.

3. Greg Bear, *Blood Music* (New York: Ace Books, 1986) [BM]; Arthur C. Clarke, *Childhood's End* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980); Robert A. Heinlein, *Methuselah's Children* (New York: Signet Books, 1958) [MC]. Later page references are to these editions.

4. Hugo Gernsback, *Ralph 124C 41+: A Romance of the Year 2660* (New York: Frederick Fell, 1950), 65.

5. For various examples of this, along with an incisive and comprehensive philosophical discussion of the nature of personal identity, see Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

6. See Rudy Rucker, *Software* (New York: Ace Books, 1982).

7. For a philosophical discussion of time travel paradoxes, see Paul Horwich, *Asymmetries in Time* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

8. See Williams, *The Makropulos Case*.

9. For more complete citations and a bibliography of Science Fiction discussions of death and immortality, see John Martin Fischer, ed., *The Metaphysics of Death* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 411–413.