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Ratiocination

Back in the Bend


I've had a bit of a whirlwind of a weekend, giving papers at the Pacific SCP conference and at USC/UCLA (papers in philosophy of mind and free will, respectively). To those readers who were at these conferences and gave feedback on my work; thank you!

I ran into a number of interesting objections to work on and I'll post results here as they emerge. In particular, I'm interested in getting a little clearer on some theoretical constraints in the 'moral responsibility for a material conditional' debate. Several members of the audience at USC/UCLA really pressed this point (as did my able commentator Billy Dunnaway) and the discussion has given me something to think about.

BonJour vs. Externalism


Laurence BonJour (in his influential book, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge) articulates a basic worry for externalism about epistemic justification: 'Why should the mere fact that an external relation obtains confer justification for a subject when the relation in question is ’entirely outside his ken? As BonJour is well aware, this worry is not all that different than a mere denial of the externalist's central claim. But BonJour does give some teeth to the worry in the form of several counterexamples. I here evaluate one of these and find it lacking.

Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power under circumstances in which it is completely reliable.

Norman is not justified in believing that the President is in New York City, though both Armstrong and Goldman's formulations of externalism imply that he is. So much the worse for externalism, BonJour says. But I suggest that the externalist ought to press BonJour on the claim that Norman's belief isn't justified. In the sequel, I develop two promising strategies toward this end.

Strategy 1: Undermine BonJour's Dilemma. Call the belief that the President is in New York p, and the belief (which Norman may or may not have) that Norman has reliable clairvoyant powers q. BonJour argues that Norman's belief is not justified by proposing the following dilemma: either Norman has belief q or he does not. But q would lack justification (even on the externalist criterion), should Norman have it. q's lack of justification would infect all beliefs generated by the clairvoyant faculty, so p wouldn't be justified either. If, on the other hand, Norman does not have belief q, then it's hard to see how it would be reasonable for him to believe strange hunches about the President, hunches coming from some process he's not aware of. So in either case, p isn't justified.

Neither horn of the dilemma is particularly sharp. Consider horn one: externalists will want to know how belief q has been formed. If it has been generated by a reliable cognitive faculty or process (to put things crudely), it is justified. Otherwise, not. In the former case, BonJour's argument for the non-justified status of p fails. In the latter, externalism generates the right result, viz., that p is not justified.

Now take horn two: I reply that it's not at all obvious that beliefs coming from mysterious faculties (ie, those faculties we lack beliefs about, especially beliefs about their reliability) are ipso facto unjustified. I develop this thought in my discussion of Strategy 2.

Strategy 2: A Parity Argument. The thought here is simple. Consider afresh a case like Norman's, but replace 'clairvoyance' with 'hearing' throughout.

Norma, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable listener with respect to certain kinds of sounds. She possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power or for or against the thesis that she possesses it. One day Norma comes to believe that one particular sound is louder than some other, though she has no evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from her exercising her hearing power under circumstances in which it is completely reliable.

Is Norma's belief justified? I'm inclined to think it is. And if it's odd to think of Norma lacking beliefs or evidence about which cognitive faculties she has and how reliable they are (especially as ordinary a faculty as hearing), add this detail: Norma has never heard anything in her life (a birth defect, say) until undergoing a radical surgery which gave her the gift of sound. Add further that Norma is not aware of her recent surgery, and has never considered beliefs about the possibility of her having the power of hearing.

Again I ask, is Norma's belief justified? It's hard to see why not, and I trust that this thought has some pull even for internalists. But now see that we have the makings of a parity argument. Norman, like Norma, is exercising a reliable cognitive faculty for the first time, and like Norma, lacks any beliefs or evidence about its existence, reliability, and so forth. Since Norma's belief is justified, so too is Norman's. Until BonJour can cite a relevant (and 'internalist-friendly') distinction between the cases, I suggest he's in a bind. Thus, there is a plausible argument for the claim that Norman's belief is in fact justified, precisely the result that Armstrong's and Goldman's formulations of externalism give us.

Externalism Remixed. Suppose everything I've said is mistaken. Suppose further that Armstrong and Goldman's externalist accounts fail because they don't give the right answer to cases like Norman's. The externalist proper still need not be up a creek without a paddle. Take a proper-functionalist spin on externalism, according to which (crudely) a belief is justified when it is formed by a reliable belief-forming process actually governed by a design plan: a belief-forming process that is reliable and operating in accord with its function. (There is much to say about this account, of course, but the details aren't relevant to my current purposes).

The proper-functionalist has a way of distinguishing between clairvoyance cases like Norman's and ordinary cases involving sense perception (contra BonJour). Norman is not justified in his belief since clairvoyant faculties aren't governed by any design plan (it's plausible that neither God nor any evolutionary process 'made Norman to work that way,' say). Normal perceptual faculties, on the other hand, are, and when they function properly, the beliefs they generate are justified.

The externalist has a story to tell, then, which gets the right answers. While BonJour has at best landed a blow against Armstrong and Goldman, externalism proper is secure from his attacks.

Ron Paul on War


I'm encouraged to see these words spoken on the floor of the House:

Our policies have been driven by neoconservative empire radicalism; profiteering in the military industrial complex; misplaced do-good internationalism; mercantilistic notions regarding the need to control natural resources; and blind loyalty to various governments in the Middle East.


Paul even takes on that meaningless and all-justifying phrase "the war on terrorism." In short, it's hard for me to remember the last time I've heard anything this sensible and courageous from the mouth of a member of Congress.

In Defense of Externalism


Got a feeling inside (Can't explain)
It's a certain kind (Can't explain)

-The Who, "I Can't Explain"

I just believe
I just
Believe it
And sometimes I dunno why

-Newsboys, "Believe"

Pop culture references aside, I've been thinking about externalism about justification as of late. I have opinions on the topic, but the one I hold most strongly these days is this: Laurence BonJour's arguments against externalism are decidedly unimpressive. Coming soon: a partial defense of this claim.