Articles

  • Incompatibilism and the Past - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [abstract]
    • There is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide-ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages.
  • No Bare Particulars - Philosophical Studies [abstract]
    • There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence.
  • The incompatibility of composition as identity, priority pluralism, and irreflexive grounding - Analytic Philosophy [abstract]
    • Some have it that wholes are, somehow, identical to their parts. This doctrine is as alluring as it is puzzling. But in this paper, I show that the doctrine is incompatible with two widely accepted theses. Something has to go.
  • No Pairing Problem (with J. Rasmussen and L. Van Horn) - Philosophical Studies [abstract]
    • Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim's Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim's Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can't be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We'll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim's Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim's Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim's case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim's argument against substance dualism fails.
  • Warrant Is Unique - Philosophical Studies [abstract]
    • Warrant is what fills the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. But a problem arises. Is there just one condition that satisfies this description? Suppose there isn't: can anything interesting be said about warrant after all? Call this the uniqueness problem. In this paper, I solve the problem. I examine one plausible argument that there is no one condition filling the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I then motivate and formulate revisions of the standard analysis of warrant. Given these revisions, I argue that there is, after all, exactly one warrant condition

Book Review

Work in progress

  • Papers in metaphysics and mind [details]
    • I have six papers (in metaphysics and philosophy of mind) under review at various journals. I here omit paper titles to preserve anonymous review.

Dissertation

  • Person and Animal [abstract]
    • This dissertation is a study in the nature of human persons. It explores and defends materialism, the thesis that we are wholly material beings. Materialism is widely held, but its status as orthodoxy is not well-founded. Materialists rarely argue for their position, sometimes contenting themselves with mockery of rival views; and they often don't take seriously the increasingly sophisticated objections of anti-materialists. The essays comprising this dissertation remedy this unfortunate situation. In them, I develop a novel case for materialism and answer some influential objections to the view.

    I begin by distinguishing three questions about the metaphysics of human nature and show how their answers fit into the broader project of ontological inquiry. Then, I advance two novel arguments for my preferred version of materialism---animalism, according to which we are animals or organisms. One argument exploits crowding problems that plague non-animalist views. Another shows that animalism best accommodates the moral data. I further argue for a priority principle according to which each of us thinks our thoughts in the primary and non-derivative sense and show that a number of non-animalist views are inconsistent with this principle. These considerations constitute a cumulative prima facie case both for materialism about human persons, and for a species of that doctrine, animalism.

    There are powerful objections to materialism. I spend the remainder of the essays developing and answering a few of these challenges. I first examine a class of objections to materialism that stem from reflection on some peculiar cases. I show that proponents of these objections have made a mistake in ignoring questions about composition (questions about when some things make up another). Finally, I argue that cases of supervenience failure do not tell against materialism. I articulate a version of materialism that is both thoroughly materialist and compatible with such cases. I show that this position is both tenable and stable.

    Successfully defended on August 19, 2011.

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Upcoming Presentations

  • The Elimination Argument - Central APA, 2012 [abstract]
    • Animalism is the view that we are animals: living, breathing, wholly material beings. Despite its considerable appeal, animalism has come under fire. Other philosophers have had much to say about objections to animalism that stem from reflection on personal identity over time. But one promising objection by Hud Hudson ('The Elimination Argument') has been overlooked. In this paper, I will remedy this situation and examine the Elimination Argument in some detail. I will contend that the Elimination Argument is both unsound and unmotivated. I will further argue that Hudson (and those sympathetic to Hudson's general views about the material world) may have no reason to believe one of its premises.

I am a postdoctoral fellow at Notre Dame, where I recently completed a Ph.D. in philosophy. My research is mostly in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind. I am interested in general questions about what things there are, what they are like, and what can be known of them. But I am especially interested in us human beings, and in our powers and our place in the world.

Teaching

  • S12: Death and Dying [description]
    • An intermediate-level course focusing on some questions about death, including: What is death? Does death harm those who die? Is it rational to fear death? Might we exist after death? What, if anything, makes killing wrong? When is killing permissible?
  • F11: Introduction to Philosophy [description]
    • An introductory course with both classical and contemporary readings. Topics covered include the existence of God, free will, human nature, knowledge, and an extended study of Descartes' Meditations.
  • S11: Introduction to Philosophy [description]
    • An introductory course with both classical and contemporary readings. Topics covered include the existence of God, free will, human nature, skepticism, and the demands of morality.

Resources

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