tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-79959812008-02-29T17:21:17.403-08:00Andrew BaileyBlogger282125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-44112394338684208722008-02-28T06:43:00.000-08:002008-02-28T06:49:17.472-08:00

Contemporary analytic philosophy has its bugbears. But I think we do better than most academic disciplines when it comes to the complication fetish humorously described here.

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-51438041749686718132008-02-18T11:21:00.000-08:002008-02-18T11:28:06.206-08:00

NDPR regularly reviews the latest and (sometimes) greatest books in philosophy. Recent gems include Michael Kremer's devastating takedown of a new translation of The Foundations of Arithmetic and this line from Gerald Lang: It is easy, in truth, to make anything look silly if we use upper-case lettering in a certain way... Murder is an injustice, and morality holds it to be seriously wrong. Do we

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-39976283207354781142007-12-06T12:54:00.001-08:002007-12-06T13:03:13.668-08:00

A nine year old went to the Eastern APA meeting. This is what he had to say about the matter: 2 days after Christmas I went to a philosophy confrence [sic]. It was horrible. There were 200 philosophers. They all did weird things. They couldn’t make jokes, many had beards. In the elevator it was worse. Once a philosopher got off on the wrong floor, so said, “wait for me.” “We’ll take you to the

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-91461076391662980082007-09-23T08:39:00.000-07:002007-09-23T08:44:14.410-07:00

Eric Blair (a.k.a. George Orwell) famously gave some advice about writing (quite good advice, I think). I'm pleased to see that Bertrand Russell has something quite similar to say as well: There are some simple maxims which I think might be commended to writers of expository prose. First: never use a long word if a short word will do. Second: if you want to make a statement with a great many

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-12320015839749733442007-09-11T13:47:00.000-07:002007-11-18T08:56:56.825-08:00

I subscribe to a Quinean meta-ontology. I'm committed to Fs existing just in the case that I'm committed to the truth of sentences like `there are Fs' or `there is an x such that Fx.' With this in mind, I'll try in this post to indicate why I believe in events and what I take them to be. This sort of endeavor, is of course, subject to the usual qualifications and hemming and hawing--it's

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-26189798563175314032007-09-03T16:45:00.000-07:002007-09-03T16:46:03.641-07:00

I recently received word that I passed my comprehensive exams in the history of philosophy (`good' in both). This is, to say the least, a relief. While I read no primary texts in preparation for the exam, it was a lot of work and something I'm glad to have behind me. Next up: finishing coursework and then oral examinations in my areas of research!

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-85344004826863343552007-08-12T07:49:00.000-07:002007-08-12T07:51:56.677-07:00

I shall here articulate Hume’s most important contributions to the problem of liberty and necessity (that is: free will and determinism). For Hume, determinism (`the doctrine of necessity’) is the thesis that everything that happens has a necessitating antecedent cause. And Hume thinks that anyone who understands what cause and effect are should accept this thesis (or at least a formulation

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-86750939689474386972007-08-11T14:00:00.000-07:002007-08-12T08:01:19.615-07:00

I shall here present Augustine’s arguments for the doctrine of divine ideas and divine illumination. Augustine is a platonist. That is, he thinks that there are perfect and immutable objects of knowledge in virtue of which ordinary objects have the features they do. But unlike early platonists (and unlike Plato himself, if we may be so bold), Augustine doesn’t think that these perfect and

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-880531181094364242007-08-10T09:31:00.000-07:002007-08-12T08:27:42.990-07:00

I here articulate an interpretation of Kant’s famous Transcendental Deduction. My goal shall be to sketch a minimally plausible argument that can be attributed to Kant (with some minimum degree of plausibility). There are two dangers when engaging in this project: on the one hand, I could give a textually faithful rendition of Kant's argument on which the argument turns out to be radically

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-62320065551271518622007-08-09T15:04:00.000-07:002007-08-12T08:04:28.311-07:00

The history of philosophy of littered with monists. Parmenides was a monist about our most general sortal terms (`thing', `object'); the later Plato was (probably) a monist about Form. Aquinas was (arguably) a monist about human Soul. With these luminaries stands Spinoza, a substance monist. I shall here articulate Spinoza’s central argument for substance monism as clearly as I can. I shall

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-21762517033303888142007-08-08T12:15:00.000-07:002007-08-12T08:07:32.394-07:00

I shall here explicate Aristotle’s celebrated ergon, or function argument. On my reading, the argument goes something like this: 1. For anything, its function (ergon) is its characteristic (peculiar) activity. 2. For anything, if it’s got a good, it’s good is the excellent (arete) performance of its function. 3. So if humans have a good, the good for humans is the excellent performance of the

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-52837368613492657002007-08-07T09:05:00.000-07:002007-08-17T06:28:10.756-07:00

Nearly every medieval philosopher who treated universals employed (at one time or other) the so-called formal distinction. I shall here state this distinction as clearly as I can (following the early Scotus), offer examples of it, and then give one of Ockham’s arguments against the coherence of such a distinction. It’s easiest to state the formal distinction by noting its relation to two other

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-8212452177752679082007-08-06T11:11:00.000-07:002007-08-12T08:11:51.409-07:00

I shall here explicate how Aristotle and Plato respectively account for the possibility of change or becoming. I shall first articulate the problem they inherited from Parmenides, give Plato’s apparent solution, and then Aristotle’s. Parmenides argued that becoming was impossible: what comes to be comes to be either from what is or what is not. Not the latter, since nothing comes from nothing.

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-11182060959257143272007-08-03T11:07:00.000-07:002007-08-03T08:07:48.632-07:00

(Context)

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-63617396113927631702007-08-02T10:44:00.000-07:002007-08-02T07:44:43.350-07:00

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Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-49213716679829602342007-08-01T09:24:00.000-07:002007-08-01T07:37:13.865-07:00

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Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-58551838873251594792007-07-31T15:05:00.000-07:002007-07-31T12:05:27.137-07:00

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Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-16640012769305227762007-07-30T09:21:00.000-07:002007-07-29T21:15:41.713-07:00

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Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-89183609410084828242007-07-29T07:47:00.001-07:002007-07-29T07:59:54.083-07:00

(Context)

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-13005497287937448352007-07-26T15:10:00.000-07:002007-07-29T07:48:19.824-07:00

One recent internet phenomenon has become known as a lolcat: a cute or funny picture of a cat, using non-standard grammar and spelling (usually 1337). More generally, these are known as image macros. Odd pictures with funny captions. In this grand tradition, I start this series dedicated to lolfilosofers. Here's the first (a lolleiter, if you like):

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-12500075768794146462007-07-11T11:41:00.000-07:002007-07-11T11:52:10.376-07:00

I'm no historian; my philosophical research is entirely contemporary. But I am studying this summer for comprehensive exams in the history of philosophy. Two thinkers who have stood out to me (that is, thinkers I've ending up liking) are Leibniz and Locke. Leibniz reminds me of David Lewis: he's a system-builder and unafraid of doing metaphysics in the grand old style. He says fantastic things

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-18579439294791931372007-07-03T09:50:00.000-07:002007-07-03T10:01:42.168-07:00

I recently read Ray Monk's biography of Wittgenstein--and it is wonderful. Monk has done his research, and I especially enjoyed the many diary entries and such--it really brings Wittgenstein to life as a character. He was a fascinating man, and I say this as someone who has virtually no interest in him as a philosopher. One particularly interesting feature of Wittgenstein's life is the sheer

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-22423073222918041402007-05-26T16:45:00.000-07:002007-08-03T00:30:08.087-07:00

I've learned a lot in the last academic year. In some areas of philosophy, the more I learn, the less I know; study pushes me into agnosticism toward the standard list of doctrinal options. But after a year of graduate study in philosophy, here are some things I affirm: Metaphysics: Quinean meta-ontology: existence is being, and xs exist if and only if there are some of them.Actualism: there

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-21548874013152209262007-05-18T10:50:00.000-07:002007-05-18T10:53:02.057-07:00

Alvin Plantinga distinguishes between de jure and de facto objections to Christian belief. De facto objections say that some Christian doctrine is false, while de jure objections say that some Christian doctrine is inappropriate, irrational, or unjustified. Plantinga also famously argues that a successful de jure objection requires a successful de facto objection. The truth of the matter about

Andrew Baileytag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7995981.post-1654470373621051222007-05-09T12:14:00.000-07:002007-05-09T12:20:50.925-07:00

I rather like movies. And I rather liked this defense of Hollywood Summer Blockbusters in the New York Times: A good blockbuster, like the recent Bond flick “Casino Royale,” takes you places you might never otherwise go and shows you things you could never do. It brings you into new worlds, offers you new attractions. It takes hold of your body, making you quiver with anxiety, joy, laughter,

Andrew Bailey