Where I Stand
- Posted by Andrew Bailey on Saturday, May 26, 2007 at 4:45 PM
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9 Comments |
I've learned a lot in the last academic year. In some areas of philosophy, the more I learn, the less I know; study pushes me into agnosticism toward the standard list of doctrinal options. But after a year of graduate study in philosophy, here are some things I affirm:
Metaphysics:
- Quinean meta-ontology: existence is being, and xs exist if and only if there are some of them.
- Actualism: there aren't any non-actual objects.
- Theism: one God, three persons.
- Platonism: properties, propositions, sets, worlds, numbers, states of affairs. These are my friends and I quantify over them on a regular basis.
- Abstractionism: possible worlds are ways things could be (not the things that are that way), while impossible worlds are ways things couldn't be (not things that couldn't be the way they are).
- Restricted compositionalism: tables and chairs are zero in number.
- Physicalism (with respect to human persons): I am my body.
- Non-presentism: there are things at a temporal distance from me.
- Endurantism: I last, and I don't have any proper temporal parts.
- Tenseless quantification: it happens (if only 'in the philosophy room').
Free Will:
- Incompatibilism with respect to freedom and determinism: if determinism is true, no one can do otherwise.
- Compatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism: but even if determinism is true, I'm still a person and an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes (praise, blame, and the like).
- Frankfurtian: moral responsibility doesn't require alternative possibilities.
- Kantianism: 'ought' implies 'can,' but maybe not a very strong sense of 'can.'
- Old schoolism: I know what libertarianism is, but I don't know what libertarian free will is.
Epistemology:
- Externalism about justification: no access, no problem!
- Knowledge without justification: deontic justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge-level warrant.
- Infallibilism about knowledge-level warrant: I couldn't be (K-level) warranted in believing a falsehood.
- Proper-functionalism: knowledge is true belief formed in the right (proper functional) way.
Style and Method:
- Analytic: clear, concise, precise, these are my goals in writing.
- Heroes: I strive to write like David Lewis, W.V.O. Quine, Peter van Inwagen, and Trenton Merricks.
- Chisholmian: define a term by giving truth conditions for an open sentence where it appears.
One must hold most philosophical opinions only tentatively, and this I do for nearly all of the above. But some opinions are more tentative than others; those are the underlined ones.
When I set out to write this post, I didn't expect the list to be this long. But there you have it: a tidy list of 'isms in my research interests. And I'll update tge list in a year or so. Hopefully it will change in that time and thus assure me of some sort of progress. =)
9 Comments:
Burglar at 7:00 PM said... Two questions:
1. Can you describe the kind of physicalism to which you currently ascribe?
2. Why do you think change in belief is a sign of progress?
Andrew Bailey at 8:03 PM said... 1. I would very much like for reductive physicalism to be true (all the way to type identity). But other commitments of mine preclude this. So something less austere will have to do.
2. I don't--at least, not in general. But in my case, a number of my beliefs stand in a certain tension (the obvious candidates: eternalism vs. endurantism, restricted composition vs. physicalism, Kantianism vs. MR compatibilism)
I'd like to resolve these tensions if I could, but I have a feeling that in time (and if I do my homework), I'll have to give up some of the above theses. That much would be progress, I'd think.
Alex at 6:59 AM said... Boo tenseless quantification. (I'm doing my best Ayer impression.)
Also, with respect to Quinean metaontology, you should say an x exists iff there is at least one of x. You must respect parallel construction: use singular subjects and singular verbs on both sides of the biconditional.
A better definition of endurantism: substances do not have proper temporal parts.
Did I already boo tenseless quantification?
Regarding a change of beliefs as being progress: one might consider a change in beliefs to constitute progress if (but not/and not only if) one "gets clearer" on what one believes, and comes to realize that one's former beliefs are absurd, or subject to grave difficulties.
Andrew Bailey at 7:15 AM said... Right. =)
Justin Capes at 12:30 PM said... I'm still of the mind that you'll have to leave either Kantianism, MR-compatibilism, or Frankfurt behind, though I'll hold out hope that you'll get rid of both of the former and retain the latter =-)
Justin Capes at 4:39 PM said... I think, too, that given your Kantianism your MR-compatibilism and your FW-incompatibilism are inconsistent. Here's the rough and ready argument: You accept the propositin that
(1) There is at least one person S who is morally blameworthy for something he has done
regardless of whether or not determinism is true. But it is plausible to believe that
(2) If S is morally blameworthy for what he has done, then he ought not to have done it.
Now, by the Kantian maxim that "ought" implies "can"--where "can" is the can of ability (i.e. the same 'can' involved in PAP--it follows that
(3) If S ought to have refrained from dong A, then S could have refrained from doing A.
Thus,
(4) If S is blameworthy for doing A, then S could have refrained from doing A,
regardless of whether determinism is true or not. Hence, S had free will with respect to A, regardless of whether determinism is true.
On another note, I'd like to know what influenced your move to physicalism.
at 5:37 PM said... They say... when you think you know everything, you get a bachelors. When you think you know everything with the help of a Prof, you get a Masters. When you realize that you know nothing, you get a PhD.
God Bless and Ciao!
Edward T. Babinski at 11:07 AM said... You are mixing theological affirmations with philosophical ones.
Your affirmation of the Trinity is of a different sort than your affirmation of general philosophical viewpoints.What philosophical questioning process by itself would have ever make you think "God" consisted of "three persons?" Your affirmation in this case is based on words found in first century writings, that you also believe to be inspired, and that you also believe your church holds the correct interpretation of.
Secondly, Platonism seems at odds with a scientific view of the world. Take the electromagnetic spectrum. The colors of light lay along a continuum, as do all other forms of measurable energy. The world in that sense, does not consist of easily defined archetypes, but of a spectrum of energies and sensations, and it would appear that the brains of different organisms perceive such energies and place them in "Platonic" fashion into discrete categories, just as honeybees see the ultra-violent range and we do not.
Or take the word, "chair." Is it a Platonic category? I can imagine a series running from chairs to sofas to divans. I can also imagine chairs with three, two and even one leg, or even no legs, such as a swing, or a cushion of air jets. What is a "chair" then in Platonism? And have you read David Stove's _The Plato Cult_?
Andrew Bailey at 11:49 AM said... Edward:
First: I'm not as sure as you seem to be that there is as clear a line between "philosophical" and "theological" bits of of reasoning. Nonetheless, there are "purely philosophical" grounds for belief in God and in a triune God. I have in mind especially Swinburne's a priori argument for the Trinity.
Second, the typical Platonist is already committed to their being uncountably many properties (one for every real number, say). Given this, I don't see anything odd about saying that there are at least a continuum--2^(aleph-null)--color properties.
And like you, I'm suspicious of any Platonism that talks of "easily defined archetypes." But no Platonist I know of would talk like that anyways.
