Objections De Jure and De Facto
- Posted by Andrew Bailey on Friday, May 18, 2007 at 10:50 AM
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3 Comments |
Alvin Plantinga distinguishes between de jure and de facto objections to Christian belief. De facto objections say that some Christian doctrine is false, while de jure objections say that some Christian doctrine is inappropriate, irrational, or unjustified. Plantinga also famously argues that a successful de jure objection requires a successful de facto objection. The truth of the matter about Christian belief is linked to its epistemic status in at least the following way: if it’s true than it’s warranted.
While this is an interesting defensive maneuver in its own right, I’m interested here in some broader applications. Let’s call it the Truth Connection. It strikes me that many objections to many things can be rebutted a Truth Connection move. Three examples:
After the recent death of Jerry Falwell, Christopher Hitchens (and others) have said many disparaging things about the man. And in response, one hears the objection that such remarks are inappropriate or unjustified given that Falwell is only recently deceased. These objections are de jure; they don’t claim that Hitchens is wrong in his remarks about Falwell, but rather that the remarks are somehow unacceptable for other reasons. It strikes me that Hitchens & Co. can make a defensive move here just like Plantinga's: If Falwell really is as bad a chap as I say he was (that is, if my words expressed truths), then it is permissible, and perhaps even obligatory to give the remarks I did. When a scoundrel dies, there is nothing inappropriate about saying she was a scoundrel. Let’s call a spade a spade.
There was a recent thread on the Leiter Reports about the appropriateness of certain behavioral rules some religious colleges set for their faculty (viz., requiring them to abstain from ‘homosexual behavior’). One commentator noted the Truth Connection and its relevance to the thread (and I don’t think the comment was given sufficient attention). If these colleges are right in the sexual ethics (and more broadly--the worldview) they seem to assume, then they may be also in their rights to impose the rules they do. The two questions are hard to separate.
In a debate a few nights ago, presidential candidate Ron Paul (referring to the 9/11 Commission Report) noted that the attacks of September 11 were blowback from American foreign policy, the consequences of a decade of bombing campaigns in Iraq. Giuliani (and a handful of pundits) objected in several ways, one of which claimed that Paul’s remarks were unpatriotic. The idea here seemed to be another de jure objection, that it is somehow inappropriate to criticize American foreign policy when employing the attacks as an example or item of evidence. I think the Truth Connection move is helpful to Paul. If Paul was right in saying the things he did, then he was also in his rights to so speak.
I like the Truth Connection. In general, I think it’s permissible, justified, and appropriate to assert truths. Not all truths require assertion, of course (some are too mundane, while others spell disaster when asserted), but in general, the ‘but I was right!’ defense strikes me as a good one.
3 Comments:
Noumena at 9:19 PM said... You seem to be switching between, first, a connection between truth and justification (a deontic and not necessarily epistemic notion) and a connection between truth and warrant (an epistemic and not necessarily deontic notion), and second, the connection used as a premiss and the connection presented as a conclusion.
Plantinga clearly has warrant in mind. He also has a story to tell about how, if p is true and believed, then p is known. Hence, he doesn't appeal to this connection, he argues for it; ie, the Truth Connection here is not a premiss, but rather a conclusion.
By contrast, when talking about Hitchens, Paul, &c., you want a connection between truth and justification, and you want to appeal to the Truth Connection as a premiss: p is true, therefore A is justified in asserting p.
But if justification is supposed to have any epistemic weight behind it at all, this is at least suspicious and at worst question-begging. If every proposition has the Truth Connection for justification, and justification brings along at least a little epistemic weight, then every true (and believable) proposition has at least a little epistemic weight. That's a little weird. If every proposition has the Truth Connection for justification and justification brings along enough epistemic weight, or every proposition has the Truth Connection for warrant, then you've made true belief sufficient for knowledge. That's a lot weird.
I think the most obvious way to avoid the weirdness is to deny that every proposition has some connection between truth and epistemic status. (Perhaps you could restrict the Truth Connection to propositions whose truthmakers have a fairly close causal connection to the agent's belief, as in Plantinga's argument.) But then you can't, in general, appeal to the Truth Connection as a defence.
Next, say you just get rid of any epistemic status. All propositions enjoy the Truth Connection for justification, but justification brings along no epistemic status whatsoever. On this move, I'm not sure what's left of justification. Is it just a matter of social mores? If that's the case, then why should p being true entail that it's socially appropriate or acceptable to assert p?
Stepping back a bit, here's a test case I think you should consider: Say Goldbach's Conjecture is true, and no-one has any strong warrant (under any rubric for warrant you like) for believing it to be either true or false. Do you really want to say that I'm justified in going around asserting that Goldbach's Conjecture is true?
at 1:13 PM said... Is it appropriate for me to tell someone that I find them ugly or stupid whenever it is a fact that I find them ugly or stupid?
Andrew Bailey at 1:21 PM said... Obviously not (hence the "in general" proviso) -- but if you were to defend the practice I'd think that the truth argument would be a good place to start. =)
